Seventh Infantry Division - Yearbook (South Korea)

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Pvt. George Hodkinson, llondon, Englundj talking with Col Luther W Evans Chaolum uf the 45th Surgical Hospital they poured eight more rounds into the debris just to make sure. The most consistent activity, however, was patrol activity and the most successful of that, the ambush tactic. Typical was a patrol action in early February against four prominent knobs on an enemy ridge some 1,300 yards long. The knobs, with typical G.I. -humor, had been named Ace, King, Queen and Jack. Involved in the action were the I and R Platoon of the 32nd In- fantry and the 3rd Platoon of the 32nd Infantry's Company K. On 31 January, 1953, eight members of the I and R Platoon were attached to the 3rd Battalion for recon patrol. They were to reconnoiter areas in front of the battalion sector and investigate known and suspected enemy patrol routes. This was routine. It happened day in and day out along Line JAMESTOWN. If possible, the patrol was to locate positions where, from ambush, they could seize enemy prisoners. For ten days, under direction of First Lieutenant Don Delaney, the eight- man group operated with negative results. Even though the group had failed to contact the enemy around Jack, Chinese patrols were known to occasionally travel routes in that area. Sergeant Lyons believed a proper ambush in that vicinity would produce results and Delaney, at first convinced they should give up and try elsewhere, finally agreed to give it a try. On the 11th the ambush

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After having been awarded Korea's highest award the Taeguk medal with Gold Star, Mai. General William F. Dean lcenterj receives a bouquet of flowers from ROK President Syngman Rhee, as General Mark W. Clark looks on. POW REPATRIATION The use of tanks to blast enemy bunkers and also the accuracy of artillery spotters became more proficient each day. They were nicknamed shoots, these lines of fire from our artillery and tank guns to the enemy bunkers. Once, Second Lieutenant Albert Dela Garza, Jr., of San Antonio, Texas, scored a bullseye which caused a strong Chinese point literally to go to pieces. Garza used a 105 howitzer, a weapon rarely used for pinpoint accuracy. Spotting a camouflaged opening to a Red emplacement about 35 feet below the ridge he directed six missiles into the area of the one-foot high, five-foot wide aperture. The sixth shot failed to explode. Then a moment later the entire hillside collapsed in a belch of dirt and flame. The shot had gone right through the minute hole. Suspenseful duels between enemy and UN gunners also were frequent. A crew of recoilless riflemen from the Buffalo Regiment stood face-to-face with a Red 105-millimeter cannon one afternoon and for forty-five minutes the two fired away at each other. The cannon had for three days been harassing UN positions both day and night. After 60 hours of watchful waiting, an infantry spotter saw the Reds moving the heavy gun into an open position. Cpl. Ferriel G. Case, of Marion, Ind., and PFC Jimmie Aponte Diaz, of Puerto Rico, moved out directly in front of the gun and began to calculate the gun's position. Case, the first gunner, fired a white phosphorous round and it puffed its tell- tale clue near the gun. The howitzer answered and its projectile went screaming twenty feet over the heads of Case and Diaz. Each shell Case and Diaz fired fell closer to the cannon. But each time the howitzer an- swered with a round that boomed nearer the two rifle- men. The seventh shot fired by Case found its mark. The enemy cannon disappeared in a cloud of black smoke. The two boys fell back and sighed relief. Then

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was planned. It was to be executed the night of 12 February and called for a twelve-man I and R ambush squad and a ten-man support squad to be furnished by Company K. A ten-man alert squad would also be furnished by that company. Sergeant Lyons would com- mand. Lyons decided to set the ambush squad on Jack and the support on Queen. The approach route for both squads would be the trail along the top of the fingerlike ridge. Ambush would deploy an inverted Ui, formation on the north slope of the knob, support would form a perimeter around Queen. Lyons hoped to catch a Chi- nese patrol moving south into either of the valleys flanking Jack. He would Wait until the Reds were well into the south of Jack, then slip his ambush squad into the valley behind them. By forming an east-west skir- mish line, Lyons could open up in the enemy and when they withdrew to the north, support on Queen would get a crack at them. Success depended on an early arrival at Jack since Lyons could hardly hope to spring an ambush if the Chinese patrol had already passed this position. Also a late arrival could greatly increase the possibility that the ambush squad would walk into a trap itself. In recent Weeks, more than one 32nd patrol had been assaulted by Chinese in ambush positions. The patrol members conducted rehearsals during the afternoon of the 11th and at 1830, 12 February, the ambush squad's point man climbed from his trench. In single file, with ten-yard intervals, the ambush squad began its march along the top of the finger to Ace. The patrol reached Queen about 1910. Corporal Leo Hilton assumed the point position. The AR man dropped be- hind Hilton just in front of Lyons. The ambush squad then moved off Queen, through the black, moonless night, toward Jack. Support, following about 15 min- utes behind ambush, reached Queen about 1915. Ser- geant Acebado, in charge of support, deployed his men into a perimeter. At about 1918, Hilton, now the point man for ambush, turned to Lyons and whispered: We're at Jack. Ambush set up the horseshoe as they had rehearsed it. Lyons, meanwhile, intended to make a tour of the horseshoe, then pick up the man with the 4