United Colleges - Vox Yearbook (Winnipeg, Manitoba Canada)

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Cola salesmen, and the impoverished inhabit¬ ants of the area can continually contrast their position with that of the rich imperialist. On the other hand, Russians are not present in any large number, but are only represented by agents and promises, and no such unfavorable contrast can be made. Let us remember, how¬ ever, that few Middle Easterners understand or are even interested in the theoretical aspects of communism, but are more concerned with the immediate questions of land and bread. If the West has only arms and military pacts to offer in contrast to the land and bread offered by the communists the course for the Middle Eastern peasan is clear. There is another and equally important factor in the communist appeal in the Middle East. It is the problem that crops up everywhere; the state of Israel. As far as the Arab is concerned, the Jewish state was established in the centre of the Arab world by Western capitalism; the failure of the Arabs to stop this act and the results of the war clearly underscored by the presence of 800,000 refugees are all laid at the door of the United Nations and the West. The West, in its continued support of Israel to the disadvantage of the Arabs, leaves itself open to the possibility of losing the Middle East by de¬ fault. Let us now turn to the question of Western policy in the Middle East in an attempt to dis¬ cover what the West is doing and should do in order to develop the area and cultivate the friendship of the peoples, rather than to coerce them into becoming reluctant, and therefore use¬ less, allies. IV The West and the Middle East From what has already been suggested con¬ cerning the Middle East in relation to collective security and the relationship of Russia to the area, the pattern that emerges is clearly focused around two problems. Firstly, the social and economic problem expressed in the vast in¬ equalities of wealth and land, which is closely connected with Western imperialism and dollar diplomacy, and, secondly, the problem of Arab- Israel tensions. If the West is constructively and 6 Crossman, R. H. S .—Israel and the Arabs. New Statesman and Nation, page 169, February 14, 1953. 7. Shultz, L.— U. S.- Israel Crisis. The Nation, page 343, November 7, i953. clearly to indicate an interest in the Middle East for more than reason of military expediency, these two problems must be seriously taken in hand. Let us take these problems separately, not with any sanguine hopes that an absolute plan of solution can be produced, but rather with the intention of suggesting some of the steps that must be taken and the pitfalls that must be avoided. The problem of peace in the Middle East is, perhaps, the greatest of all the multifarious diffi¬ culties, for it can be argued that without peace there can be no stability; without stability, pro¬ grams of economic, social and political develop¬ ment, designed to produce social justice, would be ineffective. “On the Arab side the governing oligarchies will continue to divert attention from the social problem by keeping the anti- zionist fervor in a white heat, and then blaming the Jews and their Western imperialist backers for the miserable condition of their people” 6 ' On the Jewish side the fear of Arab hostility forces the state to maintain a huge army, as a constant drain on an already weak, unsound economy. The recent sale of jet planes by the British to all Middle Eastern states was hardly a measure designed to promote peace. The situation remains deadlocked with little sign of improvement. The Arabs demand an “honorable” settlement, which means a solution to the refugee problem, before peace negotia¬ tions are begun. The Jews, logically enough, say that the refugee problem can only come as part of an overall agreement. Both sides remain in¬ transigent. The recent tragedy of Kibya serves to highlight the fact that the present truce arrangements are no substitute for peace as the Nation declares “dicussions looking towards a settlement can no longer be delayed”. (,) It is in the interest not only of the Jews and Arabs, but of world peace, that a settlement should be arrived at. There is, however, no pat formula for breaking this deadlock. One thing that must be avoided is a forced settlement by Britain and the United States alone. Recent attempts by the State Department at Washing¬ ton to appease the Arabs, by cutting off aid to the Jews for a brief period, is merely another step in the pattern of placing military expedi¬ ency before principle. Perhaps the best way of influencing both the Jews and the Arabs is to show that we have a genuine interest in the people of the area, and not just in the strategic 20

