United Colleges - Vox Yearbook (Winnipeg, Manitoba Canada)

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but has in fact for its “raison d’etre” opposition to and defence against the state of Israel. Even in this limited aim it has proved ineffective. The military weakness of the League was clearly indicated by the fact that the only victorious Arab force in the Arab-Israel war was the com¬ pletely British-trained and subsidized force, known as the Arab Legion of Jordan. Inside the League there are many tensions, including the traditional Hashimite-Saud frictions, the fear of some nations that the League will become the instrument of the Greater Syria movement; hos¬ tility towards Jordan due to that country’s gains in the war with the Jews, and perhaps most im¬ portant, fear and jealousy of Egyptian “leader¬ ship”. From a practical point of view then, it it appears that a military pact in the Middle East is not feasible. There are, however, even better reasons for opposing such a move. I have tried to indicate that there are at least two general problems in the Middle East of more concern. A British Editor recently wrote: “So long as Britain and America, exclusively concerned with their mili¬ tary interests in this area, permit Arab refugees to rot, and show no interest whatever in Middle Eastern development”, (1) the difficulties of Jews and Arabs, of pasha and fellahin, of oil and social security will remain unsolved until the forces become explosive. The present bent of our policy is well illustrated by the British attitude to Jordan. Of the grant of ten million dollars that the British Conservative government has earmarked for Jordan, nine million goes to the Arab Legion, one million to economic develop¬ ment. This is nothing more than the continua¬ tion of the power politics which has made the West the “bete noire” of almost every Middle Eastern state. We must make up our minds that friendship can never be achieved in the Middle East if we continue to keep an army there against the will of the people, or exploit the oil resources in the area while leaving its inhabit¬ ants destitute and diseased. Closely connected with the thesis that a Middle East Defence Pact should not be an immediate aim of the West is the attitude of the U.S.S.R. to the Middle East and the com¬ munist influence in that area. 4. Martin, K .—Can Israel Survive? The New Statesman and Nation, January 28, 1953. 5. Quoted by Towster, J .—Russia Persistent Strategic De¬ mands. Current History, Vol. 21, No. 119, July 1951, page 2 in Communism and the Middle East The policy of Russia in the Middle East today is most difficult to discern, though it appears to be less openly aggressive than it was in the early years after World War II. It must be remembered that as a strategic factor the Middle East, due to its proximity to the Soviet Union, is of greater importance to Russia than to the West. Under any circumstances we would not find Russia’s attitude to the Middle East as one of neutrality. Certainly Russia is pleased to see the West experiencing difficulties in the Middle East, but we must not make the mistake of thinking that there is a communist behind every nationalist outburst. Russian aspirations in the Middle East have a long history, and it is difficult to deny that the communist rulers of Russia have fallen heir to the Czar’s desire to control the egress from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean. Warm water ports are just as necessary to Communist Russia as they were to Czarist Russia. The presence of about half the world’s supply of oil reserves in the area only serves to increase its attraction to Russia, as to the West. In November, 1940, when Russia was negotiating with Germany, Molotov maintained that Soviet security in the Black Sea area demanded that “a base for the land and naval forces of the U.S.S.R. within the range of the Bosphorous and the Dardanelles” and “that the area south of Batum and Baku in the general direction of the Persian Gulf must be recog¬ nized as the centre of the aspirations of the Soviet Union” 4 5 ' Iran situated as it is, on the sofe underbelly of the Soviet Union, is then of strategic value to Russia as well as the West. Russia’s policy in the Middle East has, how¬ ever, been propaganda rather than direct aggres¬ sion and this propaganda has fallen upon fertile ground. It has a powerful appeal because it promises to end the two great grievances of the Middle East—foreign exploitation and unfair distribution of wealth, for which in both cases the West is wholly or in part responsible. In countries where the average annual income is one hundred dollars, and where attention is continually focused on foreign exploitation, communism should make great strides. The Rus¬ sians have yet another advantage. Westerners are present everywhere in the Middle East, whether in the form of oil magnates or Coca- 19

