Randolph (CVA 15) - Naval Cruise Book

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when the Greek ships covered the flank off the army at the pass the odds were about 270 to 900 ships. .Xl- though in these first encounters the Greek ships proved individually superior to the Persians, the action was inconclusive. The Greek armies retreated to the Isthmus of Corinth, and the ships to the island of Salanris, while Xerxes' 'rrrny plundered Athens. Gould the Persians have landed 'r SllbSl'IHI1l tl force behind the Greek position at the Isthmus the defeat of Greece would have been certain but the existence of an active Creek Egyptian Galley naval force prevented this operation. A minority of Xerxes' advisors argued that the Greek ships could not sustain themselves long at Salamis, and that it would be better to let time defeat the Greek defense than to risk everything in a battle. Xerxes admitted the wis- dom of this advice, but the considerable success of the Greeks in the naval battles off Thermopylae had wounded Persian pride, and because his numerical superiority was so great Xerxes decided to force an engagement. The position of the Greeks made it possible for the Persians to send a detachment around the island and cut off the possibility of retreat, but Themistocles in- sisted that the heavy odds against the Greeks could only be resisted rn n rrrow waters ind he is IS resolved to fight if thc Persr ins would oblige htm Xcrxes did oblige him both by blocking r retrert and by sending lns fleet into the strait for 1 decrsrse b rttle There is about .1 mile of WltC1 between the rsl ind of Salnnis ind the m rrnlrnd which rllowcd room for 1 front of about 80 ships The Persi tns sent 700 ships uound the island which the Creeks opposed with I0 shit s so thcre were tbout 000 Persrrn ships opposed by '70 Greek ships rn the rn un b tttle Ising Xcrxcs took his s ition on 1 throne erettcd on Mount Xegilos on I ic mainland shore to observe the forth-coming virtory. and to admonislr his men to greater glory by his personal presence. The tactics of the two nations were sigrrifirantly dil- ferentg Greek soldiers were heavily armored and fought with the spc-ar and the sword, while the Per- sians fought with the bow and arrow, and preferred to fight at a distance. Naval warfare differed from land w'rrl rre only in that thc light ships of the time could easily be sunk by r'nnming, warships being fitted with it hear y beak below the water-line. A close engagement was favorable to tr heavy Greek troops, ss rereas the Persians at- tempted to envelope their enemy 'rnd destroy him with superior fire-power. The rival fleets approached c'1ch other slowly to save the strength of the rowers, and met about noon in the middle of the channel. The Persian ships in the rear continued to press forward under the eyes of the Great King, which threw the front line into great confusion. The fighting was desperate, but gradually the Greeks forced the Persian line backwards, redoubling the press and filling the water with broken ships and dying men. The Greeks were able to keep room to maneu- ver, and to bring forward fresh ships from the rear ranks, while the confusion of the Persian fleet made it all the easier to ram their ships. Hlhen the Persians were forced back to the mouth of the channel they turned their prows to 1'IlI1 to the open sea. and the day was won for the Greeks. Thernistocles longed to PLIFSLIC the Persian fleet to its complete destruction. but the allies of Athens, their object won. were un- willing to risk further battle. It was discovered that 200 Persian ships had been sunk or captured. against 110 lost by the Greeks. Xerxes returned to Persia to attend to domestic troubles, leaving an arms' to winter i11 Greece and continue the canrpngn in the Sprint' nl lie next sen this army 11 is deferred rl the ltnd battle ol l'l1t1e1 its tl it urs clrnuni vcr rgnn could tie ersirns rusttr it 1 x ce is 11d Jten turned ui rs rn tns 1 un iugn n 1 ens wrs rebuilt lor whit urosetl to 1 tl1 C o 1 Xge of Crcete C s s s U l rt 1 r DCIIIK III I I IIN I IIil r -. L I 2 . 3,2 i ' ' al ' gp i 1 y '11 - - J '-f . V Q , .Q Y V . .' Q Y' i -V ' V I X . ' C 1 . A 4 . 1 'I 1 ' 1 . 4 4 1 1 1 l . , ' z ' 2 , 'J ' O and tl time the Persian rrcz 'ag - ' ' ated. -' 1 S ' 'z 1' 2 . ' Ne itll' i 'l I' 5 n 5 sr 'l a 'ast 2 ' 1 1 2 ' - '.f.z forf :Q lz I1 . ' 1 'z l -1 rg' ,g il 1 K 2 ' 5 1 1 ' 2 ' 2 i' ' ' ,Xth .' sz: ' i U' 'S I' lv e Ellen ' ' . ' h 4v'f , .3 l V V , ' V I Y V ' Q A ' - - 1 - I - 1 . 4 ,' 1 ' ' ', 7 ' ' ' 'i T -' -' 'I L I - 'J-X Th- victory at Salanrix :crur'etl the control ol' thc ' I ' ' N 1 . z Q u f L sea: to Atliens, and i11 the following years sie ea 1 ed I i 'i 'V ' i 2 i ' Y .' ' a rich reward in rnaritiiut' t'UlIIIlIt'I'tl'. lu order to itz 1 ' ' 1' 1' T J I ' : Q: I l intl l' - her control ol' turtle. .Xtl e 3 l'o'i l au 1 1

