Shannon (DM 25) - Naval Cruise Book

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After a momentary t f C breathing spell,two more X ' were upon us in what ap- fa . I 4 A I, . . peared to be l'.llVC-lJO1llJ- ' - ,K ing runs-one direct at ,f X . T j -ig, , I 'Z :W the Shannon the other l 'f .- 'A ' at the Smith. Our vio- ' N px K ' lent maneuvers and with- - fr- . - 1 N ermg volume of fire X seemed to spoil their X K aim for they pulled out N early and their missiles fell harmlessly into the g, 5 'N s ea. Woke: ? As we were catching our breath again, a Betty was picked up, coming in from the port quarter, low on the water. ,lust after we had commenced firing, the radar operator noticed another plane following the first, about one or two thousand yards behind him. The first plane was the most threatening at the moment, so control stayed on him. He maneuvered very little, making it easy to keep him on our beam. IVhen he had gotten in to two miles, he suddenly turned off, flew up on the port side, and then turned out. The moment the first plane broke off his run, the second became the more threatening of the two. Combat immediately and franticly sent this information up to control, and gave them the ranges and bearings necessary to pick up the second plane. The reaction and teamwork was excellent. Control shifted to the second plane, which was maneuvering to get astern of us, and was on him in a very few seconds, missing only one salvo in the process. This plane, however, was so close when we started shooting at him that only a few salvos could be put out before he was on top of us. He was apparently not interested in becoming a suicide hero for the Emperor, but merely flew over the ship, fortunately for us. When he had opened to about 4000 yards, he suddenly disappeared from the radar screen and from sight. We presumed that he crashed, having been hit by our fire. Just before that plane disappeared, the ominous, phosphor- escent wake of a torpedo was sighted, passing about ten yards ahead of the bow. This we assumed to be the Ufishy' dropped by the first plane. Again the Luck of the Irish was with her native daughter, the Shannon. When traveling ati30 knots, ten yards is not very comfortable clearance for a torpedo. During the next few minutes, several planes made rung on us, but most of them were driven off before they closed the ship, None inflicted any damage. At 0141 we ceased firing. All the attackers had been re- pelled. Those that were still airborne had become discouraged and headed for home. Several other raids-enough to keep the condition Flash Red, and keep the ship at general quarters-closed the area, but none approached our station close enough to be taken under fire. During the night's actions, we expended 856 rounds of tive inch ammunition, 385 rounds of 40 mm, and 808 rounds of 20 mm ammunition, accounting for two sures, two assists, and three probables. In addition, several enemy planes could not be accounted for, and, therefore, could not be claimed. The action moved too fast to be accurately recorded. At the time, we were too busy to care. The Van Valkenburgh CDD 6563 arrived on R.P. 16 at 0839, relieving the Shannon so that she could return to Kerama Retto for fuel and ammo. The rest of the 28th and most of the 29th were spent in this occupation. Later on May 29, the ship was ordered to her familiar old station-155-A-in support of the anti-small boat screen. Vile remained there throughout the night, but then the next day returned to Kerama Retto to prepare for a coming sweep operation which we were to support. 52 Admiral Halsey had relieved Adrniral Spruance on May 27 and assumed eoinmand of all former liifth lileet units. At that time, we became a member of the Third Fleet, and Task l:',,,-CQ, Group, and Unit designations were changed aqcgrdingly but the current tactical organization was otherwise unaffected, IHEYA SHIMA SWEEP AND OCCUPATION ln the evening of May 31, the ship moved to the Northwest Anchorage, where we joined Task Unit 32.54, of which Comin- Div 7 fCapt. liarrowj because FOP.