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West who claim to be the repositories of the liberal tradition it should also be the element of most concern. We should not perhaps concern ourselves with the social problems to the total exclusion of oil and strategy, but we must re¬ member that the social problem is fundamental to all others. Have we learned nothing from our experience with China, where we supported reaction to the exclusion of social justice and came out on the very short end, with nothing to show for our efforts but troublesome factions in Formosa and North Burma and a badly- stained reputation in Asia. The communist tactic is to pose as the champion of nationalism; it has not created the forces of upheaval, in fact the West is far more responsible for them, but Russia is trying to give direction to these forces. This policy has succeeded in China and may well succeed elsewhere, unless we are prepared to accept a new type of policy, one that is con¬ cerned with liberality and social justice, as opposed to placing all our faith in the pashas and reaction. We must remember that we think of communism in a different light than those peoples of under-developed countries; we think of it in terms of what we are going to lose; more backward people think of it in terms of what they have to gain—especially when they have nothing to lose. There are other phases of Middle Eastern nationalism which bear on external problems, and which we must look at briefly before turn¬ ing to the question of collective security. Per¬ haps the most important is that of the state of Israel, set squarely in the middle of a hostile Arab world. The presence of the Jewish nation, placed there as the Arabs claim, by western capitalism, is an irritating thorn in the Arabs’ side; as great as the problem of foreign enclaves in such countries as Egypt and Iran. It is a prime stimulus to nationalist fervor and chaun- vinism in the Arab states, and particularly in those countries where refugees are settled. Speaking strictly of external affairs the Arab- Israel question is the greatest source of irrita¬ tion and instability in the Middle East today. One further stimulant to nationalism in the Middle East today is the fact that even in the countries where independence has been gained, there is sympathy for countries in the area which remain under foreign domination. Though our geographic limits have left North Africa, Turkey, and Pakistan out of our discussion, let us remember that in reality they are not ex¬ cluded from the world of the Middle East. North Africa provides examples of continued foreign domination, while India provides an example of what an Asian nation can do when released from imperial control and secondly an example of the liberality of the west. When the history of the British Labour government is written, its grant of independence to India will rank high in its list of accomplishments, just as its reluctance to leave Egypt will no doubt be judged as one of the shortcomings. With these all too general observations about Middle Eastern nationalism in our minds, let us now turn to the question of collective security. II Colective Security The fundamental problem in terms of external issues in the Middle East is the question of Arab- Israel hostility. The problem pervades the atmosphere of the whole area and has a direct bearing on every other problem. Within the context of this hostility and the pressing social and economic injustices, it is neither feasible, practical, nor desirable to form any Middle Eastern Defence Pact. From a practical point of view a Middle East¬ ern Defence pact which would include both Arabs and Jews would be impossible at the present time for neither Jews nor Arabs would find the suggestion acceptable. A defence pact made up of only the Arab states is objectionable for several reasons. Firstly, to arm the Arabs to the exclusion of the Jews would only increase the very great tension which now exists, with the increased possibility of the renewal of the Arab-Israel war. Secondly, any such past with¬ out a tremendous amount of western aid would be technically weak, and even given this aid it would remain a doubtful quantity due to local jealousy and antagonism. A third reason, and one that clearly indicates the truth in the first two, is the fact that such a pact already exists in the form of the Arab League. Let us look for a moment at this pact between the Arab states which has been in existence since March, 1945, and has already demonstrated clearly the inherent weaknesses of such a plan. Seven Arab states are members of the Arab League, which was ostensibly constituted as a means of co-operation among the member states 18

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Cola salesmen, and the impoverished inhabit¬ ants of the area can continually contrast their position with that of the rich imperialist. On the other hand, Russians are not present in any large number, but are only represented by agents and promises, and no such unfavorable contrast can be made. Let us remember, how¬ ever, that few Middle Easterners understand or are even interested in the theoretical aspects of communism, but are more concerned with the immediate questions of land and bread. If the West has only arms and military pacts to offer in contrast to the land and bread offered by the communists the course for the Middle Eastern peasan is clear. There is another and equally important factor in the communist appeal in the Middle East. It is the problem that crops up everywhere; the state of Israel. As far as the Arab is concerned, the Jewish state was established in the centre of the Arab world by Western capitalism; the failure of the Arabs to stop this act and the results of the war clearly underscored by the presence of 800,000 refugees are all laid at the door of the United Nations and the West. The West, in its continued support of Israel to the disadvantage of the Arabs, leaves itself open to the possibility of losing the Middle East by de¬ fault. Let us now turn to the question of Western policy in the Middle East in an attempt to dis¬ cover what the West is doing and should do in order to develop the area and cultivate the friendship of the peoples, rather than to coerce them into becoming reluctant, and therefore use¬ less, allies. IV The West and the Middle East From what has already been suggested con¬ cerning the Middle East in relation to collective security and the relationship of Russia to the area, the pattern that emerges is clearly focused around two problems. Firstly, the social and economic problem expressed in the vast in¬ equalities of wealth and land, which is closely connected with Western imperialism and dollar diplomacy, and, secondly, the problem of Arab- Israel tensions. If the West is constructively and 6 Crossman, R. H. S .—Israel and the Arabs. New Statesman and Nation, page 169, February 14, 1953. 7. Shultz, L.— U. S.- Israel Crisis. The Nation, page 343, November 7, i953. clearly to indicate an interest in the Middle East for more than reason of military expediency, these two problems must be seriously taken in hand. Let us take these problems separately, not with any sanguine hopes that an absolute plan of solution can be produced, but rather with the intention of suggesting some of the steps that must be taken and the pitfalls that must be avoided. The problem of peace in the Middle East is, perhaps, the greatest of all the multifarious diffi¬ culties, for it can be argued that without peace there can be no stability; without stability, pro¬ grams of economic, social and political develop¬ ment, designed to produce social justice, would be ineffective. “On the Arab side the governing oligarchies will continue to divert attention from the social problem by keeping the anti- zionist fervor in a white heat, and then blaming the Jews and their Western imperialist backers for the miserable condition of their people” 6 ' On the Jewish side the fear of Arab hostility forces the state to maintain a huge army, as a constant drain on an already weak, unsound economy. The recent sale of jet planes by the British to all Middle Eastern states was hardly a measure designed to promote peace. The situation remains deadlocked with little sign of improvement. The Arabs demand an “honorable” settlement, which means a solution to the refugee problem, before peace negotia¬ tions are begun. The Jews, logically enough, say that the refugee problem can only come as part of an overall agreement. Both sides remain in¬ transigent. The recent tragedy of Kibya serves to highlight the fact that the present truce arrangements are no substitute for peace as the Nation declares “dicussions looking towards a settlement can no longer be delayed”. (,) It is in the interest not only of the Jews and Arabs, but of world peace, that a settlement should be arrived at. There is, however, no pat formula for breaking this deadlock. One thing that must be avoided is a forced settlement by Britain and the United States alone. Recent attempts by the State Department at Washing¬ ton to appease the Arabs, by cutting off aid to the Jews for a brief period, is merely another step in the pattern of placing military expedi¬ ency before principle. Perhaps the best way of influencing both the Jews and the Arabs is to show that we have a genuine interest in the people of the area, and not just in the strategic 20