Midway (CV 41) - Naval Cruise Book

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5uch fl . Qcirca 19 the hist0l i are an 4 HE onlY are THE NAVY wltltlll U onYWhe' neC955q' slf0le9 ln the world at l96l,the Cold War is a distressing Country, and E0 S:'llP C0UlCl eVe P0fllClP0l6 eltective- 1 endian: but inescapable tact of lite. At o time when actual ly in such a att e. Seated war consists ofIlY of occoslolwl fine Sl 0f'l '9 mid MOBILITY onensiv guerrilla warfare in variioia 'hotsp0lt.siea guna orbig Those who predicted the N0VY'S inevitable ohio' ventioni struggle between Egstnagior mx' :Susie ways. The lescence soon realized that a sea-borne force pos. cggwacggz 330: Z no' manly milimryl but political, sessed a tremendously valuable asset to modern nocongc' pwcll?'o?ic'ol' a.ndI:tlo:':i:E1 As long wclhhizredzeflzrisliiiilysense, mobility provides a military mini i srae In - - - -- asT rgll-ociilnmnuurizlear waTYremains unworkable as a bose wth C kgregier deirei Oli' Invulnzxslmynr lleet, l means to world domination, the Soviet effort at enemy alloc ' 'Sparse O WI cnyw on 0 090-ol present is to lessen United States prestige and influence abroad, lament discord between the United States and her allies, obtain political and economic control ol uncommitted nations, and push this country and her ideology right back to her own borders. The methods available to the West lor combating this strategy and maintaining peace are numerous, ranging from Radio Free Europe to the Organization of American States. Yet the sine qua non of an effective counter-strategy is strength military strength, Not only can military strength prevent total war, but it is an inescapable foundation for foreign policy. lt enables this country to speak with authority during periods ol crisis. lt acts as a deterrent to local military aggression by the Com- munists. lt reassures American allies. ln sum this backbone of military strength allows the United States to move decisively on both the military and non military fronts of the Cold War. THE UNITED STATES NAVY An integral part of this country s military Copa btlmes is the United States Navy From the days of colorful and legendary sea battles between crusty men ol war the Navy has evolved today into a mammouth fighting force of over 800000 officers and men including l75000 Marines and 860 ships on active duty armed with the most modern weapons and weapon systems As America 5 acknowledged First Line of Defense the Fleet covers a front of some l0O00 miles all over the World Although the great importance of the Fleet to United States military strategy is now generally accepted It was widely thought after the develop ment of so-called ultimate weapons that the era of the sea going fighting force was at an end Future wars, it was felt, would be total holocausts waged between opposing ICBM s launched from the Mother millions of square miles ot ocean, a moving naval task force is extremely difficult to locate. The location ot a land missile base on the other hand must remain stationary and therefore much easier pinpoint. Furthermore even a successful kill on one or a few sea bases would immediately alert all the other deployed naval units. Thus to be COITI- pletely eltective a surprise attack must destroy of this country's mobile bases, and destroy simultaneously--a feat of extreme ditticulty. Ottensively, mobility contributes great to a military policy. The mobile task force move immediately to an area of crisis and ashore quickly. If necessary, Army and elements can then be brought in to partiCiPUl9 any protracted hostilities. ln Lebanon, Suez the Formosa Straits, the Navy has demonstrated the advantage ot Introducing ate military strength into limited war sltuatl0I1S keep the peace. These small brush tire can thereby be contained and the threat ol