Seventh Infantry Division - Yearbook (South Korea)

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approaching Pork Chop, apparently in an effort to rein- force their newly won positions. DivArty promptly swung into action, pinpointing the enemy groups and bombarding them in addition to maintaining a continu- ous flash fire all around the outpost. Contact was also made with adjacent main battle positions and they too attacked the enemy with close support fire. The outpost became the subject of a bitter counterattack action which lasted until 11 July. Companies A and B, backed by Company E and Company F of the 32nd, performed counterattacks against the enemy. Groups of Colom- bians came into the battle, went out and returned. Company F attacked the enemy force which had infil- trated and Was beaten off. Other companies were sent in to reinforce the units already in combat with enemy forces. During the five-day seige, the weight of the fight shifted back and forth between the friendly forces and the Chinese. During the morning hours of 1 1 July, the Army Com- mander, Corps Commander and Division Commander Assembly and disassembly of the Browning Automatic Rifle

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While Division artillery shelled their positions, the Chi- nese also sent a dozen soldiers against the position but they withdrew following a five minute firefight with riflemen. Initial reports on the action along the Pork Chop line were received from Division artillery at 2241 on 6 July and these indicated that Flash Pork Chop, the close-in defensive fire for the position, was under heavy fire. At this time no accurate evaluation as to the size of the enemy force could be made. Reports on the size of the enemy contact, its location and disposition were vague due to communications difliculties. Also vague were re- ports pertaining to Company A of the 17th Infantry. Since conditions there were unknown, the 17th's Com- pany B was sent in to reinforce the position. The company worked its way into the area under fire and, unable to make contact with Company A, immediately at- tacked the enemy in an attempt to make contact with the initial company. During the iight they reported back to headquarters that groups of enemy troops were

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met to discuss the relative merits of continuing counter- attacks and occupation of the outpost. It was obvious from the size of the enemy forces already committed to the battle that the Chinese were determined to take and occupy Pork Chop outpost. It was also quiet possible that the enemy either intended or had intended to at- tempt a MBP penetration. By this time Pork Chop had lost any possible tactical value it had and since casual- ties were expected to be high, it was considered fruitless to continue reinforcing and counterattacking the posi- tion. Elements of two regiments and possibly a third had been thrown into the fight by the Chinese despite an estimated 4,000 casualties. The ground around Pork Chop was literally sown with steel from mortar and artillery fire. The decision was to withdraw from Pork Chop in a deliberate daylight evacuation. The plan was to pull back the remaining effective troops and dead after the wounded had been evacuated. UN units in the right sector, meanwhile, would cover for the withdraw- ing men and an officer in each sector was ordered to remain in the battle zone until the last man departed from that particular outpost. The plan was followed. By 1100, 11 July all UN casualties had been evacuated from the hot spot. As the evacuees struggled down the road from the outpost, tanks from the regimental tank company groaned along its shoulders smashing enemy snipers with heavy fire. The operation was thus com- pleted without a single casualty, despite the fact that the withdrawing troops had to cross an exposed section of road 1,000 yards long. In this manner, Pork Chop, one of the deadly hills along the MLR was lost to the Reds for the last time. Sixteen days later on the morning of 27 July at 0100 hours, the truce was signed, heralding the end of three years and one month of bitter fighting in Korea. To the men on the front lines, however, the truce meant twelve more hours of fighting, ducking incoming rounds, watching, waiting and sweating. At 1325, after the official word of the truce was is- sued to the men of the 31st Infantry Polar Bear Regi- ment, company commanders began the task of briefing their men on cease fire procedures, the meaning of the truce to military personnel and other important items that had to be covered to insure full compliance with the terms of the truce. The men were also cautioned against being over con- fident and jubilant. This, they were told, was a time for prayer, for watchful and careful conduct. At 1400 hours there were still eight hours to go. We busied ourselves cleaning weapons, checking gear in preparation for the hours of darkness. Outguards were briefed and told to be especially careful during the hours between darkness and 2200 hours-the moment of war's end. In a blocking position at 1 530 hours, religious services for men of K Company were being held. At 1900 hours, outpost Westview, an ominous patch of earth jutting out into No Man's Land, was quiet. Hours before it had been the scene of bitter fighting. Lt. Robert E. Chisholm, Dallas, Texas, L Company Commander, called his platoon leaders and sergeants into the command post for a final briefing. At 2100 hours, six mortar rounds were fired into Chisholm's position.