Shannon (DM 25) - Naval Cruise Book

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l l Pg-Qgress during tl1e few days befoie and those after our dgparture was slow despite daily lDl'4CllZll'2lllOll and support by artillery, an' strikes, and naval gunhre, such as we hgttl ly,-t-11 C0l'1dL!Cllll3 beltre a 1i'd111'111g lilfll grounrl attack. liul sub- sequentto tlltidllglll, of hlarcli 1-8, during which an 11111-inptt-tl majgf lI'll'lltl'3.flQIl organizetl by the eneniy was broken Ill? by the 4th lhlilflllt' -lJlYlSlUll, killing over 1,000 Japs, resistance to our attacks tlllllllllSllCll SUlllCXYll1l1. March 1-l tl1e flag- was raised ollieially over the island the establishment of a lllllllllfj' governineiit was 1ro'l.' 1 t '1l1llGLl. On March 16, when lllC,lh l2ll'lllQS reached tl1e lltfl'lllXVKlSlCi'll and shore, isolating Kitano loint, org1111ized resistance was de- clared ended, as of 1800, Much inoppnig up reniained to be done, particularly i11 one of the rugged igulches just south of Kitano Point, but tl1e island was 111 Olll' hands: tl1e major 1 part of the bloody task was tinished. l l 1 - Tl1e Marines began re-einbarking innnediately. On March the U, S. Arnly 1-l7th lllflllllfy lQt'Qll11Clll of 1llQ garrison 1 -ce arrived, and on tl1e 26th responsibility for defense lllltl development officially passed to them. 20 fox Fleet Admiral King, i11 his final report to tl1e Secretary of 2 the Navy, o11 tl1e Navy at XYar. said of lwo Jima: .'l'he loss of life during the capture resulted inevitably l-l'lJlll the streiigth of lwo Jima as a defensive position and from tl1e 1'e:.1di11ess of the enemy. Neither strategic nor tactical surprise was possible . . . lwo Jima was by its lo- cation and 1llC character of its 1Cl'l'2llll tl1e most profitable land obviousl objective. lt llllil no extensive coast line to afford invading troops a choice of laiiding points where they would meet little op- position, either o11 the beaches or i11 subsequent deployments for 'advance against enemy positions . . . Landing was feasible o11 only two beaches of limited extent, and they were so situated that a single defensive organization could oppose Zlll assault against either separately, or both simul- taneously , . , The defensive orgaiiization of lwo Jima was the most co111plete and effective yet encountered. The beaches were flanked .by high terrain favorable to the defenders. Artillery, mortars, Zllltl rocket launchers were well concealed, yet could register on both beaches in f'1ct, on any Joint of tl1e t ,.- . ,f 1 island Tl-1 -A' ' -- -' I it 1161131111 affoidcd excellent natural cover and concealment, a11d lent litselfj readily to the construc- tion. of SLllJ1CI'I'21llC2lll positions to which tl1e Japanese are addicted. ' , , , The diminutive size -of' Two Jima and its general . . , Tl1e defenders were dedicated to expending them- 1 barrenness. lack ot natural .facilities and resources should selves-but expending skillfully a11d protractedly 111 order lead no one either to minimize the importance of capturing to exact the uttermost toll from the attackers. Small won- it or to depreciate as unreasonable and unnecessary our der then that every step had to be won slowly by men l heavy losses in doing so. lt was important solely as an air inching' forward with hand weapons, and at heavy costs. l base, but as such its importance was great. Not only was the There was no other way of doing it. - of air attacl' bv our 1VI1r1anc1s-ba:ed B-291' materi- . . . . . l Webs-ure ,- X ' , -I I-1-C, fcl , Sf 7 , The sk1ll and gallantry of tl1e Marines in this exception- allv mtensified by the axai an ity o wo or topping them . . . . . . - . , , ,- , I - I - ,I Y , allv difficult enterprise was worthv of t11e1r best traditions OE with fuel and fo1 supplying tiem wit 1 ng 1ter cox er from - , . , A , , ' , - - , , - , - - - and deserving of the highest commendation. This was there on, but also there was a11 111crease 111 combat effective- ecuau V tru of the mural units actin in their Support ness of the B-29's due to the heightened morale of personnel, ,l .5 Q , c ' g -' .. b b loads and decrease in abortive Hightq There especially those engaged at tl1e hazardous beaches. Ameri- heavler Om ' ,, - , '- , - , D - X' . can historv offers no finer example of courage, ardor, and Was, moreover, a substantial saving in valuable hfe in the effbiencv ' , number of B-29's which would have been shot down over ' -' japan had there been no flghter cover, and in tl1e number I which would have been lost at sea had 1wo Jima not been Upon arrival at Saipan March 11, the Task Unit was available for emergency landing-s. It 15 estimated that tl1e dissolved, The Captain reported to the Port Director for on- liveg saved through this latter factor alone, subsequent to ward routing, which took us past Tinian and Guam to Ulltlll the capture of Iwo Jima, exceeded the lives lost in ,tl1e Atoll in the VVestern Caroline Islands. We arrived early March capture itself, 13 and reported to COIIIITIPHC for duty. l - :1 , tl., wi- -W ..Y?