military expansion can be reduced Moreovel' initial counter force can be brought to lJ60f out infringing on foreign soil, without e'lemY fire to our own country without friendly nations for logistic support, and belng lmmpered by the restrictions Ol nations It can be tree It necessary at all lurlsdtctlon whatsoever FLEXIBILITY With the ll'llFlI lSIC asset of moblllty the NUVY Comblned 0 man made asset Flexibility ep oyed fleet consists ot the attack carrier Slf' foffe the Umpltlblous landing force, the tleef ce and the mobile logistic support torce A dmposol of m'l'l0VY Planners are special dufY m antlsubmarme hunter killer forces f et Ships and a variety of weapons tram Marines Ml to the most destructive all weapons T ss I I l I S - . I - ' r . , . T . 1 . ., I I . ' - I . ' ' . . . I 0 0 I ' . - cl I - ' - 'king 1 U 1 i 1 I . . . -T . . tor , ' - - . t 1 1 , ' . . . , ll l il - . . TFUO i- ' - ' 0 . ' pick ' I - 1 Q ' T

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UPI l b .,i,. l f ' l fi. ki' ,fgrdg utung L5 Tao 'Hmuhm X l . SOUTHEAST ASIA, --A-1 ,, l HoTSPoT IN 3.2.2, f' LU10H'M me 2 THE COLD WAR S '-71Zl'.,' l A srnur 'L A -2 n.i......,'5'.L.f '..t r W f4v, Q 5'7 ' A Niall umiagffm A ln the Western Pacific of l96l, the H Nz, hifi v4 focus of attention was clearly on the in C, g 'WML 'vast L islands and peninsulas of Southeast 5, . S, - ' A ff Asia. ll 1, - H., A v..i.-nf... A scant ten years ago, such names v ' , i ,,, Q' . as Luzon and Indochina were only 'U 'i 923211, dimly familiar to most Americans. s 9 c ' 4... Economically backward, culturally 'U 1-L15 F- - diverse, geographically and politically Cm ' . g ,.. confused and disiointed, Southeast A ' , V Asia was traditionally a low pressure g...,,C '. A , c,,,,,..,..S:-A-B area ripe for penetration ranging I M' 5 AAJZON from ancient Chinese migrations to the T MM A V ,mugs W -Q, ,. institution of Western colonialism in the . .I , ,Af 'SW' early l900's. ln fact for more than .40 v, mn. ..f. -t NL M 5:..1hPMMw My years. before World War ll, the region Wm... -1 .4 I-1, --,,.,' ,,,,,,.. was little more than remote extensions M rss. f , 'ge , 'I' ' ' Cuf,fg,fj',' 'O of the British, French, Dutch and Ameri- H--'RI' ' , Y ... can colonial empires. f .Arran ,.. ,1 ., 2- xjgw K Change was in the offing, however. 'ff ....... 7 , iA-- Fired by the temporary Japanese accu- '4-.fmzln 5 'i,QffffL:ff, ' ,' I U -......, ,. potion during the war, hitherto dormant M: ftp: ,ff --Q-D-r- ... W feelings of nationalism suddenly awoke. cnuuunanoifr N' ' -W ' i ' -. 5' . .WU Instead of dealing with passive accep- ' ' A , A tance, colonial powers were confronted s eg.1-A ' tQ'jgQQ7, A i - A A Q with armed resistance. Some left U-4--w... - A '..,-:uv-t ' ' W' . W i't' peaceably. Others were ousted by 'Ulf ' rl-1 f ,H - tv- ' ' fOfC0. MU, fqguunn v ,K ,' ,I ut - . S 5 f , ' D-segot logos ' fhlrlnwh A phil B 'add ,.,.,,,,,,.,.,,,,,,-. ,.!f?l!1 5 ,sm . ' Nndlc c.q.'u, A' N' rtoP'mzo-n ,uma 'uw rl .N Q an oolo'sPau-I f C aoluba C.. . lvgud Imaam ,Q Shun ,mn , . F', ' na.-.at T MW 'gm Inf'-Uveuv ' snu'ih.t'rh-TM nrf-v-rw ww ' F Q M ' 'l 'ir :Vx 74'! !r:'fI:' hnqufvln ns'-NN L hui aiadd hh'-'R iuinasmw-Jul' Q Ng ' Us a ' Lawn sf N 0 R timddm ':: p' . 39:9 l 1' udunan :Sl ,flfmil rv' S- has-or INA IP! vGo 'Pair gk' and ef' W 1:10. S ', ' Mvh K, I . 4 W :nun .aww , ' 0 T Cu m tl' 'foul S u . A iw. humid' Wg In l L ' ' 1 Q is 5. V ' , , ,, gi, Arn. .I -A O s ,g 1 5 . qqsl Aga, 'un' 4, s l l. s A I , J-1 J' K, t ' 'i . Q -1-'..n... ,Q ' ' 'v 4 1 'S ' S Ill ' r. ps. ,ll u 1 x , I. Una I - 1 .W Y A v-,pg t Ci., ul .'- on ' . 'in 1 can lin a 'I I .J ' - 1 r I I F mn I . u-po -paw . . su' it .. itll' :Ni a -Omaha s . 4 ' r f ,, , M., . t g f this H sm-:quote H t ,MN I , Q ,du .'lmh-un V- Q ' A ' -nr. .ui run ' , tn., I '.