Okinawa (LPH 3) - Naval Cruise Book

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WA A of 1944 drew near, the strategy of the war in armies in the United Kingdom were attack to enter the continent of Europe and .... undertake heart of Cermanv and the destmction of her armed forces. The allied forces now concentrated their efforts toward an unremittmg military pressure against Japanese military and naval might. Due to a strong .lapanese drive on Chungking indications were that the Japanese might attempt to force a separate peace with China. Consequently. Admiral Chester W. Nimitz advanced the view that establish- ment of positions on the China coast. in order to supply and equip the Chinese and exploit their manpower potential. appeared essential. The resulting campaign plan, dubbed CAUSEWAY, was to secure positions on Formosa as a base for very long range bombers and in order to get supplies into China. However. with the continued success of .lapanese offensives against the Chinese. the ineffectiveness of China's forces was implied and the cxpcdicncy of attempting to support a Chinese land campaign was rendered doubtful. Allied might was then turned toward a direct push to reach the industrial heart of Japan. On October 3, lfllal. .-Xme-rican force- in the Pacific Ocean areas received a directive to seize positions in the Ryukyu islands. 'l'hc island of Okinawa acquired a special significance since it was -elf-rteil for the initial penetration of lapan's inner ring of defenses. and its capture- was to be thi- pri-luilc to the invasion of Japan. From Okinawa long range bombing mi--ions would be condut-to-d against the japanese mainland. The invasion of Okinawa, Opt-ration ltflllll Htl, was to follow the capture of lwo ,lima from which fire support unit- and close .ur -upport would votttv. and the occupation of Luzon which was to provide prompt ri-lo-aw ot' -upporting naval forces and assault shipping. 'fhc .lapant-se high conunand re-.ilm-il that time for reinforcing thc inner defenses was growing woefully -hort. liottxtttriul that thi- cm-nit would not be defeated on Okinawa, thc strategy for fortification of the island prove:-ili-fl under a plan of defense from ex- tensive underground position- in order lo di-nv the invasion force the use of the island for as long a period as possiltlf. and causing it the izreate-st casualties. Shari. in the southern bortion of the island was selected as thc he-art of Okinawa's defenses. The twisted. confus- ed character of thc terrain surrounding Shuri featured est-arpements. steep slopes, and narrow ravines that showed no discernible pattern. The Shuri bastion assumed the form of a series of concentric rings. each bristling with dug-in mutually supported weapons. The outer perimetcrs of defenders were instructed to make a fighting withdrawal to these prepared positions. to extract a terrific toll in lives for every yard of allied advance. The dawn of Easter Sunday. l945. saw the Pacific's largest fleet positioned for the initial Amphibious Assault on Okinawa. A British armada guarded the south flank. An American carrier task force stood poised to intercept attacks from the Imperial home- land less than 400 miles away. At 0406 the traditional signal was given to Land the Landing Force . and shortly before daylight the assault on Okinawa opened with a crash of naval gunfire. ' As air support arrived over the target in force, the assault troops began the 4,000 yard run to the beach in landing craft. Resistance met at the beach front was almost negligible. The path was cleared rapidly and the assault forces surged inland. were linked and the invading forces had successfully completed the initial

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K. ,fi -t. 1-s , ., isfhtifv. ,, Q as 0 ' w- -fplaiaf , . f f ,.f. lt'-f'j - 1 ,,4,,, 1 ' if , s R-u..:, ,r ' 1 ,if--we -0' , 1 ' 'i Q' . f- -- t'is:f 41 Q ,- ,U M- -. A: . t -.-- . .K W 5 0 ' at land The Landing Force XllIl'l'll'llll l't'F r l '!il'l l 'fl11 ? llffljfr lllland in Search-tif thiefhenetriilovni tildhgeiifilzigfiii l,, ,-J,-It tpril the ent-iiii nas niet in lull loree at the blltlfl IHS- .te Siceeginglv difficult .it .l.tptttli'sa' lort't's -'oiipleil with the lortress-like terrain ma e ldef d rswere deter- tiu' thi- Xiiivriviiii troops to gain strategic footholds. The Japanese een e d He rice uuui-tl to light lo tlii- di-athf The bloody t-onflict raged for nearly two months anl it h Pthe ul' Kim-rii-abit xivttirx uns high. ,-Xn estimated 50.000 Japanese troops were kilec In Sliuri liiuhting. .Xiiieriiftiii dead numbered l for every 10 of the enemy. . , . Q e- - nsuccessful Xlti-r thi- ilovisiw defeat at bhuri. the Japanese attempted one laei U denoting vuiiiitci- utfi-iisiw. Un ,lune 22. 10-15 the American flag was raised over Okinawa 1 the end -if organized resistaiiec. Uxcrwlieliiiiiti .Xmeriean naval might had exacted a terrific toll on the defelptifefs- ln a valiant attempt to hold Okinawa. approximately 110 000 Japanese UOOPS were I ' The final count of -Xinerican casualties was the highest experienced in any campaign against the Japanese. Total :Xmerican battle casualties were 49151. The Battle of Okinawa was the largest Amphibious Battle that our sea, land. alflg 31131100 1i0 '95 10113111 during World War ll in the Pacific Theater. This fact coupe ivith-the tradition that aircraft carriers have previously been named for battleS famous lp hiitogumade it natural that this special type of aircraft carrier, this AmPh1b'ou5 . ssaut - .hip, amid be named Uss OKINAWA. 1 The amphibious warfare vessel was a development of World War ll.