-B, :',,,,.? i . Y 17 1 ,,,l:,-- , l . 'ZfQ f- jf-J -T-' - -' '- -'- -, '- .- ,. , fi? '?T5?f62'z- . 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'AQ -G 5 - 'NE l Ulithi is a large atoil formed by many reefs and small 11123 IU3g3Zff1eSfW1tl1 9'mUJU111tEQU,3l1'1Elfligilgqplgizllgjilgliolsqilgi islands that provide an excellent anchorage Ellltl ideal staging mengal tales Od lifelmfatlgll- Hg? Woimhe deserted glands base for large operations. Xlfe XYlt1l6SSCCl the preparation of br1e stea an DCCF. par y on e . - - l one so large that we hardly believed what we saw, Almost The afternoon before our departure. ChL11'Cl1 SCFVICCS Weis HS far 33 One COL1ld SCC there WCVC Fllilis-sh1P5 of CVCYB' S1201 held on board-Catholic Mass in the mess hall and Protes- type and description, tant service on the boat deck for tl1e rest of tl1e crew. 16 . . , 1 , t solemnlty that gripped the crew and tl1e large attendance at We lay at anchor for six days surrounded by Q16 fllfali' these services was an indication of each man's anxiety con- Naval arlllafla m the tllsfofs' of the world' Carrlershimtii- cerning the coming campaign. 2 Ships, cruisers, destrovers small Jatrol and 1111116 Craft 121111 l ' - , 7 . I . A mg craft, and all the auxiliary ships necessary to 21 531111118 fleet were there. Signal lights blinked constantly, llaghoists streamed in the breeze, and radios blared, while ships' boats .cut c1'azy1p21ttG1'11H in the water as tl1ey raced from ship to ship. 'l he effect WHS one of complete confusion, but work lJI 'l!'fC55Cfl at toll Sllfefl- It soon became clear that there was complete and 6l:lflClCllt Organization behind it all. .The Sll3Ill1OlliS crew forgot heat that. was more. opprless- lflg than many had ever experienced anrljoined in this bee nyc of activity-loading stores. fiieling. inaking' repairs, lCDlLlll5l- :Xt 0900 March 19, just a month after the .beginning of tl1e It,-O Jima 'campaign we got underway, leaving the safety of our big-gunned brothers. The small craft formed 111to six columns of eight ships each and tl1e shepherding destroyer- minelavers took screening stations ahead and on tl1e flanks. ' . wo, as we were known, consisted of Sweep U,?iItl?ZyClItJC?uFl,'Il2, 13, 14 and 15, and included the Shannon, Robert H, Smith CDM ZSJ, Thomas E. Fraser CDM 245, Harry F Bauer QDM 26J, J, Wi1lia1n Ditter QDM 31J, Tracy CODM 101 AM's YMS's, PGM's, LC1's and LCS's. Commander of the, task group was CominDiv 7 fcapfam W- G- Beecher: USNJ in the Sl1anno11. 41

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4 We then requested that the air strike be called off. A couple of minutes later our spotter remarked, The fZoomie' boys are going home now. Let's go! Resume fire on the same set- up. ' After several more salvos and spots, the spotter ordered, Check fire. I'll go down and take a look. This fog and rain is getting so bad I can't see too much . . . H I I-Iave investigated the area. Personnel killed all over the place down there. No one there now. The artillery piece is abandoned. What about the gun? we asked. It might still be operational. I'll take another look. Don't take any chancesg we need you around! The spotter thought the gun might still be good, so we resumed fire. The plane again spotted. .'fFour fox-holes- four of them newly dug-any shell in this area is doing a hell of a good job . . . just saw one of the boys come out of a cave. We're on him . . . Hit about three caves on that last one . . . Swell job-the gun has completely vanished now. The spotter called for several more salvos and then some anti-personnel air bursts. Right on. Check fire. Very nice, coming over at about 100 feet. Area is completely neutralized. Am looking for that gun. '- The shore spotter cut in, VVant to make sure of that gun. He has been all our