Randolph (CVA 15) - Naval Cruise Book

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The destruction of the French fleet off the Nile on the lst August 1798 by a squadron of British ships under the command of Adm. Nelson real strength, and that the ambition ol' Persia was such that she would undoubtedly make a second attempt in much greater force. Themistocles ranks among the ablest strategists of military history. Not only did he insist to his con- temporaries that they must prepare for an invasion on an unheard-of scale, he insisted that only sea-power could possibly save Greece, and it was because ol' his vigorous leadership that Athens procured in good time a fleet of 200 fighting ships. This fleet was a great expense to Athens in peace-time, but in the event they were to light against desperate odds, and did in fart provide the only means to prevent the sulijugation ol all of Greece. When at last, ten years after Marathon, the Persians ?,ng.in their advanre into Greece, this time under King l l Xerxes, the army numbered at least 350,000 men escorted by more than 1300 ships. In order to arrive in overwhelming force the Persians marched over- land around the Aegean Sea, the ships being used to augment supply and to protect the seaward flank of the army. So ponderous was this great armament that six months were required to transfer it into the heart ol' Greece. The Greeks were divided as to where to make a stand, the Peloponnesians wanting to hold the Isth- mus of Corinth, which would have left Athens to be destroyed. In the event a half-hearted effort was made to hold the pass at Thermopylae with a force of only A1000 men, who were annihilated in the course of the most gallant fight of ancient times. just prior to this battle 400 Persian ships were lost in a gale, so that

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7 THE E TROUBLED WATERS The history of naval power in the Mediterranean Sea is very ancient and very honorable. The cruise of the Randolph and her crew chronicled in this book is the latest page in a story of ships and men that stretches back thousands of years to a time of which our only records are legendary ones. The present dominant position of the American navy in these waters is of such recent origin that it is proper that we should bear ourselves respectfully, and begin our book by honoring the deeds of the great sailors in whose wakes we sail. There is another and weightier reason for con- sidering what has gone before us in this sea. The duty we have performed has cost us much in time, effort, money, and lives. It would not have been re- quired of us were it not of the utmost importance to our government. The events at which we shall briefly look in this introduction are the great days of naval history, when the actions of sailors dictated the course of world history. Wife shall see that it is not only in the middle of the twentieth century, and not only to the American people, that naval control of the Medi- terranean has been a matter of anxious concern and great moment. In 1194 B.C. Agamemnon, King of Mycenae, led a great allied fleet of the kingdoms of Greece and of Crete against the heavily fortified city of Troy. A beachhead was established, and a combined land and sea war of attrition was conducted for ten years before Troy capitulated, and was razed to the ground. As is so often the case in naval warfare, the question at issue in the Trojan VVar was sea-borne trade. Troy was a great naval power, and lay in a situation com- manding the Hellespont, nowadays called the Dardan- elles. Her navy demanded and received tribute from all the traffic along what was then the great East-lfVest trade route from the Mediterranean to the far shore of the Black Sea. The Greek kingdoms were young and vigorous sea-faring nations who chafed under this domineering influence, and longed to assume for them- selves control of this rich trade. They were a people given to warring among themselves, but economic necessity at last led them to combine in force sulli- cient to match the strongest and most civilized power of the time. The Greeks did not attempt to cut Troy's lines of communication to the interior of Asia Minor, but systematically raided the sea-ports of the neighboring coast-line, thus cutting off Troy' from the sea. Since the wealth of Troy derived from trade, this policy had the effect of draining Troy's treasury, and divid- ing her from her allies, the states of the interior, who no longer found a market for their goods in Troy. These allies were more than willing to do business with the Greeks, but the strength of Troy was such that she held out for ten years of siege. The legend of the wooden horse is considered to be apocryphal. perhaps deriving from the fact that Troy was carried at last by means of huge wooden engines covered with wet horsehide as protection against Hre. The effect of the Trojan XVar was the complete destruction of the greatest Mediterranean power'ol the day, and the transfer of economic and military dominance to the Greeks for a period of a thousand years. In view of the vast effort and magnificent prize involved in this war, the legend that it was essentially an affair of honor fought over a woman is considered fanciful. The first great fleet action in naval history took place on 23 September 480 B.C. in the narrow waters between the island of Salamis and the peninsula of Piraeus. NVhen Randolph anchored oll Piraeus many of us ascended the Acropolis of Athens. from which height our guides pointed out the site of this famous battle, which saved Greece from being over-run by a vast Persian army. In 4190 BLK. Darius. the King of Persia. had landed at Marathon an amphibious force of 50.000 men who were to strike at Athens. This army was opposed at its beach-head and defeated by a numerically inferior Athenian army, forcing the Persians to re-embark and return to Asia. Marathon was a great victory which led many of the Greeks to hope that the threat from Persia had been destroyed, but the wiser heads among lheni, notably 'lheuristocles of Xthens. knew that the Persian army at Marathon was only a fraction of her lil

