Shannon (DM 25) - Naval Cruise Book

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4 We then requested that the air strike be called off. A couple of minutes later our spotter remarked, The fZoomie' boys are going home now. Let's go! Resume fire on the same set- up. ' After several more salvos and spots, the spotter ordered, Check fire. I'll go down and take a look. This fog and rain is getting so bad I can't see too much . . . H I I-Iave investigated the area. Personnel killed all over the place down there. No one there now. The artillery piece is abandoned. What about the gun? we asked. It might still be operational. I'll take another look. Don't take any chancesg we need you around! The spotter thought the gun might still be good, so we resumed fire. The plane again spotted. .'fFour fox-holes- four of them newly dug-any shell in this area is doing a hell of a good job . . . just saw one of the boys come out of a cave. We're on him . . . Hit about three caves on that last one . . . Swell job-the gun has completely vanished now. The spotter called for several more salvos and then some anti-personnel air bursts. Right on. Check fire. Very nice, coming over at about 100 feet. Area is completely neutralized. Am looking for that gun. '- The shore spotter cut in, VVant to make sure of that gun. He has been all our trouble. Take all the time you want. Target area thoroughly neutralized, came from the plane. Cannot see gun there. The area is so stirred up I can't find anything left. At this time the relief spotting plane arrived. The first spotter told him, Come over here in 187 at 'angels' point- seven and I'll show you a good ship to work with and plenty of targets ,worthy of her salvos. Watch out for the flak though! After turning over his duties, he told us, Your firing has been very good. Have enjoyed working with you. Before we could hand back orchids for his excellent spot- ting, the new spotter came in, very excitedly, with Good Lord! There are a bunch of Iaps down there shooting into our lines , . . Hell, they're firing at me! Give me some more right away-Hurry! After one salvo came, No change, no change. Rapid fire for one minutef' The spotter then picked out some more targets for us. In the next hour and a half we fired 130 two-gun salvos-salvos that earned such welcome remarks as, Direct hit-right on . . . That takes care of that target . . . I have a major emplace- ment up hereg up 200, right 50, . . Good! Excellent! Especiallv in this terrain. It's rugged. Four more salvos, maximum ratie . . . Right on about ten emplacements down there. There are emplacements all over this gulley. Keep them coming . . , Oh, Boy! Those were the best of all. Hit a stone bloekhouse that time . . . Hitting right on now . . . Very, very good, We are doing a fine job . . . There were many pogifions in that area-not so many now. Looked like mortar emplage- ments. You knocked out about eight. Only a couple left. Despite the hills you dropped those last few right into eight dug-ins and more mortars. Will be a great help to our infantry going up there. Damn good work! You just got five gun emplacements, too! VVhen we ceased fire in that area to make an ammo report, the spotter said, Area well beat upg only two slit trenches left. Gun emplacements vacated. No activity. By this time we had become inured to the day and night, seemingly endless jar and concussion of our roaring five-inch batteries. Concussions that exploded light bulbs all over the ship, ripped.tOpside doors from their hinges, and twisted solid steel ladders into snake-like patterns no longer bothered us. VVe had learned what the Marines were paying to take that tiny island. Wie had buddies, brothers, and neighbors over there, and our part seemed small. Every shell in every salvo carried our prayers-earnest prayers that they would destroy to make a path for the Marines through the fanatical resistance. Our prayers seemed answered in the pilot's remarks, as we poured fifty-seven more salvos into a new area: Perfect, All four salvos right on . . . Check fire . . . Every projectile a hit . . . Area well covered and concentration of 12 or 14 mortar emplacements knocked out. Excellent work! The' SFCP told the relieving plane, These last two 'Wfake Island planes have been having a field day with the Shannonf And the field day continued. f ,VVe began firing at an enemy troop concentration, being chreeted, at times, to lay salvos as closes as 200 yards to our own slowly advancing lines. This was ticklish business, .but verb' effective. When it became too risky, we switched to another area and worked over a blockhouse. DiSHDpointment was the principal feeling throughout the 511119 when we had to be relieved because practically all of our thousands of rounds of ammunition had been expended. T!11S was reflected in the last message from the Shore Fire ContrOl Party as we reluctantly pulled away. 