trouble. Take all the time you want. Target area thoroughly neutralized, came from the plane. Cannot see gun there. The area is so stirred up I can't find anything left. At this time the relief spotting plane arrived. The first spotter told him, Come over here in 187 at 'angels' point- seven and I'll show you a good ship to work with and plenty of targets ,worthy of her salvos. Watch out for the flak though! After turning over his duties, he told us, Your firing has been very good. Have enjoyed working with you. Before we could hand back orchids for his excellent spot- ting, the new spotter came in, very excitedly, with Good Lord! There are a bunch of Iaps down there shooting into our lines , . . Hell, they're firing at me! Give me some more right away-Hurry! After one salvo came, No change, no change. Rapid fire for one minutef' The spotter then picked out some more targets for us. In the next hour and a half we fired 130 two-gun salvos-salvos that earned such welcome remarks as, Direct hit-right on . . . That takes care of that target . . . I have a major emplace- ment up hereg up 200, right 50, . . Good! Excellent! Especiallv in this terrain. It's rugged. Four more salvos, maximum ratie . . . Right on about ten emplacements down there. There are emplacements all over this gulley. Keep them coming . . , Oh, Boy! Those were the best of all. Hit a stone bloekhouse that time . . . Hitting right on now . . . Very, very good, We are doing a fine job . . . There were many pogifions in that area-not so many now. Looked like mortar emplage- ments. You knocked out about eight. Only a couple left. Despite the hills you dropped those last few right into eight dug-ins and more mortars. Will be a great help to our infantry going up there. Damn good work! You just got five gun emplacements, too! VVhen we ceased fire in that area to make an ammo report, the spotter said, Area well beat upg only two slit trenches left. Gun emplacements vacated. No activity. By this time we had become inured to the day and night, seemingly endless jar and concussion of our roaring five-inch batteries. Concussions that exploded light bulbs all over the ship, ripped.tOpside doors from their hinges, and twisted solid steel ladders into snake-like patterns no longer bothered us. VVe had learned what the Marines were paying to take that tiny island. Wie had buddies, brothers, and neighbors over there, and our part seemed small. Every shell in every salvo carried our prayers-earnest prayers that they would destroy to make a path for the Marines through the fanatical resistance. Our prayers seemed answered in the pilot's remarks, as we poured fifty-seven more salvos into a new area: Perfect, All four salvos right on . . . Check fire . . . Every projectile a hit . . . Area well covered and concentration of 12 or 14 mortar emplacements knocked out. Excellent work! The' SFCP told the relieving plane, These last two 'Wfake Island planes have been having a field day with the Shannonf And the field day continued. f ,VVe began firing at an enemy troop concentration, being chreeted, at times, to lay salvos as closes as 200 yards to our own slowly advancing lines. This was ticklish business, .but verb' effective. When it became too risky, we switched to another area and worked over a blockhouse. DiSHDpointment was the principal feeling throughout the 511119 when we had to be relieved because practically all of our thousands of rounds of ammunition had been expended. T!11S was reflected in the last message from the Shore Fire ContrOl Party as we reluctantly pulled away. 'As far as we are concerned, Shannon, you are the best 511111 we have ever worked with. The plane spotters and WC are very much pleased, and are happy to have worked with yOU- You did an excellent jobf' Such D1'21iSC from those veterans of other invasions was HS . -, , 1 QOOC! HS 3 Hlghts sleep to us. It was by far the best time we had ever had. We left for a rendezvous with the Idaho 11213421 to load ammunition, and then took station in the outer screen. The flex! Clay, Hflef fueling, we returned to the ammunition replen- ishment area to discharge some of the ammunition we had Worked so hard to get the day before to the two destroyers that .had less than we and were not returning to a rear area within the next few days. Lvwe departed f'Bloody Iwo at 1616 March 7, with a group-Qf 2-Ss .and LST s, enroute to Saipan. Thus ended our particle PHUO11 in the capture of Iwo lima I ki 1 ,ss . I . 40 I ,, N 21' . f L..-iff ' ff it ' 'W an . 9 Q.,

