University of Massachusetts Amherst - Index Yearbook (Amherst, MA)

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more workers had so far complied with the 7 percent guideline. The question is how long we can expect labor to stay in line, he said. He didn ' t have to wait long to find out as the Teamsters Union began nationwide negotiations with the trucking industry. Teamster Presi- dent Frank Fitzsimmons stated pub- licly that high corporate profits made it unfair to ask his members to settle within the guidelines. The White House, aware that this was the first major test of the wage guidelines whose outcome was likely to affect the settlements of airline mechanics, electrical workers, rub- ber and auto workers, warned that it would seek deregulation of the trucking industry if the guidelines were exceeded. Deregulation would increase competition, possibly af- fecting the security of union mem- bers. Although the government relaxed this stance somewhat and indicated it would accept a settlement slightly higher than seven percent, talks broke down over the cost of living adjustment. A ten day strike fol- lowed. The union called a selective strike against 73 of the biggest com- panies, but management responded with a lock-out, shutting down 500 companies. The effects of the strike spread to the auto industry, particularly Chrysler, which laid off 84,000 work- ers. Autoworkers, however, were pleased to see a challenge to the guidelines coming before their own summer contract talks. The Teamsters ended the strike agreeing to a contract giving mem- bers an increase of at least 27 per- cent over three years. In what was viewed as an effort to save face, the White House praised the settlement. Alfred Kahn called it an important contribution to controlling infla- tion. Yet inflation continued at a rate of 15 percent per year; no company ever lost a government contract for exceeding the guidelines. Carter ' s popularity continued to drop, and speculation about having another Kennedy in the White House grew. Jim Gagne Sadat talks... Begin talks... PEACE TALKS... The grueling, bitter, antagonistic relationship between Israel and Egypt which has lasted for three decades has now diplomatically end- ed with the signing of the elusive peace treaty which will establish normal and friendly relations be- tween the two countries in the near future. The path to this historically signifi- cant agreement began in November 1977 with Egyptian President Anwar Sadat ' s unexpected visit to Jerusa- lem in hopes of settling Mid-East tensions. But the rising hopes of No- vember faded with time and the rift between the nations was once again established. A stalemate on critical issues was implanted, neither side wishing to probe action toward normative relations because everyone felt justi- fied in their stands. A move by Israel seemed appropriate because of Sa- dat ' s initiative but Israel remained firm to its constituents and stayed neutral. Sometimes the differenced heated up and verbal bickering by both parties, each blaming the other for the breakdown, often occurred in the press. As time and hope of a quick settle- ment vanished, the U.S. sought measures to bring the two parties back together. An invitation to a summit meeting at Camp David was extended to Israel and Egypt by President Jimmy Carter in August 1978 with the meetings to be held in September. Admittedly, the U.S. ad- ministration held little hope for an overall settlement, but a frame- work for peace was the ideal objec- tive. The main issues revolved around the West Bank of Israel, a region populated by Palestinians and con- trolled by Jordon before the Israe- lies seized it during the 1967 war, and the political destiny for the Pal- estinians, who wished an autono- mous state and who occupied the region. Sadat demanded the return of all territory while Menachem Be- gin, Prime Minister of Israel, re- mained adamant in not releasing all territory for security reasons. In the waning hours of the sched- uled 13 day conference, conces- sions were granted by Sadat and Be- gin allowing a positive step for alle- viation of basic differences, and open communication. Both parties praised the work of Carter in forcing the issue of peace by setting the framework. Under it, the parties agreed to: exercise Egyptian sover- eignty up to the recognized border; have Israel to withdraw from the 27