-X. CTU 32.5.4 was in the Staunch CAM 3071. lVe got underway at 2139 in company with the Henry A. VViley QDM 292. six AM's, and two Pfiwls At 0300, as we neared the objective, the Task Unit was ordered to turn around and proceed to I-Iagushi Anchorage. The operation had been post- poned because of an expected large scale air attack the next morning. The next night we tried again. At 2116 the Task Unit was formed and enroute to Iheya Retto for the operation which had been postponed. This time it was only an hour before we were ordered to reverse course and return to Kerama Retto, anticipating the same large enemy air attack which had failed to materialize that morning. Again the attack did not come, and again we were ordered to the Northwest Anchorage to prepare for another attempt. The third time proved to be the charm! At 0015, June 3, Task Unit 32.5.4 was underway. Three hours and 30 miles later the Destroyer Support Unit joined our formation. Simul- taneously, the transports, loaded with the attack troops, were picked up by radar. Throughout the approach, enemy planes were in the area, but none closed our group. VVe arrived at the objective area, off the southeastern end of Iheya Shima, just before dawn. VVithin an hour, the sweeps had their gear streamed and were conducting exploratory oper- ations, while the VViley and Shannon supported them. At the same time, the Destroyer Support Unit moved in to conduct preliminary bombardment. As soon as the sweeps had passed the designated beaches, the transports moved in to launch the landings. VVhile we were sweeping the waters at the northern end of the island and then down the west coast, many reports of the Dmgress of the troops were received. All seemed to indicate that the resistance was meager and that the operation was being -successfully carried out. This made us wary, for it seemed too easy. Our fears were confirmed by the sounding of the general alarm. Reports from the nearby pickets, at l300, indicated that unusually large enemy raids were closing from the north. These raids were soon picked up on our gear. Some gafltfed up on the pickets, while the largest groups flew on by 10 attack the ships and installations at Okinawa. After f01'l3' minutes of tracking the main raids southward, We Picked UD Hn unidentified plane fifteen miles to the north, Cl0SlI1g. VVC weren't sure of his complexion until five minuteS later when he was visually identified as a slow but deadly Val- The Captain ordered. Commence firing. as the plane began he dlvc- COUUIIQ' in from the starboard side. the Val closed 'V 4 - fe 0000 Yfl1'ClS lbelore he was turned away by our gunfire. He then opened to sev- eral miles and circled ,-' . X, !-,' 1, around to make an- . , ,ff other approach. N'Ve W , W' if . I ' resumed tire at l350 as the first Val peel- - - '- .. . 9 ed ol'l in a suicide ft np' . dive from the poi-1 K ,df rluarter. 1' ' A' If dfnhycs' I l l - l . l this , 62,5 4 ' ,, .Q,,iLf'2ff . , ' 1 55212 . V J .Pwr W if 9 ' I Lag 1 - ss , g 1 b, . -1' me . 4 .wt ' f'

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-i RUGGED DUTY TORI SHIMA SWEEP Task Unit 52.4.4 madea rendezvous north of Kei-uma Retto at 0700, and then proceeded to Tori Shima, 50 miles west of Okinawa, to conduct a sweep of the surrounding shallow waters, in preparation for a landing the next day, Tori Shima is just a pin-point of rock, but its strategic position made it important as the location of a land-based air Warning station. Every destroyer and destroyer type was happy to see land based stations established, for each one reduced the number of radar picket ships needed. At 0830, we arrived. The AMG commenced their sweep, which lasted until early afternoon, and proved uneventful. Throughout the day, many enemy planes attacked shipping in the Okinawa area, especially around Hagushi, and the northern radar picket stations. Fortunately, no planes ap- proached or attacked us, for with the sweep gear streamed our maneuvers were greatly hampered. During our return trip, a sonar contact was picked up at 2800 yards. It was first believed to be a sub, but after investi- gation it was evaluated as non-sub. The sweeps were left at Kerama Retto while we were ordered to anti-submarine patrol station B-18, with additional duties as radar picket. After their unusually heavy daylight raids, the Japs were not very active, and the night passed without disturbance. The next day, May 12, was spent conducting fueling opera- tions, and the night, which once more found the laps active, on station 155-A. Daylight hours of the following day were spent on anti-sub- marine and radar picket patrol south of Kerama Retto. That night, we returned Okinawa. This .and several successive raids headed directly for the island, passing us up for bigger game. Our feelings were not hurt in the least by thus being slighted. The Japs, however, must have thought we missed their company, for .they soon became interested in our welfare and tried to make it as unhealthy as possible. r The first attackers to approach R.P. 16 were taken under Hre at. 2259. While the other planes circled the ship, a Betty came in low. just after this plane fiew over the ship, a torpedo wake was sighted passing down the port side, close aboard. Ihe Betty had been hit by our fire, and was finally knocked down while going away, crashing off our port quarter, close aboard the Smith. -Six minutes later another Betty attacked from the starboard side and was taken