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but has in fact for its “raison d’etre” opposition to and defence against the state of Israel. Even in this limited aim it has proved ineffective. The military weakness of the League was clearly indicated by the fact that the only victorious Arab force in the Arab-Israel war was the com¬ pletely British-trained and subsidized force, known as the Arab Legion of Jordan. Inside the League there are many tensions, including the traditional Hashimite-Saud frictions, the fear of some nations that the League will become the instrument of the Greater Syria movement; hos¬ tility towards Jordan due to that country’s gains in the war with the Jews, and perhaps most im¬ portant, fear and jealousy of Egyptian “leader¬ ship”. From a practical point of view then, it it appears that a military pact in the Middle East is not feasible. There are, however, even better reasons for opposing such a move. I have tried to indicate that there are at least two general problems in the Middle East of more concern. A British Editor recently wrote: “So long as Britain and America, exclusively concerned with their mili¬ tary interests in this area, permit Arab refugees to rot, and show no interest whatever in Middle Eastern development”, (1) the difficulties of Jews and Arabs, of pasha and fellahin, of oil and social security will remain unsolved until the forces become explosive. The present bent of our policy is well illustrated by the British attitude to Jordan. Of the grant of ten million dollars that the British Conservative government has earmarked for Jordan, nine million goes to the Arab Legion, one million to economic develop¬ ment. This is nothing more than the continua¬ tion of the power politics which has made the West the “bete noire” of almost every Middle Eastern state. We must make up our minds that friendship can never be achieved in the Middle East if we continue to keep an army there against the will of the people, or exploit the oil resources in the area while leaving its inhabit¬ ants destitute and diseased. Closely connected with the thesis that a Middle East Defence Pact should not be an immediate aim of the West is the attitude of the U.S.S.R. to the Middle East and the com¬ munist influence in that area. 4. Martin, K .—Can Israel Survive? The New Statesman and Nation, January 28, 1953. 5. Quoted by Towster, J .—Russia Persistent Strategic De¬ mands. Current History, Vol. 21, No. 119, July 1951, page 2 in Communism and the Middle East The policy of Russia in the Middle East today is most difficult to discern, though it appears to be less openly aggressive than it was in the early years after World War II. It must be remembered that as a strategic factor the Middle East, due to its proximity to the Soviet Union, is of greater importance to Russia than to the West. Under any circumstances we would not find Russia’s attitude to the Middle East as one of neutrality. Certainly Russia is pleased to see the West experiencing difficulties in the Middle East, but we must not make the mistake of thinking that there is a communist behind every nationalist outburst. Russian aspirations in the Middle East have a long history, and it is difficult to deny that the communist rulers of Russia have fallen heir to the Czar’s desire to control the egress from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean. Warm water ports are just as necessary to Communist Russia as they were to Czarist Russia. The presence of about half the world’s supply of oil reserves in the area only serves to increase its attraction to Russia, as to the West. In November, 1940, when Russia was negotiating with Germany, Molotov maintained that Soviet security in the Black Sea area demanded that “a base for the land and naval forces of the U.S.S.R. within the range of the Bosphorous and the Dardanelles” and “that the area south of Batum and Baku in the general direction of the Persian Gulf must be recog¬ nized as the centre of the aspirations of the Soviet Union” 4 5 ' Iran situated as it is, on the sofe underbelly of the Soviet Union, is then of strategic value to Russia as well as the West. Russia’s policy in the Middle East has, how¬ ever, been propaganda rather than direct aggres¬ sion and this propaganda has fallen upon fertile ground. It has a powerful appeal because it promises to end the two great grievances of the Middle East—foreign exploitation and unfair distribution of wealth, for which in both cases the West is wholly or in part responsible. In countries where the average annual income is one hundred dollars, and where attention is continually focused on foreign exploitation, communism should make great strides. The Rus¬ sians have yet another advantage. Westerners are present everywhere in the Middle East, whether in the form of oil magnates or Coca- 19