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Maroo Theodoras Divest! Early in the spring semester, a ral- ly involving about a third of the stu- dent population at Hampshire Col- lege took place, which ultimately forced the Board of Trustees to redi- vest, since the college had divested stock in corporations doing business in South Africa, only to reinvest lat- 7% Solution In the fall of 1978, with inflation threatening to run him out of office, President Jimmy Carter decided to fight back. He announced a volun- tary government program designed to slow down inflation by limiting wage and price increases. Wage raises were to be held to seven percent per year and prices were not to exceed the average of price increases over the past two years, a figure the government esti- mated at roughly 5.7%. Companies granting larger pay increases or rais- ing prices beyond the guidelines were supposed to lose government contracts. It didn ' t work. Carter ' s 7% solution was at- tacked by labor, which objected to government interference in collec- tive bargaining, particularly when it became evident that businesses were ignoring the price guidelines without penalty, yet using the wage er. At Amherst College in the fall of 1978, a large rally took place in front of the Black Cultural Center where a meeting of the Board of Trustees was going on. In spite of a number of workshops, educational forums and speakers, all of whom urged Am- herst College to divest, the trustees did not deem the issue im portant enough for them to include it as an item on their agenda. Hence, it was not the cross-burning provocation alone that subsequently precipitat- ed the take-over of the administra- tion building in the spirng, but also frustration on the part of organizers and students. Frustration which re- sulted from the stubborn attitude of the administration in light of strong demands by students that the col- lege divest more than $20 million in stocks. Similar views were expressed by a large segment of the student popu- lations at Mt. Holyoke and Smith Colleges, whose combined invest- ments totaled at least $50 million. The culminating event for the work done by the Southern Africa Liberation Support Committees of the various colleges was the South Africa Action Week, which started on April 4, continued for two weeks and featured a rally with speakers such as Prexy Nesbitt, Sean Gevarsi and U.S. Se nator Paul Tsongas, and oth- guidelines in an attempt to force un- ions to settle within the wage guide- lines. Meanwhile, every month brought a report of the rising cost of living, followed by a report of a drop in Carter ' s popularity amongst Ameri- can voters. Massachusetts Senator Edward Kennedy fueled the fire un- der Carter when he suggested in De- cember that the future of Carter and the Democratic Party was pegged to inflation and economic stability. The situation really heated up in the Spring as the expiration of major industrial contracts drew near. The Oil Chemical and Atomic Workers In- ternational Union was the first major union to bargain on a national basis under the guidelines. Surprisingly, they settled within the guidelines. But February brought further re- ports of inflation, the worst since the 1974 recession, and although the White House refused to publicly agree, private economists began predicting a recession. Inflation was not the only thing ris- ing. The Commerce Department re- leased figures showing that corpo- ers, all of whom strongly urged di- vestiture. During the year the movement gained momentum, involving more and more students. More action was planned to be directed in particular against Amherst, Smith and Mt. Ho- lyoke colleges. It was also important that South Africa Week of Action coincided with a week commemorating Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., and that both events were jointly organized. The organizers made a link between ra- cial oppression and economic ex- ploitation in the United States and Southern Africa. One example of this link is that many economic institutions such as banks and multi-national corpora- tions that take advantae of legal slave labor in Southern Africa, have for years fought unionization and have relined certain urban areas in the U.S., particularly black and His- panic neighborhoods. Evidence has shown (even by the admission of such important officials as former U.S. Ambassador to South Africa, Bowdler) that these economic ven- tures into South Africa strengthen, rather than weaken, the hand of facisim and racism in that country. They do virtually nothing to alleviate the economic and political plight of the black majority. Bheki Langa rate profits had jumped to 9.7 per- cent in the fourth quarter of 1978. This supported labor ' s charge that big business was cheating on the guidelines. AFL-CIO leader George Meany called it the grossest dem- onstration of profit-gouging since the opening days of the Korean War. The government ' s Council on Wage and Price Stability had written the price guidelines loosely, allowing most companies to find a way to evade them. The director of the council, Barry Bosworth, concluded, We were suckered. When even the government began to admit failure, Meany called for mandatory price controls, or at least an effective government program to monitor prices. Carter responded by asking for union help in monitoring prices, and Operation Price Watch was born. A stillbirth; no one has heard of it since. Despite widespread union scepti- cism of the program, inflation czar Alfred Kahn reported that 90 per- cent of contracts covering 1 ,000 or 26