'As far as we are concerned, Shannon, you are the best 511111 we have ever worked with. The plane spotters and WC are very much pleased, and are happy to have worked with yOU- You did an excellent jobf' Such D1'21iSC from those veterans of other invasions was HS . -, , 1 QOOC! HS 3 Hlghts sleep to us. It was by far the best time we had ever had. We left for a rendezvous with the Idaho 11213421 to load ammunition, and then took station in the outer screen. The flex! Clay, Hflef fueling, we returned to the ammunition replen- ishment area to discharge some of the ammunition we had Worked so hard to get the day before to the two destroyers that .had less than we and were not returning to a rear area within the next few days. Lvwe departed f'Bloody Iwo at 1616 March 7, with a group-Qf 2-Ss .and LST s, enroute to Saipan. Thus ended our particle PHUO11 in the capture of Iwo lima I ki 1 ,ss . I . 40 I ,, N 21' . f L..-iff ' ff it ' 'W an . 9 Q.,

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When asked for a summary of the results of our fire the SFCP replied, Oh, you knocked out quite a few things, 'Iiherg were block houses, pillboxes, small gun eniplacenients a bivouac area, that truck, entrenchments, and many many small buildings. And then last night you silenced that battery That was good work. ' ' Our fire had been a distinct aid to the advance of the ground troops, which had to be made against fanatical resistance from rockets, bazooka-type guns, pillboxes and interlocking underground strongholds. On one flank alone, 100 caves 30 to 40.feet deep, had to be knocked out, one by one. i By noon we had only 80 rounds of AA Common ammu- nition left on board. Consequently we had to be relievgd for replenishment in the outer transport area. SAIPAN AGAIN At 1815, having received orders during the afternoon, we took departure for Saipan, in company with eight transports and three other escorts. As we left we learned that the conquest of Iwo Jima was virtually assured. Marine observation and spotting planes were operating from Motoyama Airfield No. lg hills in the north had been captured, further reducing the enemy's fire power and allowing freer flow of supplies to the beaches, and from the beaches to the front lines, over half of the island had been captured, including Motoyama Airfield No. 2, and the troops were closing in on the main village of Motoyama. The Japanese despite heavy losses, continued to offer maxi- mum resistance, but the Marines were established on high ground and moving ahead' steadily. The Finnegan, one of the escorting DE's, reported a surface radar contact early the next morning and was ordered to in- vestigate, That contact was lost but a sound contact gained. Several depth charge attacks were made before she was re- lieved by a hunter-killer group. Reports indicate that the Finnegan had probably sunk an enemy submarine. The balance of the trip was uneventful. Upon arrival at Saipan, the Task Unit was dissolved. The Shannon and Van Valkenburgh CDD 6561 accomplished logis- tics and then departed at noon, March 1, to return to Iwo Jima. On board was a precious load of mail for the Marines. We were sure to be the most welcome ship in the area. BACK IN THE FIGHT After delivering the mail, we patrolled in the inner screen until noon on the Sth when we reported to Commander Am hibious Support Force and relieved the Bache CDD 470J. P During our absence, fierce ground fighting had continued. By March Znd the whole of the Motoyama tableland and all of the southern part of the island was in our hands-more than two-thirds of the island. Progress on the right flank was made difficult by the enemy's skillfully prepared defense