University of Michigan Law School - Quad Yearbook (Ann Arbor, MI)

Page 88 text:

of action, and ismtoo poor to pay for the services of a lawyer. But in Sllch Case the eighth principle enunciated covers the point. An attorney who is imbued with the true spirit of his profession will in any case, where a party desires to bring suit and he advises his client that he hasta good cause of action, plant the suit for him, perform the services and await the result. But it may be urged that this view leaves out the consideration of the poor lawyer instead of the poor client, and the poor lawyer awaiting for a case cannot afford to take it and await the result This begs the ques- tion. The poor lawyer anxious for business can receive no share until the judgment is obtained and collected, and so he might have as well agreed to prosecute for a reasonable fee to be paid when the fruits of the suit are realized. Another thing: a lawyer treating with a poor or impoverished client for a share in the result of the litigation as his compensation, occupies a position where he can, and generally does, drive a hard bargain. The poor client, on account of his poverty, is at his mercy, and his mercy is regulated by the same feeling which influences the money lender. It is that mercy which in the latter case has called from the legislature the enactment of stringent. laws against usury. The result of permitting lawyers to agreewith their client for a part of the property, or damages recovered, usually has, and will result in lawyers getting extravagant compensation, and out of all proportion to the services performed, where the suit terminates favorably. That which is above a just compensation-is something which the lawyer has taken from his client for nothing, and his retention of it is wrong in morals, whatever may be' his legal right to it. No one knows it better than he, and it cannot have other than a deleterious effect upon his character, lessening his sense of the dignity of his profes- sion, and placing a blight and stain upon his manhood. HA man can bear a world's contempt when he has that within him that says he is worthy. But when he contemns himself, there burns the hell . Every violation of the long-established, well-understood code of legal ethics has its effect upon the profession at large. lt detracts from their usefulness, it undermines the confidence of the people in their honestlf and iH'ECgi'i13y, and gives to the tongue of slander a poisoned shaft against the character of the whole body of lawyers. Phe inducement to planting the suit is different. ln the one C ' - - . . . 356 he acts after CX-3m1HHf1OH and deliberation, and after lie is

Page 87 text:

called champerty. By the Statute 33, Edward l, Vol. 2 Qr3o5j, it was enacted: Ch:uuperters, be they who move pleas or suits, or cause them to be moved by their own procurement or by others, and are at their proper costs to have part of the land in variance, or to have part of the gainsf, lilver since they were declared criminal acts under the statutes, maintenance, champerty, barratry and embracery have so continued in England, and in most of the United States until a recent date. But all such offences are now done away with in Michigan and in some of the other States, and the question arises whether it is now contrary to legal ethics to enter into an agreement with a client to institute or carry on a suit for a share of the spoils. It is no longer illegal. Ts it dishonorable? If such agreement to share in the spoils tends to debase the business of an advocate by making his profession depend upon a game of chance, if it tends to deprave his nature by inducing him to stir up litigation, encouraging law suits which have little or no merit in them, if the idea of running after clients and proposing to prosecute their claims for a share of the plunder, offends the high sense of honor which should charac- terize the profession in all his relations to society, then it is contrary to legal ethics, and contravenes that high code of honor which he is pledged to maintain. That it does belittle the lawyer in his own estimation and in the eyes of the public, cannot be gainsaid. The result of this practice is, and has been, that wheneverhan accident happens, causing death or personal injury, this class of attorneys hear of the injury before the surgeons do, and rush headlong for the scene, tumbling over each other in their haste to be the first on the ground, with a contract in their pocket already prepared for the injured person if he be not killed, or, if he is, then for the widow, if he have one, to sign-only leaving a blank to be filled, as to the share of the recovery the attorney shall have. This being filled in, the signature is obtained, and a suit promptly commenced, if the party refuses to settle at the attorneyis figures. Such an attorney never stops to inquire whether his client has a cause of action. He is taking the chances, .and banking upon the sympathies and preju- dices of a jury, if the defendant be a corporation. There can be no doubt but that such practice is unprofessional and contrary to legal ethics. ,Only one possible exception can be urged as an excuse. That is, where the party has a just and meritorious cause w

Page 89 text:

satislicd that his client has a meritorious case. In the other he determines to talqc the chances with the, motto as between himself and his client: ft l-Ieads, I win, tails, you lose . The great question in legal ethics is an old one, has been much discussed, and is still unsettled. It is this: ought a lawyer or advocate to espouse the cause of a client and either prosecute or defend a suit for him, when he conscientiously believes that his client ought not to prevail in his suit? This at once raises a moral question of conscience. It will be perceived that the subject has several bearings. There 'is a difference between taking thecase of a client to plant a suit, when the lawyer conscientiously believes ' that his client is in the wrong and ought not to recover, and where his client is a defendant in a suit, but relies upon a defence which is morally wrong. Again there is a difference between civil and crim- inal cases. In a civil cause it is hard to imagine a justification for planting a suit which the attorney believes to bemorally wrong, or -what is the same thing-which he conscientiously believes should be decided adversely to his client. In the first place it is hisduty . to advise his client that he has no case. If he does not do this he takes his money without consideration, and this is no better than robbery. If he does so advise his client, and, notwithstanding, his client wishes him to proceed and bring suit, he knows that his client is prompted by revenge, and he has no right to be an instrument in his hands for wrong and oppression. But suppose his client convinces him that it is to be a test case, and is to settle a legal principle not before passed upon by the Supreme Court of that State? Here, if it appears reasonable that there is a question in the case which has not been settled by the Supreme Court, although it does not appear to him certain, or even probable, that his client will win, he sought to entertain it, a than the court of last resort, ,for however wise, capable and honest ible that considerations may present nd not consider himself wiser a lawyer may be, it is poss themselves to the court p they may take an entirely different view of the law. A lawyer called of last resort that do not occur to him, or upon to defend a client in a civil suit cannot well refuse to do so. I-Ie has, however, the whole control and management of the defence ' e in his hands, and he has no right to permit his client to interpos a fraudulent defence, or one supported by suborned witnesses. Whenever he discovers that the cause that he has engaged in for his