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Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin embrace as President Carter applauds during a White House announcement that the two Middle East nations had agreed on the Camp David agreement. (UPI) Begin and Sadat toast each other at a state banquet Sadat held for Begin during a two-day visit to Egypt. (AP) (continued from page 27) Sinai; have a joint meeting between Israel, Egypt and Jordan to deter- mine the future of the West Bank and Gaza Strip self-rule with the eventual withdrawl of Israeli armed forces after five years and other stipulations concerning Egypt and Is- rael. Arab reaction in Syria, Libya, Alge- ria, South Yemen and from the Pal- estinian Liberation Organization strongly denounced the agreements calling them a stab in the heart of the Arab nation and a flagrant devi- ation from the common Arab strate- gy, a contradiction of Arab summit resolutions and a denial of Palestin- ian rights. Jordan expressed con- cern saying any peace which disre- gards the Palestinians would be false . . . with upheavals in the Arab world. At the time of the Camp David signing, Israel had refused any deal- ings with the PLO because Israel felt that the organization was a terrorist group not representative of the Pal- estinian people. This conflict of interest was a de- terrent along with the question of Israeli settlements in the West Bank, and on the fate of Jerusalem. Only three days after the framework was signed. Begin answered that he never promised Israeli withdrawal from existing West Bank settlements when the U.S. tried to pin him down to the language written in the text of the agreements. The stage was again set for dis- agreement, this time with linguistics as a barrier. The three month period within which a formal peace agreement was to be signed, passed. Israel ' s stance on the West Bank settle- ments disheartened Carter and those who thought peace was so near. On several occasions the talks were running smoothly, according to official comment, then were ab- ruptly dismantled with each side proclaiming fundamental differ- ences. While this jockeying was taking place, the Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to Begin and Sadat in Octo- ber. While domestic problems mount- ed with the montly inflation figures, gas increases and a rapidly declining popularity, Carter invited Begin to join him and Prime Minister Mustafa Khalil of Egypt to new negotiations in February 1979. Begin rebuffed the offer for new negotiations but did say that he would talk with Carter. At the meeting, Carter advanced new proposals in a desperate effort to salvage some type of accord be- tween Egypt and Israel. Begin re- mained open, saying negotiations needed a revision and I don ' t see any tragedy in it . . . ultimately there would be peace in the Mideast. That peace was finally reached on Monday March 26, 1979 after a bold decision by Carter to visit the Mid- east earlier in the month. The trip was conceived after the Israeli cabi- net approved suggestions Carter made to Begin while he was in Wash- ington. White House sources said that the president ' s trip was open- ended so that the prospects for peace do not dim and perhaps van- ish. One diplomatic source summed up the trip as this last ar- row in the president ' s quiver. He better not miss. Carter shuttled between Israel and Egypt and persuaded Sadat and Begin for a formal signing with the approval of their countries ' legisla- tive bodies. The major elements in- clude: — a surrender of the entire Sinai desert by Israel to Egypt, including settlements. — withdrawal of all military forces and air bases from the Sinai within three years and abandonment of El Arish, the largest Arab city on the Sinai within three months. — establishment of the pre-1948 boundary lines with the fate of Gaza to be determined in future negotia- tions. — normalized relations including economic and cultural, with free- dom of movement, an end to hostile propaganda and the building of nor- mal postal, telephone and highway communications. — exchange of ambassadors. — agreements to set goals for the completion of negotiations concern- ing the West Bank and Gaza Strip elections. — agreement of Egypt to sell Israel oil on non-discriminatory commer- cial terms. — a 15-year extension on guaran- teed Israeli oil supplies to the U.S. — establishment of negotiations for the fate of the West Bank and Gaza . although Israeli officials have indi- cated they would continue building of settlements. The important Palestinian ques- tion remains unresolved at this junc- ture. Begin is still holding the line, refusing to accept a Palestinian state on Israel ' s border. And the U.S. also does not recognize the PLO as representatives of the Pales- tinians until the PLO recognizes Isra- el ' s right to exist and accepts the United Nations Resolution declaring that right. Further negotiations on this sensitive issue are expected to follow the Camp David framework. The first visible sign of harmony has been recorded through the ef- forts of three nations. It is now the option of Mideast negotiators and leaders to implement that printed document that calls for peace. Art Simas