under fire by both ships. In less than a 1I1ll'lL1lC,-'IDIS plane, intent on suiciding, was splashed close to the Smith. The other planes of the raid were turned by our fire and opened towards Okinawa. For about the next hour, the japs gave ug 3 little breathing spell, wlnle they concentrated on other picket stations and on Okinawa. Shortly after midnight, new adversaries began to close us, in raids of from one to ten planes. The first of these was taken under tire at 0026. High speed and violent maneuvers, aug- menting our large volume of fire, proved very effective in countering the Jap attacks. For fifteen minutes, we fired almost without a break. Many of the attackers were Kamikazes, although some attempted bombing and torpedoing tactics. Although only two of the planes in this attack were officially claimed as prob- , 6, ables, several 'others could not be ac- ' , counted for after they had made their to our old favorite-155-A. ffiffiw' runs. Those planes that were not We passed the following five days in A 'Oli K Splaished were tllmed by Ovf me and the AA Sweep around Hagushi and on a ,l,.Q, Ni 14' gx Elhased lhoine with their tails between Shoff aV9fil3-b1litY period at that anchor- 1 - l ' len Wwe S' . . . age and in Kerama Retto. Enemy air R ,Q , 51,-N A few minutes of inactivity and rest activity during this time was heavy, but Qt if ' gf was Interrupted by 9' fevoff of gr0up5 we were usually prevented from tiring jf- '- ! H' Of DIHHCS Closing us. These were sub- by the smoke conditions in the anchor- Q fxq WW' J' . Sefluently DIQICCC1 UD. At 0120, 2111 STIIDS ages. Q 0 . X . -Y H-- gf-1 X on the station .commenced firing and , , . g '15 s tired almost continuously throughout the From May 19 to Zn, we patrolled Sta- k f i ltihll 1 thirteen minute attack . , . . Y N.. . X. . . . tion 135'A' Ja? alf raids were prevalent ,A At one time during the attack, there throughout this period, although few 'N-5 ' were ten planes within ten miles of the planes came close enough to our station ' Ship all closing to allow us to fire. ' ' The few occasions on which planes were sighted and taken under-tire, they were either quickly turned away, or splashed by ships nearby. ROGER PETER 16 During the morning of May 25, came the orders that we had long expected, but had dreaded to hear- Proceed immediately. in company with the Robert H. Smith, to Roger Peter 16 and relieve the Cowell CDD 4575 and Wren CDD 5681 1 With the ominous feeling that gripped his heart showing in his voice, the Combat Officer Rogered for the message and passed the word on to the Captain. At 1023, We left station and proceeded on our assigned duty. The Smith joined us an hour later for the rest of. the trip. When we arrived on station, the Smith assumed the fighter direction duties, and the Shannon joined the Ingersoll CDD 652D and the LCS's 14, 17, 18, and 21, which were already on station, as supporting ships. CominDiv 7 assumed tactical command and issued instructions for the patrol. Soon after our arriva.l the sky became heavily overcast and a steady, heavy downpour began. This blessed weather lasted for two days and nights, keeping the laps at home. But when the skies cleared, on the evening of May 27, we realized that the past two days had been only the calm before the storms of what proved to be the most harrowing night in the Shan- non's existence. And the situation was aggravated by the loss of almost one-third of the station's fire power, when thc Ingersoll was ordered to return to Kerama Retto, during the early morning of May 26th. The usual routine dusk general quarters was SOHHCRNI HT 1845, May 27, but the routine aspect was soon replaced by one of necessity and activity. Shortly after sunset the first of the night's 54 raids was reported by a picket northwest of This attack seemed to be more coordi- nated than any of the previous ones, and entailed a variety of tactics. The first plane started his run from about five miles on the starboard bow. As soon as his intentions were detected, con- trol was put on the target and the main battery opened up. The plane maneuvered to get ahead of us and seemed intent on suiciding. But the Captain's expert ship-handling, enriched by previous experience with Kamikazes, kept the attacker between the beam and the bow, allowing all guns to bear. Suddenly control passed the dreaded word to combat: VVe've lost him! One quick, new bearing from combat was fortunately enough to put them back on. They resumed fire. At about 4000 yards the forties opened up, telling those who couldn't see of our adversary's nearnessg at 2500 the twenties. I-Ie was breathing his fiery breath down our necks, but no one flinched-we were all too busy. Anxious moments later, we could see that he had been hit, but was trying- to maintain the altitude and aim necessary.to carry out his diabolical mission. But the Shannon's Irish Luck was still with her. He fell into the sea a very few hundred yards away. We had chalked up another sure! But our spirits were soon dampened, and thoughts were never allowed to turn to the added meatball that would soon grace our bridge, the attack was being pressed from another quarter. Both ships resumed fire. This plane turned away at 5000 yards, having suiiiciently diverted our attention from one of his cohorts .who was com- ing in on the starboard quarter. Both ships shifted targets. The plane never had a chance, and was splashed before he got in to 3000 yards. 51