-at ' 4' -s 51.4, NX ' r 'V ,X -. I l -, N u L U Uv---1 :un 'lift' J 1 2 E . 'tri ha' S w -V Q 4 ' t dmv' --4.--t-A . j 5 .. . S , I., ' 5 ' An N l 0 'I I i 1 . ,I ' ,,,..,,,i H I , Lyn. , Y. -'k- s V -ina A or 0 u 2 s 5 A 5, P -- A mt.. ' 5 ' 'f .u ' A' - ' '9' r H- .' F ' -. if 9 Q 4' ' ' :mum u,. i,.,'- Jfhila ,Ah , l rl..-t., vena , , 1' an A !' 4 .I ' D . uv .Q V ' I' fir , lP,l.u-t-se ' - h i . fu-Afqu ' 41 I 3'-. 'N . ' 0 in 'b A f -rP j .1-..e T 'fa ,' 11-3' P F, 4' Uwp l-ful! is r em 'xx , .Ls X .t-nf' .mag r ' KA.. pai' H 'f'.5+- fltlltt , 0 W k -K Mantua Suit i-H5-'W yi um A Dutvfclaxl jihgi- A ,, N 5 'WMA ,ut r L E B E S S E A -,. -.. --- -1' V ' Auf:-Q4 'Win' U0-ru! , una loci-em. and Ky' K' af' uv' ' L.:-san can . ht , at-ra 3 Surf I SIMM a y 4 'Q rmgaq , i q . eh Li r lar: lu,:: Unfrhagn, . ', 2 ragg 69 O ' D: 'Tier 54 'T T 709-'VIH' 1-r-A U-w iv.4..i..i.. 5-Ill -ewe- zxuaru L lfllld After the fall of Dien Bien Phu and the French colonial empire in l954, Southeast Asia entered a new era. Although divided efficiently by the Geneva Convention into distinct inde- pendent countries, the stability once provided by colonialism was now gone. Some countries such as the Philip- pines and Burma have made the tran- sition to independence easily. ln other areas, notably Indochina, insta- bility continues to reign. The unfortunate result in Southeast Asia has been a severe power vacuum of quite sizeable proportions. Under normal conditions this would mean only an indefinite period of slow adiustment and possibly eventual organization. Normal conditions have never characterized Southeast Asia, however, and the post-war rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union has catapulted the region into world promi- nence. As an uncertain, uncommitted group of small undeveloped countries, the area is an ideal playing field for the global conflict between Western Democracy and Communism. In the first half of 1961, Southeast Asia was the principal battleground for the Cold War. The National Geographic Society 3

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Such diversity is a necessity. Contrary to beliets lcirca l95O ol several military strategists the history all the last ten years has shown that not only are many Types ot limited war possible but are an ever-present and otten recurring aanger. lt is clear that armed torces must be maintained which Ore capable Ol waging any l-rind ot war anywhere. A one-weapon, one-concept strategy necessarily ties toreign policy to an intlexible strategic concept that permits no freedom ot action and no capability to counter the numerous and devious strategems ot the Communists. Today the United States Navy can tight an air and sea war, Geography does not change. Water still covers nearly three-quarters ot the earth's surface. 9990 ot all toreign trade is transported along the lO0,000 miles ot primary ocean routes. As the United States increasingly becomes a have-not nation in terms ot many important raw materials, she becomes more and more dependent on her economic ties with other countries. Firm control ot the seas pre- vents the possibility ot a total seizure ot sea power by the Communists and maintains not only the economic, but also the cultural, political and ideolo- gical ties between the nations ot the tree world. oltensive and defensive, strategic and tactical, con- ventional and nuclear, limited and total. COUNTER-STRATEGY CONTROL OF THE SEAS Yet in spite ot the radically changed nature ot ln addition to its military mission, the Navy is modern warfare and the new responsibilities at the also an active participant in the United States' non tleet, the Navy nonetheless continues to retain its age-old missioni control ol the seas military strategy to combat communism. An lmpor tant goal at this counter-strategy is an atmosphere ide i,