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value of the Middle East. This will be difficult, particularly with the Arab, who “blames the United Nations for his plight, feeling that its intervention prevented the realization of his hopes for an independent Palestine. He blames the British for allowing Jewish strength to grow prior to May 15, 1948, and for allegedly prevent¬ ing the Arab Legion from following up its vic¬ tories over the armies of Israel. He bitterly blames the United States for its support of Israel”. (8) Neither British nor the United States are treated without suspicion in the Middle East and in fact the United States has succeeded in five years in doing what took Britain thirty years, namely, to antagonize the Middle East¬ erners. Though the proble mseems almost impossible, the West must not despair. “Israel has made no secret of its desire and need for peace. The Arab world needs it just as urgently, and Western security is tied up in it inextricably”. (0 Leader¬ ship in producing a peace settlement must be taken by the Big Powers, who up to the present have made no sustained, positive and construc¬ tive attempt to decrease Arab-Israel tensions, let alone promote a peace settlement. But this leadership must be exerted through the too often forgotten agency of the United Nations. We must return to the position of President Truman, when in a 6peech on April 16, 1946, he said: “No country, great or small, has legitimate interest in the Near East which cannot be recon¬ ciled with the interests of other nations through the United Nations” 10 ’ Only through greater emphasis on the United Nations can the stigma of imperialism be removed from benevolent attempts by the West to aid in the development of the Middle Eastern area into stable nations which can aid in the cause of maintaining peace throughout the world. If at the same time as the United Nations is taking leadership in initiating peace negotia¬ tions, a carefully planned program of economic development is begun, a sound basis for sane nationalism in the Middle East can be laid. We in Egypt. “Decency and selflessness, vigorous 8. Richardson, C. B.— The Refugee Problem. Proceedings of the American Academy of Political Science, Vol. xxiv, No. 4, January 1952. 9. Ibid.— Nation, page 344. 10. Quoted by Black, C. E.— Old Problems in New Hands. Current History, Vol. 21, No. 119, July 1951, page 29. 11. Issawi, C.— Prospects of Economic Development in the Middle East. Procedings of the American Academy of Political Science, page 29, January 1952. 12. Ibid. Stevenson, A. E., page 39. must keep clearly in mind that at present “the greater part of the land belongs to absentee landlords who let it out on short leases, which deprives the share-croppers of any incentive to introduce improvements” 11 ’ Leaders of the Middle Eastern nations must follow on their own initiative or on urging from United Nations technical advisors, the example set by Neguib land reforms, relentless attacks on corruption, economic control measures, political house clean¬ ing and social improvement have won Neguib widespread public support and given Egypt a new sense of national pride, purpose and hope” 12 ’ A program of this nature is most neces¬ sary to fill the vacuum that will be left after the Middle East is rid of foreign encroachments. Iran provides a good contrast to Egypt, for as someone has observed acutely “Mossadeq failed because he succeeded”. He came to power on the swell of a great wave of nationalism, gained national control for Iranian oil, but today finds himself on trial for his life. He lost public sup¬ port because nationalization of oil did not pro¬ duce the expected result and he failed to turn nationalistic ferver into constructive channels, such as the much-needed land reforms. Accompanying land reform irrigation is neces¬ sary, for the limiting factor in the Middle East is not land but water. Through planned irriga¬ tion developments, much of the land, now un¬ productive, can be fertile, making the refugee re-settlement problem considerably less difficult, as well as greatly raising the standard of living in many of the countries. Up to the present foreign influence in the Middle East has more often than not been exercised to block neces¬ sary reform and hold up progress, and more im¬ portant has provided an irritant that has detract¬ ed from the basic social and economic problems. By a greater emphasis on the United Nations, and a willingness on the part of the West to spend money for constructive social ends, rather than destructive military ones, reactionary policies can be reversed. Much of the initiative in such a combined pro¬ gram of peace negotiations and economic de¬ velopment must rest with the United Nations. However, the final responsibility must rest with the Middle Eastern people, for as a former pre¬ sident of the American University at Beirut points out “If we try to reform the Middle East by coercing members of the older generation, 21