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Although scuttlebutt was voluminous, our destination and all information on the operation had been, for security reasons, a well kept secret. Vile were far out to sea when the Captain announced over the 1 MC: We are proceeding to Okinawa Island in the Ryulflm Group, We will arrive on the morning of the 25th. Our job is to enter the harbor formed by the islands of Ixerama Retto, off the Okinawa coast, and cover the sweeD5- We are to destroy any shore batteries or gun 6mDl3CQ' ments that the laps may have. We may encounter oDD05l' tion even before reaching the objective. It behooves every man to be alert, to maintain a sharp lookout, even when not on watch. The ,laps are expected to throw everything they haveat us. We must be ready for air attacks, submarines, suicide boats, and suicide swimmers. just do your jobs as well HS you have done before, perhaps a little better, I know I can count on every one of you to come through with YOUT best' The tremendous size and importance of the operation upon which we were embarked, its scope, character, and objective became apparent to us as time progressed and added bits of information could be pieced together. With the Marianas and the Philippines under our control, and with the newly-captured Iwo lima, just 640 miles from Tokyo, becoming operational, the next step was directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff-to secure a position in the Nansei Shoto chain, which extends in a shallow loop from Kyushu, the southernmost of the main japanese islands, down to jap- anese held Formosa. Okinawa, the largest and most populous island in this chain, offered numerous sites for airlields from which almost any type of plane could reach industrial Kyushu, only 350 miles distant, and attack the enemy's communications to Korea, to the Chinese mainland, and to the Indo-China and Singapore areas. Since Okinawa also contained several excellent naval anchorages, it was chosen as the objective. From many standpoints the Okinawa operation proved to be the most difficult ever undertaken by our forces in the Pacific. It was defended by 120,000 men Cinclud-ing native.. Okinawans serving with the .combat forcesl with tanks and artillery.. As.-possiblLI.d nts,, there were 'some-I 60,000 ' troops in various other positions in the NanseitShoto chain, plus much larger forces in nearby Formosa, Kyushu, and the Shanghai area. Also of great importance was the large native population, which afforded the enemy an unlimited supply of labor, and which might easily become a serious problem to us by clogging roads and imposing a burden of relief. The most serious threat to us, however, lay in the very factor for which we had initiated the operation, namely the short distance from Okinawa to the japanese homeland, where lay the main reserves of air and naval power. just as we would be able to strike Japan to better effect after securing Okinawa, the Japanese could strike us while we were attack- ing that island. Iapan's naval strength had been so reduced that it could not hope for success against our own in a decisive actiong but hit-and-run raids, or perhaps forlorn-hope, honor-saving attempts, were a possibility. Air attack, partic- ularly of the suicide variety, was the greatest menace, since the japanese airfields within easy range of Okinawa were too numerous to permit more than their partial and temporarv interdiction by our own air strikes against them. Severe damage and losses, therefore, had to be expected and accepted as the price of our success. Our initial part in the operation would entail seven davs maneuvering with three destroyer-minelayers, the heaviest ships present, a few supporting LCI's and PGM's and sewn- teen yard minesweepers, only 325 miles from the Japanese homeland and right in the center of a hornet's nest of Jap- anese-held islands. Seven days and nights in and around an area of which little was known about enemy defenges 'ind preparations. Seven days and nights subject to air attack fgom F01'm053f, China Hrldjapan as well as from the local islands Seven days, and nights of God knows what! if H The Executive'fOfficer remarked to a group gf Officers and chiefs, If we are alive at noon on Love-minus-seven Day our chances of survival are good. The talk around theship was of the Shannon'5 dune Q Comments ran ,in general: I ei' The laps will probably take us for cru' l ' 'spit-kits' and beat our brains in. ISHS 3 Ongslde them 'f'I'hey'll let us get inside that harbor and then cut loose from both sides. 