positions in steep and rough terrain. This left the enemy in possession of a diminishing horse-shoe shaped area fringing the north- eastern end of the island. Motoyama Airfield No, 1 had been used for several days by artillery spotting planes, but on March 3 it came into its own when a B-29, returning from a strike against the Japanese mainland, made a successful forced landing at Iwo Jima. The importance of the Iwo Jima airfields for emergency landings became increasingly greater as the tempo of air strikes against Japan was stepped up. On March 6 the first land based fighter planes came in and relieved carrier planes in patrol flights and close support of troops. Our assignment for the afternoon was to bornbard enemy areas using direct fire. Such targets of opportunity as caves, trenches, buildings, concrete blockhouses, and a five-inch gun emplacement were taken under fire and destroyed or damaged. Another night of harassing and illuminating fire lasted until we were relieved at 0847 by the Stanley CDD 4785 to again take an inner screen station. The next morning, March 6, we were again back in the fire sup- port sector to relieve the Putnam CDD757J. This day and the next were to be our best on the firing line, proving to be the most interest, and achieving the best results, The spotting planes and Shore Fire Control Parties assigned to us were all excel- ent and efficient, and especially pleasant to work with. The strain of our intense firing schedule was eased by the humor which the spotters interspersed throughout their remarks and directions. To ut us on tar et the spotter gave its grid coordinates. p . g . g . g . The position was then picked out on the special chart in CIC. Our position and the front lines were continually plotted on l llgwv , xx'-txbt I 1 'f A' 5 Xgtkx ---a xr ff? - xt ta af ,ia Ffh 1-5 4-we if is 2 fa XS1 ' tl11S.Cl13I't, to facilitate determining the elevation, range, and bearing of the target, and to check the safety bearing. This information was passed to Plot and Control, where they set up the problem and laid the guns, After the first salvo the plane made whatever correcting spot was necessary to put us directly on the target, and then called for the num- ber of salvos, type of fire, and kind of ammunition he wanted. Additional spots were given between salvos whenever neces- sary to correct the fall of shells, or to shift us to another nearby target. The first target assigned by the plane was a large concrete pillbox in an area near the front lines. Thirteen two-gun salvos were fired before fire was checked at the plane's Beau- tiful, Two direct hits. I'll go down and take a look. Fire was then resumed and spotted by the plane. After twelve more salvos the pilot took another look and remarked, Very good. At least one direct hit. All within twenty-five yards. Again we fired, nine more salvos this time. The plane observed, VVe put shells right in the eastern side. At least a one-and-a- half foot hole in the side. I'm sure if any men were in there they're no longer serviceable. As far as I can make out the target is definitely out of commission. And so it went until dark with spotter relieving spotter and all leading us on to enemy targets. Tanks and pillboxes, block- houses, emplacements, snipers' shacks, and fortified buildings all became targets for our guns. Few escaped damage 'and most of them were destroyed, according to the spotters' en- thusiastic reports. From time to time firing became very ticklish due to the proximity of our troops, for the Marines were taking full advantage of our fire to inch their lines for- ward before nightfall. As on previous nights we fired a schedule of harassing and illuminating fire into enemy territory, At 0636 we were ordered to cease fire and shift to another sector to conduct preparation and call fire throughout the morning. 