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The destruction of the French fleet off the Nile on the lst August 1798 by a squadron of British ships under the command of Adm. Nelson real strength, and that the ambition ol' Persia was such that she would undoubtedly make a second attempt in much greater force. Themistocles ranks among the ablest strategists of military history. Not only did he insist to his con- temporaries that they must prepare for an invasion on an unheard-of scale, he insisted that only sea-power could possibly save Greece, and it was because ol' his vigorous leadership that Athens procured in good time a fleet of 200 fighting ships. This fleet was a great expense to Athens in peace-time, but in the event they were to light against desperate odds, and did in fart provide the only means to prevent the sulijugation ol all of Greece. When at last, ten years after Marathon, the Persians ?,ng.in their advanre into Greece, this time under King l l Xerxes, the army numbered at least 350,000 men escorted by more than 1300 ships. In order to arrive in overwhelming force the Persians marched over- land around the Aegean Sea, the ships being used to augment supply and to protect the seaward flank of the army. So ponderous was this great armament that six months were required to transfer it into the heart ol' Greece. The Greeks were divided as to where to make a stand, the Peloponnesians wanting to hold the Isth- mus of Corinth, which would have left Athens to be destroyed. In the event a half-hearted effort was made to hold the pass at Thermopylae with a force of only A1000 men, who were annihilated in the course of the most gallant fight of ancient times. just prior to this battle 400 Persian ships were lost in a gale, so that

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organization called the Delian League, in which her fleet played the role ol keeper of the peace for a num- ber of smaller sea-faring cities. Gradually the league took on the color of an ,Xtheuian empire as Athenian naval dominance became more obvious, and as het treasury filled with an increasing flow of tribute ,-,. . ,LV '--xv 5 .4 if t '9 V U F i rw A We iifg??lfs . rv X- ' TN, .NX , 43 f Q- t' 1j I5 Greek Oarsman money. XfVith the seas policed against pirates and raiders, the Delian League would have been profitable for all concerned, except that in the end Athens be- came arrogant, and her demands exorbitant. From 432 B.C. until 404 B.C. the cities of Corinth and Sparta with numerous allies fought the Peloponnesian XfVars against Athens to free themselves from what had become the heavy yoke . of the Delian League. Athens held out alone during this long period because of the great economic strength given her by her overseas trade, but in the end she was exhausted by the war, her fleet was destroyed and the city capitulated to a siege. This marked the end of the great days of Athens, and there- after the scene of naval warfare shifted to other emerging powers. During the third century B.C. in the Yvestern Mediterranean two new powers, Rome and Carthage, were expanding mightily, and it began to appear that one of them must prevail over the western world. Until 2611 B.C. Rome had limited her conquests to the mainland of peninsular Italy, and her wars were fought more for political security than for economic profit. Carthage, a city on the coast of Africa near Tunis, was fabulously wealthy, and ruled a commercial empire extending throughout the WVcst.ern Mediterranean, including I3 Spain, Sardinia, and Sicily. The first instance of the extension of Roman power overseas occurred in 264 PLC. when the town of Messina in Sicily appealed to Rottie for help against the city of Syracuse. The Roman Senate considered the decision to send an army overseas for the first time so momentous, as it proved to be, that they submitted the issue to the people of Rome in a referendum, which was passed. The First Punic YVar originated when Carthage at- tempted to resist Rome's entrance into Sicily. At this time Rome had little experience on the sea, but it soon became apparent that a fleet was needed to protect communications with Sicily and to defend the coastal towns of Italy. In only two months Rome performed the prodigious feat of building and train- ing a navy of 120 warships. These ships were slower and less seaworthy than the ships of Carthage, but the balance was redressed by the installation of one of the earliest examples of a secret weapon, the corvus. In a border's fight Roman legionaries, the best troops in the world, could be expected to win, but the handier Carthaginian ships were able to ram at will and retreat with ease. The corvus was a swivel- mounted gangway rigged with a topping-lift and htted with a heavy spike. Xvhen the enemy approached to rain, the corvus was let go, the spike held fast in the wooden deck, and the well-armored Romans poured in among their victims. In the first fleet action of the Roman Trireme war, the Battle of Mylae, the Roman landsmen used this device so effectively as to win a smashing victory. The great naval battle of the war was fought in 256 13.61. oflf Mount Ecnomus on the south coast of Sicily. In order to carry the war into Africa, Rome had mounted a large landing-force, which was to be escorted by the entire fleet. Carthage stationed her fleet some thirty-five miles along the coast from the Roman base in a position to intercept the convoy, her