'dvyvonder what they do with prisoners? . . . Don't answer that. avrzell, if we come through this one we'll live through any- thing! liy far the most optimistic remark was the fatalist'5, jf yoifre going to get it, you're going to get it, so what the hell! TWO ,dayg Went by. Men topside kept gazing at the sky for any sign of planes. Radar operators were more vigilant than ever before, searching their 'lscopes for the slightest Dip-1, On the Zlst the Officer of the Deck passed the word, Spring is here officially, which drew a great deal of laughter and helped relieve the tension. Men joked, and the buzz of con- versation could be heard throughout the ship. A plying was picked up in the afternoon which, after a few anxious minutes, proved to be a friendly THF Avenger. The conversation immediately turned to Admiral Mitscher and his fast carrier force with hopes that it was in the vicinity, The following night a San Francisco news commentator elaborated on the Jap Fleet being in hiding. He called them f'yellow and said that if they didn't come out and fight we'd go in and get them. Most of the retorts that this drew from the crew are unprintable. One of the milder comments was, I don't mind this lash-up, but I don't want some guy sitting back in 'Frisco daring the laps to come out and fight. H At sundown on the 23rd, a number of battle ships and cruisers, a part of Task Force 58, were seen on the horizon. This news spread rapidly through the ship and most of the crew rushed out on deck to get a glimpse of the ships that were causing the japs so much grief. Sighs of relief and words of praise for this famed outfit could be heard everywhere. Boy, they sure look good, expressed the feelings of most. But they didn't stay with us-they had other work, closer to japan. Time was growing short. One more day of steaming and we would be on the jap's front porch. Throughout the day all hands kept a vigilant lookout for lap planes. Men shaved and showered, and donned clean clothes to lessen the chance of infection 'inthe event of any wound. We checked life -jackets, sharpened knives, and checked to make sure everything was ready to abandon ship if necessary. In the mess hall that night some wag cracked, The con- demned rnan ate a hearty meal, for the Chief Commissary Steward served an appetizing supper to ease the possible hardship of having to live on short rations for some length of time. The day before, while fueling from a tanker, the mailman had transferred overflowing bags of hastily written, last mm- ute letters. There were no wise cracks now. Laughter and even conversation faded with daylight. Ominous silence seemed to shroud the ship. That night, just before those off watch turned in, Tokio-Rose announced that an invasion of the Ryukyus was imminent. Vile recalled that she had accurately forecast the day and h011l' of the Iwo Jima invasion. We prayed . . . , At 0027 March 25 tLove-minus-scven-DayJ radar contact was made on Okinawa. The objective was in sight! The Task Group was dissolved at 0500 when Unit C0111- manders took charge. The mission of Sweep Units ll, 12914 13 was to enter Keramo Retto, a group of islands 20 m1lCS West of southern Okinawa, making exploratory and clear8I1CC SWCCDS. Transports were to enter the next day and land.troopS to secure the islands for use as a logistics base during the 0CCUDation of Okinawa Gunto. The Shannon, Fraser, and Bauer were to furnish fire suPP0'Ql for thc Sweebers. We had been assigned Unit 13 which didnt llClD the morale of the superstitious. This had not been a pleasant task to anticipate. Keram0 Remo was 0nlY the beginning, a one day operation. We were to be fit UIC Olllectivc seven days before the main f0'!'CC Wifs fo afflyc. with no heavy ships nearby and very little' 311' cover. There were a few carriers, battlewagons and cruisers bomlmrdlnlf in 0lllCf parts of Okinawa, but too far away to do Lis much tI00d if wc should really need aid. All flle wafefs 0UlSlflC Keramo Retto and around Okinawa had to be Swett' mo' before ll'3llShorts and supporting ships could m0Ve m for the landing. Phe worst Wifi was thc uncertainty-not knowing what tn Cxpect or when it would come l 2 ,xii