St Ignatius College - Ignatian Yearbook (San Francisco, CA)

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WHY MUST I BE 'MORAL? . 85 gard the fact that virtue and vice are objective realities and not subjective feelings. That was one of the great faults with the men I was arguing with. They tried to explain morality by instinct, pleasure, usefulness, etc., and entirely neglected the fact that there was something in the act com- mitted that influenced its goodness or badness. However the principal reason I asked that seeming simple question was be- cause I knew all those men were atheists. What's atheism got to do with it? I asked. Just this. Unless you acknowledge a God, you can have no such a thing as morality. That's a very broad statement to make, I replied. Granted: but nevertheless it is true. The reason is briefly this: Being moral is nothing but keeping the moral law. Now there can be no such thing as a law without a lawgiverg' Hence, when we admit a law, we implicitly aflirm the existence of someone who has promulgated it. This per- son can be either man or God. If man, he may be taken singly or collectively. If singly, each individual could for- mulate his own particular code of ethics, and the result would be a chaos of conflicting virtues and vices, man could in this supposition violate and change the moral order at will, causing right to be wrong, and vice versa, just as it pleased his fancy. This is plainly absurd, for the law of morality is immutable. Nor can this lawgiver be the collective man or society, for a lawgiver must be a superior, and since all men are equal, where could society receive its authority? The only solution therefore of the identity of the imposer of the moral law is to admit a supernatural person, in other words, God. Now, once having conceded that God imposes morality on us, the answer to my question is simple. A law without obligation is in fact no law. Since God is a perfect Being, I-Ie necessarily obliges us to obey His decrees, for it is un- reasonable to make a law and not impose an obligation on us to fulfill it. Hence the answer to my question 'Why must I be moral,' is simply this: 'I must obey the Divine law.'

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84 IGNATIAN I why men must do right and avoid wrong. Why cannot I violate the duties of others, if I care to? Well, you act unreasonably, that's all. And if I chose to act unreasonably, what then ? There's no hope for you then I guess, laughed back Fitzgibbon. But look here, the intellect does not originate but rep- resents objects. Hence virtue and vice must be something extrinsic to it, You claim this lies in the fact that some acts are useful in promoting the good of the community and others detrimental. That is all very logical in the cases like the one you mentioned of murder, but let us consider suicide. What duty to society does a suicide violate? Often he con- fers a benefit on mankind by destroying himself and yet you admit that such a man is doing wrong. The same objection applies to private vices which though undoubtedly wrong, nevertheless do not harm society as such. The trouble with you is that you confuse the eifect with the cause. The cause of good is not that which is useful, although its effect may be that it promotes the common good. Acts are 'not good because they are useful, but useful because they are good. It is in this confusion of cause and effect that the main flaw of your system of ethics consists. Y Well what is the answer then ? put in Handlos rather angrily. . That's what I'm asking you, said Smith, and smiling he rose and started toward the billiard room., vffrxafxscwrvf, 5 About a week later I met young Smith and was intro- duced by a friend of mine. As soon as the occasion offered, I broached the subject of the controversy. He was about to pass the matter over with a laugh, but my curiosity had been aroused and I asked him if he would mind giving me his opinion in the matter. What I tell you,', he answered, will not be my opinion in the sense you mean. People are too apt to think morality is a matter of personal opinion and consequently they disre-

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86 IGNATIAN But you just told me, I interrupted, that good and evil was in the nature of things and now you tell me that they are good and evil because God has so decreed. I am glad you called my attention to that point, was the answer. Acts are not good or bad because God commands or prohibits them, but He commands or prohibits them be- cause they are good or bad. In other words He sees that some things will prevent man from attaining the end for which He created him, hence His decrees are not prior to, but, according to our way of thinking, consequent on the objective morality of human acts. That is all very true, but how am I to know these de- crees of God? By the light of reason. Reason dictates that some things are good or conducive to our last end and therefore we should follow them and that other things are not conducive to our last end and are therefore to be avoided as evil. But if reason dictates what I am to do, what becomes of free will, which is an obvious fact? There is another point that was greatly confused in that little debate of a week ago. Both you and they overlooked the difference between physical and moral freedom. All that free will means is that we have the power to choose between good and evil just as we see tit, it is a physical freedom which remains even when we are not morally free. In other words: 'You can but you may not.' We are physically free to do evil, the fact that we commit wrongs is proof of this. But we are not morally free to do evil. The natural law, i. e., the Divine law as manifested by reason says, 'You may not do this, since by doing so you jeopardize the end for which you were createdf This is briefly the true explana- tion of 'Why I must be moral'. You're too much for me, I laughed, come on and let's go up to the dining-room. R,AYMUND FEELY,