United Colleges - Vox Yearbook (Winnipeg, Manitoba Canada)

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West who claim to be the repositories of the liberal tradition it should also be the element of most concern. We should not perhaps concern ourselves with the social problems to the total exclusion of oil and strategy, but we must re¬ member that the social problem is fundamental to all others. Have we learned nothing from our experience with China, where we supported reaction to the exclusion of social justice and came out on the very short end, with nothing to show for our efforts but troublesome factions in Formosa and North Burma and a badly- stained reputation in Asia. The communist tactic is to pose as the champion of nationalism; it has not created the forces of upheaval, in fact the West is far more responsible for them, but Russia is trying to give direction to these forces. This policy has succeeded in China and may well succeed elsewhere, unless we are prepared to accept a new type of policy, one that is con¬ cerned with liberality and social justice, as opposed to placing all our faith in the pashas and reaction. We must remember that we think of communism in a different light than those peoples of under-developed countries; we think of it in terms of what we are going to lose; more backward people think of it in terms of what they have to gain—especially when they have nothing to lose. There are other phases of Middle Eastern nationalism which bear on external problems, and which we must look at briefly before turn¬ ing to the question of collective security. Per¬ haps the most important is that of the state of Israel, set squarely in the middle of a hostile Arab world. The presence of the Jewish nation, placed there as the Arabs claim, by western capitalism, is an irritating thorn in the Arabs’ side; as great as the problem of foreign enclaves in such countries as Egypt and Iran. It is a prime stimulus to nationalist fervor and chaun- vinism in the Arab states, and particularly in those countries where refugees are settled. Speaking strictly of external affairs the Arab- Israel question is the greatest source of irrita¬ tion and instability in the Middle East today. One further stimulant to nationalism in the Middle East today is the fact that even in the countries where independence has been gained, there is sympathy for countries in the area which remain under foreign domination. Though our geographic limits have left North Africa, Turkey, and Pakistan out of our discussion, let us remember that in reality they are not ex¬ cluded from the world of the Middle East. North Africa provides examples of continued foreign domination, while India provides an example of what an Asian nation can do when released from imperial control and secondly an example of the liberality of the west. When the history of the British Labour government is written, its grant of independence to India will rank high in its list of accomplishments, just as its reluctance to leave Egypt will no doubt be judged as one of the shortcomings. With these all too general observations about Middle Eastern nationalism in our minds, let us now turn to the question of collective security. II Colective Security The fundamental problem in terms of external issues in the Middle East is the question of Arab- Israel hostility. The problem pervades the atmosphere of the whole area and has a direct bearing on every other problem. Within the context of this hostility and the pressing social and economic injustices, it is neither feasible, practical, nor desirable to form any Middle Eastern Defence Pact. From a practical point of view a Middle East¬ ern Defence pact which would include both Arabs and Jews would be impossible at the present time for neither Jews nor Arabs would find the suggestion acceptable. A defence pact made up of only the Arab states is objectionable for several reasons. Firstly, to arm the Arabs to the exclusion of the Jews would only increase the very great tension which now exists, with the increased possibility of the renewal of the Arab-Israel war. Secondly, any such past with¬ out a tremendous amount of western aid would be technically weak, and even given this aid it would remain a doubtful quantity due to local jealousy and antagonism. A third reason, and one that clearly indicates the truth in the first two, is the fact that such a pact already exists in the form of the Arab League. Let us look for a moment at this pact between the Arab states which has been in existence since March, 1945, and has already demonstrated clearly the inherent weaknesses of such a plan. Seven Arab states are members of the Arab League, which was ostensibly constituted as a means of co-operation among the member states 18

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UNITED MacALESTER CONFERENCE Nationalism in the Middle East GENERAL EXTERNAL PROBLEMS NATIONAL AND EXTERNAL PROBLEMS CPHE long slumbering Middle East is awake to- ■ - day, shaking off the incubus of surviving colonialism, and seething with nationalistic fer¬ ment. Nationalism in the Middle East is not, however, an entirely recent characteristic. It has, nevertheless, reached a new and climatic pitch since the Second World War. The time has now arrived, if it is not already too late, for the nations of the world to face this problem realis¬ tically, over which they have procrastinated and offered piecemeal solutions of expediency since the fall of the Ottoman Empire. The general attitude towards the growth of Middle Eastern nationalism has been clearly expressed by a former American Ambassador to Iran: “There would be no great concern about the upsurging of nationalism in the Middle East were it not for its geographic position and its great resources of oil”. (,) In short this means that the interest of the West in the problem of the Middle East is purely a matter of self-interest and expediency; we need oil and we need the area for reasons of strategy, or, conversely, we are interested mainly in keeping Russia from obtaining these advantages. If this is the fundamental tenet of Western policy in the Middle East, and the events of the past decade would indicate that it is, then the time has come for a careful re¬ examination of our policy. Let us look for a moment at what this inde¬ finable word “nationalism” means in terms of external problems of the Middle East. National¬ ism to Middle Easterners means many different things: it means a chance to stand on their own 1. Grady, H. F.— Tensions in the Middle East with Particular Reference to Iran . Page 114. Proceedings of the American Academy of Political Science. Vol. XXIV, No. 4, January 1952. 2. Munroe, E.— Pink Communism in the Middle East . N. Y. Times Magazine, July, 7, 1952. 3. Stevenson, A. E.— No Peace for Israel , page 34. Look, August 11, 1953. feet, to govern themselves and, as a result of this, to develop their own resources; it means a chance to prove that colour of skin, difference of race and religion have nothing to do with their right to walk with self-respect among their fellowmen in the world. Nationalism to them means the end of legalized inferiority. This, of course, is a great over-simplification, for nationalism is so complex that it has been used to describe everything from xenophobia to com¬ munism, from patriotism to chauvinism. In speaking of the nationalist movements in the Middle East one writer has said: “Everyone is someone’s communist”. 2) This, of course, is ap¬ plicable beyond the Middle East. To complicate matters even further, national¬ ism in the Middle East means different things to different classes and, as we all know, the differ¬ ence between pasha and fellahin is both very great and very deplorable. To the upper classes nationalism has become a weapon in the hands of reaction; the foreigner has become the whip¬ ping boy while the social problems of the vari¬ ous countries have been neglected. The upper classes support the growth of nationalism be¬ cause its obscures the true causes of social and economic evils, and it is a successful policy be¬ cause the hatred of imperialism in its many nefarious forms is deeply imbedded in the minds of the indigent populations of the Arab world. One American observer describes the problem in this way: “The Arab nations face the same staggering social, economic and political pro¬ blems as the new Asia: ignorance, disease, feudalism, instability. These are the real pro¬ blems, but ‘imperialism’ and ‘injustice’ are the universal pre-occupations”. 1 2 (3) This is not only the most explosive element in the Middle East, but for the nations of the 17