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when the Greek ships covered the flank off the army at the pass the odds were about 270 to 900 ships. .Xl- though in these first encounters the Greek ships proved individually superior to the Persians, the action was inconclusive. The Greek armies retreated to the Isthmus of Corinth, and the ships to the island of Salanris, while Xerxes' 'rrrny plundered Athens. Gould the Persians have landed 'r SllbSl'IHI1l tl force behind the Greek position at the Isthmus the defeat of Greece would have been certain but the existence of an active Creek Egyptian Galley naval force prevented this operation. A minority of Xerxes' advisors argued that the Greek ships could not sustain themselves long at Salamis, and that it would be better to let time defeat the Greek defense than to risk everything in a battle. Xerxes admitted the wis- dom of this advice, but the considerable success of the Greeks in the naval battles off Thermopylae had wounded Persian pride, and because his numerical superiority was so great Xerxes decided to force an engagement. The position of the Greeks made it possible for the Persians to send a detachment around the island and cut off the possibility of retreat, but Themistocles in- sisted that the heavy odds against the Greeks could only be resisted rn n rrrow waters ind he is IS resolved to fight if thc Persr ins would oblige htm Xcrxes did oblige him both by blocking r retrert and by sending lns fleet into the strait for 1 decrsrse b rttle There is about .1 mile of WltC1 between the rsl ind of Salnnis ind the m rrnlrnd which rllowcd room for 1 front of about 80 ships The Persi tns sent 700 ships uound the island which the Creeks opposed with I0 shit s so thcre were tbout 000 Persrrn ships opposed by '70 Greek ships rn the rn un b tttle Ising Xcrxcs took his s ition on 1 throne erettcd on Mount Xegilos on I ic mainland shore to observe the forth-coming virtory. and to admonislr his men to greater glory by his personal presence. The tactics of the two nations were sigrrifirantly dil- ferentg Greek soldiers were heavily armored and fought with the spc-ar and the sword, while the Per- sians fought with the bow and arrow, and preferred to fight at a distance. Naval warfare differed from land w'rrl rre only in that thc light ships of the time could easily be sunk by r'nnming, warships being fitted with it hear y beak below the water-line. A close engagement was favorable to tr heavy Greek troops, ss rereas the Persians at- tempted to envelope their enemy 'rnd destroy him with superior fire-power. The rival fleets approached c'1ch other slowly to save the strength of the rowers, and met about noon in the middle of the channel. The Persian ships in the rear continued to press forward under the eyes of the Great King, which threw the front line into great confusion. The fighting was desperate, but gradually the Greeks forced the Persian line backwards, redoubling the press and filling the water with broken ships and dying men. The Greeks were able to keep room to maneu- ver, and to bring forward fresh ships from the rear ranks, while the confusion of the Persian fleet made it all the easier to ram their ships. Hlhen the Persians were forced back to the mouth of the channel they turned their prows to 1'IlI1 to the open sea. and the day was won for the Greeks. Thernistocles longed to PLIFSLIC the Persian fleet to its complete destruction. but the allies of Athens, their object won. were un- willing to risk further battle. It was discovered that 200 Persian ships had been sunk or captured. against 110 lost by the Greeks. Xerxes returned to Persia to attend to domestic troubles, leaving an arms' to winter i11 Greece and continue the canrpngn in the Sprint' nl lie next sen this army 11 is deferred rl the ltnd battle ol l'l1t1e1 its tl it urs clrnuni vcr rgnn could tie ersirns rusttr it 1 x ce is 11d Jten turned ui rs rn tns 1 un iugn n 1 ens wrs rebuilt lor whit urosetl to 1 tl1 C o 1 Xge of Crcete C s s s U l rt 1 r DCIIIK III I I IIN I IIil r -. L I 2 . 3,2 i ' ' al ' gp i 1 y '11 - - J '-f . V Q , .Q Y V . .' Q Y' i -V ' V I X . ' C 1 . A 4 . 1 'I 1 ' 1 . 4 4 1 1 1 l . , ' z ' 2 , 'J ' O and tl time the Persian rrcz 'ag - ' ' ated. -' 1 S ' 'z 1' 2 . ' Ne itll' i 'l I' 5 n 5 sr 'l a 'ast 2 ' 1 1 2 ' - '.f.z forf :Q lz I1 . ' 1 'z l -1 rg' ,g il 1 K 2 ' 5 1 1 ' 2 ' 2 i' ' ' ,Xth .' sz: ' i U' 'S I' lv e Ellen ' ' . ' h 4v'f , .3 l V V , ' V I Y V ' Q A ' - - 1 - I - 1 . 4 ,' 1 ' ' ', 7 ' ' ' 'i T -' -' 'I L I - 'J-X Th- victory at Salanrix :crur'etl the control ol' thc ' I ' ' N 1 . z Q u f L sea: to Atliens, and i11 the following years sie ea 1 ed I i 'i 'V ' i 2 i ' Y .' ' a rich reward in rnaritiiut' t'UlIIIlIt'I'tl'. lu order to itz 1 ' ' 1' 1' T J I ' : Q: I l intl l' - her control ol' turtle. .Xtl e 3 l'o'i l au 1 1