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ef Gut' projectiles were seen actually hitting the as well as bursting near him, but he kept coming. the end of his dive he pulled out, several tlxousand from the ship, and pressed his attack in a low The forties and twenties opened up, adding their hits 120 those of the main battery. Still he came, held up g by God only knows what! Plot reported, Range against the stops! The advance range was zero-we were tiring point-blank. -l0mm projectiles were pouring into the engine, The twenties were hitting him everywhere. Five inch bursts surrounded him. And still he came. VVe braced ourselves for the crash . . . But it never came. At only 1800 yards-10 seconds before he would have hit- his left wing was knqcked off. The Val rolled over onto his side and his right wing hit the water. XVith a blinding flash and a great pall of smoke, the plane exploded, throwing a geyser of water into the air. Relief escaped our lungs as we relaxed and wiped our brows. Chalk up another for the Sassy Shannon! By 1410, the sweeping operations were completed. WVe returned to Hagushi. ' The following week was spent in uneventful operations as part of the Hagushi AA screen, conducting fueling, and in availability alongside the tender Cascade in Kerama Retto, to prepare for the coming East China Sea sweeps. Official UAS. Navy Pll0fUflF'Uf7!I . . But he never reached his mark. Official US. Navy Photograph And still he came. TURNOVER IN COMMAND June 10, while the ship lay at anchor in Kerama Retto, the crew was gathered on the boat deck to witness the turnover of command of the Shannon. Everyone hated to see Captain Foster leave, although we were all glad that he was going to get a well-deserved rest and shore duty. Lieutenant Com- mander Ingram's reputation had preceeded him, so we knew that in VVild Bill, as he was affectionately known in bull sessions, we were getting a fine new captain. Before turning over the Shannon to her new skipper, Captain Foster addressed his men: W'e've been through a lot together on the 'Sassy Shannon'. It was only nine months ago yesterday when we gathered together on this ship for the first time. Men from all parts of the nation, many of you putting to sea for the first time. I told you at that time that our battle efficiency depended on the spirit of teamwork, that each man must learn his job, and that all efforts should lead to one purpose-to make the Shannon the fightin'est ship in the Navy. I'm proud to say that you haven't let me down. The gun- ners have stuck by their guns, the engineers by their throttles, the CIC personnel, the repair parties, the communication gang, and bridge personnel have all done an outstanding job with the result that we have handled every assignment our Navy or the Japs have given us. U1 can thank you only in words for your loyalty and your splendid performance, but I won't forget and the nation won't forget what you have done. The memories of these past few months will be with me forever. It is hard to leave a ship and a crew with which one has been so close and on whom one has been so dependent, but that is the way progress is made. I had command of a ship before, so the Navy drew on my experience to start the 'Sassy Shannon' on her career. Now it is time to pass along a well seasoned ship and an experienced and efficient crew to new hands-to introduce new ideas. I depend on you to give Captain lngram the same fine support you have given me so that the Shannon-my ship and your ship-may ever fly her colors proudly with the best, and that you, my men, will always hold your heads high with pride in your accomplishments. XVhen Gunner Koerner left, he gave me this four-leafed clover saying: 'You'll need this more than I will.' I am passing this to Captain Ingram as the ship's good luck piece, but the real reascn for the Shannon's luck is your own skill and the kindness of God Almighty. May he continue to guard you and guide you. Remember your 'Uncle Ed' will not forget you, and I'll always be looking for news of the Shannon and her men. Goodbye and good luck. 53 5 1