'WE'RE KNOCKING HELL OUT OF THEM' The preparation fire began at King I-Iour C0800J and con- tinued until King-plus-thirty. Our spotting plane reported that during that time we had destroyed three caves on a cliff and covered the area very well. From then on the plane called the targets for us and spotted us to them. The pilot picked out two blockhouses that were pinning down our troops and called for our fire. There's enemy fire up there now. Up 100, left 100, he directed. l'Think we have him now. No change, left 100 . . . Right in there . . . Give me three more salvos right away . . . Three more! . . . Rapid fire! Rapid fire! Keep them coming . . . Really got them spotted down there. Can see the Jap's artillery Give me three more. Rapid Fire! We're knocking hell out of them down there. Three more quick! Down 50, left 20. Rapid fire, five salvos . . . Right on. That's getting them . . . Here comes an air strike in there now, but don't stop. Keep firing at that piece if it takes you all day. That's the one that's been giving us all the trouble. . We replied, This is Shannon. Wilco, with pleasure. Out. The plane then told the spotter on the ground, The Shannon has hit it. Those 8z 'l 'CJ'W Ccensoredj Nips haven't been firing lately and probably won't again. Am getting other emplacements now. Hundreds of them down there. As soon as we get this air strike out of here we will be able to take care of them. This strike is giving them all a chance to get away. Tflgeyy are getting away! VVould like to call this damn air strike o 39

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l l Pg-Qgress during tl1e few days befoie and those after our dgparture was slow despite daily lDl'4CllZll'2lllOll and support by artillery, an' strikes, and naval gunhre, such as we hgttl ly,-t-11 C0l'1dL!Cllll3 beltre a 1i'd111'111g lilfll grounrl attack. liul sub- sequentto tlltidllglll, of hlarcli 1-8, during which an 11111-inptt-tl majgf lI'll'lltl'3.flQIl organizetl by the eneniy was broken Ill? by the 4th lhlilflllt' -lJlYlSlUll, killing over 1,000 Japs, resistance to our attacks tlllllllllSllCll SUlllCXYll1l1. March 1-l tl1e flag- was raised ollieially over the island the establishment of a lllllllllfj' governineiit was 1ro'l.' 1 t '1l1llGLl. On March 16, when lllC,lh l2ll'lllQS reached tl1e lltfl'lllXVKlSlCi'll and shore, isolating Kitano loint, org1111ized resistance was de- clared ended, as of 1800, Much inoppnig up reniained to be done, particularly i11 one of the rugged igulches just south of Kitano Point, but tl1e island was 111 Olll' hands: tl1e major 1 part of the bloody task was tinished. l l 1 - Tl1e Marines began re-einbarking innnediately. On March the U, S. Arnly 1-l7th lllflllllfy lQt'Qll11Clll of 1llQ garrison 1 -ce arrived, and on tl1e 26th responsibility for defense lllltl development officially passed to them. 20 fox Fleet Admiral King, i11 his final report to tl1e Secretary of 2 the Navy, o11 tl1e Navy at XYar. said of lwo Jima: .'l'he loss of life during the capture resulted inevitably l-l'lJlll the streiigth of lwo Jima as a defensive position and from tl1e 1'e:.1di11ess of the enemy. Neither strategic nor tactical surprise was possible . . . lwo Jima was by its lo- cation and 1llC character of its 1Cl'l'2llll tl1e most profitable land obviousl objective. lt llllil no extensive coast line to afford invading troops a choice of laiiding points where they would meet little op- position, either o11 the beaches or i11 subsequent deployments for 'advance against enemy positions . . . Landing was feasible o11 only two beaches of limited extent, and they were so situated that a single defensive organization could oppose Zlll assault against either separately, or both simul- taneously , . , The defensive orgaiiization of lwo Jima was the most co111plete and effective yet encountered. The beaches were flanked .by high terrain favorable to the defenders. Artillery, mortars, Zllltl rocket launchers were well concealed, yet could register on both beaches in f'1ct, on any Joint of tl1e t ,.- . ,f 1 island Tl-1 -A' ' -- -' I it 1161131111 affoidcd excellent natural cover and concealment, a11d lent litselfj readily to the construc- tion. of SLllJ1CI'I'21llC2lll positions to which tl1e Japanese are addicted. ' , , , The diminutive size -of' Two Jima and its general . . , Tl1e defenders were dedicated to expending them- 1 barrenness. lack ot natural .facilities and resources should selves-but expending skillfully a11d protractedly 111 order lead no one either to minimize the importance of capturing to exact the uttermost toll from the attackers. Small won- it or to depreciate as unreasonable and unnecessary our der then that every step had to be won slowly by men l heavy losses in doing so. lt was