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but has in fact for its “raison d’etre” opposition to and defence against the state of Israel. Even in this limited aim it has proved ineffective. The military weakness of the League was clearly indicated by the fact that the only victorious Arab force in the Arab-Israel war was the com¬ pletely British-trained and subsidized force, known as the Arab Legion of Jordan. Inside the League there are many tensions, including the traditional Hashimite-Saud frictions, the fear of some nations that the League will become the instrument of the Greater Syria movement; hos¬ tility towards Jordan due to that country’s gains in the war with the Jews, and perhaps most im¬ portant, fear and jealousy of Egyptian “leader¬ ship”. From a practical point of view then, it it appears that a military pact in the Middle East is not feasible. There are, however, even better reasons for opposing such a move. I have tried to indicate that there are at least two general problems in the Middle East of more concern. A British Editor recently wrote: “So long as Britain and America, exclusively concerned with their mili¬ tary interests in this area, permit Arab refugees to rot, and show no interest whatever in Middle Eastern development”, (1) the difficulties of Jews and Arabs, of pasha and fellahin, of oil and social security will remain unsolved until the forces become explosive. The present bent of our policy is well illustrated by the British attitude to Jordan. Of the grant of ten million dollars that the British Conservative government has earmarked for Jordan, nine million goes to the Arab Legion, one million to economic develop¬ ment. This is nothing more than the continua¬ tion of the power politics which has made the West the “bete noire” of almost every Middle Eastern state. We must make up our minds that friendship can never be achieved in the Middle East if we continue to keep an army there against the will of the people, or exploit the oil resources in the area while leaving its inhabit¬ ants destitute and diseased. Closely connected with the thesis that a Middle East Defence Pact should not be an immediate aim of the West is the attitude of the U.S.S.R. to the Middle East and the com¬ munist influence in that area. 4. Martin, K .—Can Israel Survive? The New Statesman and Nation, January 28, 1953. 5. Quoted by Towster, J .—Russia Persistent Strategic De¬ mands. Current History, Vol. 21, No. 119, July 1951, page 2 in Communism and the Middle East The policy of Russia in the Middle East today is most difficult to discern, though it appears to be less openly aggressive than it was in the early years after World War II. It must be remembered that as a strategic factor the Middle East, due to its proximity to the Soviet Union, is of greater importance to Russia than to the West. Under any circumstances we would not find Russia’s attitude to the Middle East as one of neutrality. Certainly Russia is pleased to see the West experiencing difficulties in the Middle East, but we must not make the mistake of thinking that there is a communist behind every nationalist outburst. Russian aspirations in the Middle East have a long history, and it is difficult to deny that the communist rulers of Russia have fallen heir to the Czar’s desire to control the egress from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean. Warm water ports are just as necessary to Communist Russia as they were to Czarist Russia. The presence of about half the world’s supply of oil reserves in the area only serves to increase its attraction to Russia, as to the West. In November, 1940, when Russia was negotiating with Germany, Molotov maintained that Soviet security in the Black Sea area demanded that “a base for the land and naval forces of the U.S.S.R. within the range of the Bosphorous and the Dardanelles” and “that the area south of Batum and Baku in the general direction of the Persian Gulf must be recog¬ nized as the centre of the aspirations of the Soviet Union” 4 5 ' Iran situated as it is, on the sofe underbelly of the Soviet Union, is then of strategic value to Russia as well as the West. Russia’s policy in the Middle East has, how¬ ever, been propaganda rather than direct aggres¬ sion and this propaganda has fallen upon fertile ground. It has a powerful appeal because it promises to end the two great grievances of the Middle East—foreign exploitation and unfair distribution of wealth, for which in both cases the West is wholly or in part responsible. In countries where the average annual income is one hundred dollars, and where attention is continually focused on foreign exploitation, communism should make great strides. The Rus¬ sians have yet another advantage. Westerners are present everywhere in the Middle East, whether in the form of oil magnates or Coca- 19