St Ignatius College - Ignatian Yearbook (San Francisco, CA)

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WHY MUST I BE MORAL? 83 murder, is that it might cause mental anguish to the mur- derer. That may be all very true when it comes to cold logic, but taking experience as a criterion, it strikes me that many and many a time the thought of consequent pleasure and pain prevent a man from commiting a crime, remarked Handlos, somewhat decisively. I'm only too willing to grant that these considerations are strong factors in deterring a man from evil, but they are not obligatory. My question is 'Why must I be moral ?' not 'what influences my decisions ?' Moreover pleasure and pain are, as you just stated, consequent upon an act, hence before you can tell whether an act is good or bad you must perform it and then if it causes you pleasure you know it was good, if it causes you pain it was bad. This is evidently absurd. No, Handlos, 'hedonism' is no answer to my question. An elderly gentleman who had taken no part in the dis- cussion thus far, suggested a new solution: While,I agree that we must follow the dictates of reason and that we are infiuenced by personal pain and pleasure, yet I think that the solution is to be found in the fact that man is a social animal, and that in consequence of that fact, he is bound to respect the common good of the community and not to infringe upon the duties which he owes to his fellow men. Thus in the oft- repeated example of murder, the criminal is violating the right of a fellow man to his life and thus he commits a wrong. Since we are allowed the protection of society we are necessarily obliged to respect the rights of the individuals living in society. What is useful for promoting the common weal is therefore the good, what obstructs its advancement is evil. Your system is far more humane than the preceding one, answered Smith, since it substitutes altruism for ego- ism. Yet it lies open to many objections. First of all it does not answer my question. No explanation advanced thus far explains to me why I am obliged to keep the moral law. Your doctrines merely state what is right and wrong, not

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82 IGNATIAN approach the opposite pole, vice, and he is irresistibly re- pelled. The whole philosophy is too material, too opposed to both fact and reason to answer my question. May I ask what is your explanation, Mr. Handlos? and the speaker turned toward the man who had been debating with the doctor. Thus far I had been a casual listener, but the peculiar nature of the conversation began to arouse my attention, and to set my brain in action. The man addressed as Handlos was now speaking. I'm what philosophers technically call a hedonist. First of all some things we do, afford us pleasure, others cause us pain. Whatever causes pleasure is good. What gives pain is evil. Now reason demands that we should follow the pleasurable and hence the good, and avoid the painful and the therefore evil. This doctrine, if you examine it, is but the analysis of your own conduct. But your system, urged the young questioner, is sub- ject to the same objection as before. Pleasure and pain do not oblige, they are only motives which may or may not in- fluence my judgment. Suppose I feel inclined to act against the feelings of pleasure, what then ? The explanation of that is simple. Although the course you follow may be painful to some, the reason you pursue it, is because it is pleasurable to you. If that is the case, you must admit a variable standard of ethics. That is, an act, suicide for instance, may be a virtue in one man, an evil in another. Now I think y0u'll admit suicide is a wrong, yet men often take theirilives in order to avoid pain, and this according to you constitutes virtue. Beyond this, such a system would soon vitiate both private-and public morals. Some of the most vicious actions that man can perform are accompanied by pleasures, in fact we call them sensuous pleasures. They are acknowledged vices, yet you would have to call them good actions. Again, it would destroy public virtue. Hedonism looks only to the individual. It neglects entirely the duties which man owes to others. The only thing that would be wrong about

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84 IGNATIAN I why men must do right and avoid wrong. Why cannot I violate the duties of others, if I care to? Well, you act unreasonably, that's all. And if I chose to act unreasonably, what then ? There's no hope for you then I guess, laughed back Fitzgibbon. But look here, the intellect does not originate but rep- resents objects. Hence virtue and vice must be something extrinsic to it, You claim this lies in the fact that some acts are useful in promoting the good of the community and others detrimental. That is all very logical in the cases like the one you mentioned of murder, but let us consider suicide. What duty to society does a suicide violate? Often he con- fers a benefit on mankind by destroying himself and yet you admit that such a man is doing wrong. The same objection applies to private vices which though undoubtedly wrong, nevertheless do not harm society as such. The trouble with you is that you confuse the eifect with the cause. The cause of good is not that which is useful, although its effect may be that it promotes the common good. Acts are 'not good because they are useful, but useful because they are good. It is in this confusion of cause and effect that the main flaw of your system of ethics consists. Y Well what is the answer then ? put in Handlos rather angrily. . That's what I'm asking you, said Smith, and smiling he rose and started toward the billiard room., vffrxafxscwrvf, 5 About a week later I met young Smith and was intro- duced by a friend of mine. As soon as the occasion offered, I broached the subject of the controversy. He was about to pass the matter over with a laugh, but my curiosity had been aroused and I asked him if he would mind giving me his opinion in the matter. What I tell you,', he answered, will not be my opinion in the sense you mean. People are too apt to think morality is a matter of personal opinion and consequently they disre-