important solely as an air inching' forward with hand weapons, and at heavy costs. l base, but as such its importance was great. Not only was the There was no other way of doing it. - of air attacl' bv our 1VI1r1anc1s-ba:ed B-291' materi- . . . . . l Webs-ure ,- X ' , -I I-1-C, fcl , Sf 7 , The sk1ll and gallantry of tl1e Marines in this exception- allv mtensified by the axai an ity o wo or topping them . . . . . . - . , , ,- , I - I - ,I Y , allv difficult enterprise was worthv of t11e1r best traditions OE with fuel and fo1 supplying tiem wit 1 ng 1ter cox er from - , . , A , , ' , - - , , - , - - - and deserving of the highest commendation. This was there on, but also there was a11 111crease 111 combat effective- ecuau V tru of the mural units actin in their Support ness of the B-29's due to the heightened morale of personnel, ,l .5 Q , c ' g -' .. b b loads and decrease in abortive Hightq There especially those engaged at tl1e hazardous beaches. Ameri- heavler Om ' ,, - , '- , - , D - X' . can historv offers no finer example of courage, ardor, and Was, moreover, a substantial saving in valuable hfe in the effbiencv ' , number of B-29's which would have been shot down over ' -' japan had there been no flghter cover, and in tl1e number I which would have been lost at sea had 1wo Jima not been Upon arrival at Saipan March 11, the Task Unit was available for emergency landing-s. It 15 estimated that tl1e dissolved, The Captain reported to the Port Director for on- liveg saved through this latter factor alone, subsequent to ward routing, which took us past Tinian and Guam to Ulltlll the capture of Iwo Jima, exceeded the lives lost in ,tl1e Atoll in the VVestern Caroline Islands. We arrived early March capture itself, 13 and reported to COIIIITIPHC for duty. l - :1 , tl., wi- -W ..Y?-B, :',,,,.? i . Y 17 1 ,,,l:,-- , l . 'ZfQ f- jf-J -T-' - -' '- -'- -, '- .- ,. , fi? '?T5?f62'z- . 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'AQ -G 5 - 'NE l Ulithi is a large atoil formed by many reefs and small 11123 IU3g3Zff1eSfW1tl1 9'mUJU111tEQU,3l1'1Elfligilgqplgizllgjilgliolsqilgi islands that provide an excellent anchorage Ellltl ideal staging mengal tales Od lifelmfatlgll- Hg? Woimhe deserted glands base for large operations. Xlfe XYlt1l6SSCCl the preparation of br1e stea an DCCF. par y on e . - - l one so large that we hardly believed what we saw, Almost The afternoon before our departure. ChL11'Cl1 SCFVICCS Weis HS far 33 One COL1ld SCC there WCVC Fllilis-sh1P5 of CVCYB' S1201 held on board-Catholic Mass in the mess hall and Protes- type and description, tant service on the boat deck for tl1e rest of tl1e crew. 16 . . , 1 , t solemnlty that gripped the crew and tl1e large attendance at We lay at anchor for six days surrounded by Q16 fllfali' these services was an indication of each man's anxiety con- Naval arlllafla m the tllsfofs' of the world' Carrlershimtii- cerning the coming campaign. 2 Ships, cruisers, destrovers small Jatrol and 1111116 Craft 121111 l ' - , 7 . I . A mg craft, and all the auxiliary ships necessary to 21 531111118 fleet were there. Signal lights blinked constantly, llaghoists streamed in the breeze, and radios blared, while ships' boats .cut c1'azy1p21ttG1'11H in the water as tl1ey raced from ship to ship. 'l he effect WHS one of complete confusion, but work lJI 'l!'fC55Cfl at toll Sllfefl- It soon became clear that there was complete and 6l:lflClCllt Organization behind it all. .The Sll3Ill1OlliS crew forgot heat that. was more. opprless- lflg than many had ever experienced anrljoined in this bee nyc of activity-loading stores. fiieling. inaking' repairs, lCDlLlll5l- :Xt 0900 March 19, just a month after the .beginning of tl1e It,-O Jima 'campaign we got underway, leaving the safety of our big-gunned brothers. The small craft formed 111to six columns of eight ships each and tl1e shepherding destroyer- minelavers took screening stations ahead and on tl1e flanks. ' . wo, as we were known, consisted of Sweep U,?iItl?ZyClItJC?uFl,'Il2, 13, 14 and 15, and included the Shannon, Robert H, Smith CDM ZSJ, Thomas E. Fraser CDM 245, Harry F Bauer QDM 26J, J, Wi1lia1n Ditter QDM 31J, Tracy CODM 101 AM's YMS's, PGM's, LC1's and LCS's. Commander of the, task group was CominDiv 7 fcapfam W- G- Beecher: USNJ in the Sl1anno11. 41