Seventh Infantry Division - Yearbook (South Korea)

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the 32nd Regiment. Within a few minutes the 10th, 49th, 31st and 75th Field Artillery Battalions joined them. Both sides were now on the receiving end of direct and bloody bombardments. SFC John Fulcher, platoon sergeant of the 2nd Pla- toon, was in the cornmunications trench when the enemy shells began ripping into the UN lines. Sergeant Fulcher, two other Americans and two ROKS comprised the 2nd Platoon's force. Later Fulcher told his story: When this Chinese mortar and artillery started to work on us we got low and stayed low. It was explosion on top of explosion. Not one of the other members of the platoon made it up the reverse side of the slope to join us. After about an hour, the artillery started to slack up and I poked my head out of the trench. Chinese were swarming up the right finger in front of me. The lead Chinks were only fifty yards away. I emptied my M-1 down the slope but I don't know if I hit any of them. Then I crawled over to the heavy machine gun in the trench and found it had been damaged by the artillery fire. By this time the Chinks were jumping into the commo trench about twenty yards to my right. I crawled out of the trench, over the ridgeline, and started down the reverse slope. Both of the other GIs got out of the trench too. I don't know what happened to the ROKS. When I was about fifty yards below the ridgeline the Chinks cut loose down the slope with burp guns so I found a hole and crawled in. Some 2nd Platoon men were in holes nearby. In a couple of minutes the Chinks had a machine gun set up on the east knob and were firing down the slope. When they realized they had some of us pinned down they started rolling concussion grenades down the slope. Only a miracle saved the remainder of the 2nd Pla- toon from being wiped out. By 1915, Lieutenant Mad- dox found himself with an entire platoon hopelessly out of position and Chinese holding the ridge between the west knob of Hill Jane Russell and Company L. Minutes after seizing the knob the Chinese had two machine guns in operation. One was firing down the slope at the survivors of the 2nd Platoon, the other was chattering at the west knob, held by the 1st Platoon. Rifles and burp guns were also being used on the west knob. Mad- dox began establishing a strong point on the west knob, directing the AR team on the right of the lst Platoon to direct fire on the machine gun positions. At 2000 the 3rd Platoon received the first of several small enemy attacks along its positions. A Chinese platoon was on the slope in front of them. The two platoons battled each other for two hours with automatic and small weapons fire. Thirty riflemen, two ARS and a light ma- chine gun were ripping the east knob with fire and the Chinese assault began to lessen. At 2200, Maddox brought ten men from the 3rd Platoon to the west knob and instructed them to assault the Chinese positions. With the riflemen and automatic weapons men blasting the east knob with cover fire, the ten-man assault team crawled across the skirmish line and started up the opposite ridge toward the Chinese position. Firing from the hip, their guns booming continually, they charged toward the Reds. They were within thirty yards of the enemy when burp guns suddenly cut loose in their faces. Four of the men whirled and fell. The rest dropped as the burp guns tore up the ground around them. Con- vinced they could go no further they dragged their Wounded comrades back toward the UN position, but not until they had taken one Red captive. By now Maddox was convinced that his position could prevent any additional Chinese advance but was too slim to conduct any successful counterattack. Shortly before 2300, he called Major Buckner on the PRC-10 and told him an additional platoon was needed to drive the Chinese off the ridge. Meanwhile the failure of Com- pany G to assault the position caused a lull in the fight-

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3rd Squads Were told to get ready for the assault. Lieu- tenant Wright attached the lst Squad automatic rifle to the 2nd in order that it would have automatic weap- ons power. Wright then had an assault group consisting of eighteen men including two AR men. Maddox had 45 riflemen with two light machine guns and four ARS to furnish support fire. At 0200 the men on the west knob began the support fire. PFC Joseph N. Nulph, the AR man attached to the 2nd Squad, describes the assault: We moved into the saddle between the two knobs in a skirmish line. Some of the support fire from the West knob Was going right over our heads. Illuminating rounds were bursting over the Chinese positions. I was firing short bursts from the AR as we moved. The rifle- men were rushing up the hill beside me, firing from the hip for the most part. The Chinese seemed Well pinned downg I think We moved about fifty yards and didn't draw a shot from the Chinks. When We got about twenty yards of the Chinese most of the men on the west knob had to lift their support fire or hit us. Then the Chinese opened up with quick bursts from burp guns and lobbed some concussion grenades down the slope. We hit the ground. They were firing right down our throats. I think a couple of our men were stunned from the grenades, but the burp guns just kicked up a lot of dirt around us. Some of the riflemen tossed their grenades up on the crest of the knob. I fired a short burst on the knob and crawled a few yards to my left and got into the commo trench. My assistant was right with me. I reloaded the AR and we started to move forward up the trench. Every few feet we stopped and I put a burst on the east knob. I think the Chink burp gun iire stopped when the riflemen's grenades exploded on the crest of the knob. My assistant and I worked our way right up to the crest of the east