Loyola College - Review Yearbook (Montreal, Quebec Canada)

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ee LOYOLA COLLEGE REVIEW 29 — Mun Усы сапы ы а itae 2800 Rt Cvitors, L, С. Review Gerald Bray, 22 Paul Casey, '24 (599 Cries) tivity, that is, there are objects in the world of reality which correspond to them. But here again our adversaries are close upon our heels, and they deny to us the legitimacy of drawing this conclusion; “for,” they argue, “these ideas being uni- versal, must represent that which exists as universal; but how is tnis possible, as all things existing in the world of reality exist as determinate and particular ob- jects?” This pseudo-objection, for that in reality is all it is, is due solely to a mis- understanding of the scholastic theory, for we never claimed that our universal ideas Horatio Phelan, '25 represented objects as they existed; on the contrary, we explicitly stated that they do not represent them as they exist, but merely represent that which exists. Already our task is completed, and those of you who have followed me through the foregoing paragraphs may now, I hope, be numbered amongst those who, seeing the sound philosophical basis on which the scholastic doctrine is built, give their firm assent to the theory of the objectivity of ideas. JAMES HEARN, ’22.

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28 LOYOLA COLLEGE REVIEW This is а phantasm, and as, in this essay, we do not concern ourselves with phan- tasms, we here lay it aside. An idea, on the other hand, is imma- terial and universal. It is immaterial, for it is not the product of any organic facul- ty; it is something spiritual (meaning by spiritual, that which is opposed to mater- ial). And it is universal, for our ideas as they exist, that is, our ideas as such, do not represent any determinate or partic- ular individual—as was the case of the phantasm—but rather they represent one essence which, in the world of reality, is multiplied in all individuals of a class. Thus, our idea of a triangle—to make use of the same illustration—is not a repre- sentation of some particular triangle which exists in the world of reality, but rather it represents that which is common to all triangles of any shape, form or di- mension; it represents the essence, or that which makes a triangle a triangle; in a word, it represents the very nature of a triangle. It is with these, then, that we here con- cern ourselves, with ideas properly so- called. And, as we have shown you, since all ideas are of a universal nature, the question at issue may be said to concern the objectivity or non-objectivity of the universals; that is, do universal ideas rep- ‘resent objects which exist in the world ‘which surrounds us? Are all the universal ideas replicas of objects, which, independ- ently of our minds, exist in the world of reality? As we have seen, to this question the scholastics answer: “Yes, the universals do express that which exists in the world of reality; but they do not represent them as they exist. Although this is our stand, nevertheless, it must not be thought that we are exaggerated Realists; that is, we do not belong to that ancient school of philosophers, who held that to our univer- sal ideas correspond in the world of real- ity, objects which existed as universals. The chief exponent of this doctrine was Plato. With the above explanations, I think we have a sufficiently clear understanding of the problem in question. We have ex- plained exactly what we mean by the theory of the objectivity of ideas; we have enunciated the two characteristic tenets of the followers of this theory. Now let . us proceed to an examination of the rea- sons because of which they hold this par- ticular view. It is evident from the enun- ` ciation of the question, our problem con- sists of two parts: First, do our ideas ex- press objects which exist in the world of reality? And secondly, such being the case, do our ideas represent these objects in the manner in which they exist or not? Before we can proceed to an examina- tion of the arguments which the scholas- ties claim substantiate their stand, we must first concern ourselves with an ob- jection put forth by the Nominalists— principal amongst whom are Hobbes, Con- dillac, Comte and Hume—who deny that а universal idea can exist, and consequent- ly claim that the words, which ше hold are the outward expression of these universal ideas, are hollow-sounding and meaning- less. So, before we can prove to them that our universal ideas have objectivity, we must first establish the fact that univer- sal ideas exist. If, for instance, I say “шап”, who is there amongst you, kind readers, who will deny that this word conveys some determi- nate meaning, conveys some idea, in which idea is contained something common to Peter, Paul and John—so that this idea, while it is one in entity, represents that which is common to many; but this is ex- actly what universal means, one applicable to many. So we see that we can have uni- versal ideas, i.e., that universal ideas exist. Now, having I hope, established to your satisfaction, the fact that universal ideas not only can, but do actually exist, let us proceed to our real task, namely, to the proving that these universal ideas have objectivity; in other words, that they rep- resent objects which exist in the world of reality. Here again we have our adver- saries, principally Occam and Kant, who, although they admit that universal ideas exist, say they are mere fabrications of the mind, and that they do not represent, i.e., that they have no foundation in, ob- jects in the world of reality. Against them we argue as follows: When I give expression to the universal idea of “man”, if that one idea is applica- ble to many in the world of reality, as we haye shown it is, it is because there exists in each one of those individuals some one thing in common. Otherwise, the idea would not be applicable to all of them; consequently, the idea must designate or express that thing which exists equally in АП of the individuals. But such being the case, the universal idea represents that which exists; therefore, we must conclude that, as our universal ideas represent ob- jects which really exist, they have objec-

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80 LOYOLA COLLEGE REVIEW Anto Seven Times? I had said, I cannot pardon —But, in sleep, Before me came the glib-tongued, sinuous friend Who had sold my friendship. Him I would not lend Help, as he struggled in the sea, nor weep When he sank.—Appeared then, walking o'er the deep, A thorn-crowned Man Who, sighing, down did bend To raise my traitor-brother. . . . Now, to end My hate, He speaks while to His feet I creep; When Herod wrapped Me in the fool's white cloak I bent My patient head, caressed the shame Nor spake. Тһе soldier's spittle, the buffet's smart Found My cheek passionless as winter oak Storm-whipped.—And, on My blood-red Cross, not blame But mercy gushed out when they pierced My Heart. Selfishness When the burning mass had cooled down, and the firemen had begun to clear away the ruins, they found two human bodies. One was easily recognized as the huge frame of Dick Sage, political “Boss”: all were amazed when forced to admit that the other corpse must be that of the man whom Dick had fought tooth and nail for ten years, and who had fought back brave- Iy,——Father Gray, the parish priest. Ж ж ж ж ж ж ж He was still dictating in his loud, harsh voice when five o'clock struck, and he con- tinued for some twenty minutes more. Then, That's all,” he snarled. The little stenographer quickly, but timidly, cleared away her papers and departed. He was left alone, impatiently awaiting a friend. Dick Sage appeared to be prospering. Everything in the office glittered—from the pendant chandeliers to the fire-tongs, from the rows of studs on the leather- covered chairs to the queerly-shaped paper-knife in his hand, whose edge, as he tested it carefully, seemed unusually keen. Everything seemed the hugest and brightest money could buy,—even the flaming ruby in his cravat and the dia- mond on his left hand. But all these trappings could not dis- guise the man,—a blustering bully who frightened cowards. Could his mother have come down from. Heaven into this hole, she would easily have recognized the worthless son who had left her so long D. MICHAEL, ’22 ago. The poor widow had drudged many years, by daylight and dim candle, to send him to college and to make a man of him. But he was always lazy and heartless, and, after causing her many a heartache, had at last run away from home, taking with him the small sum she had saved. Never after did he seek news of her, nor did he know that she had died soon after his flight, wasted away by a mother’s love for a thief. Twenty years later he appeared sudden- ly in this western city, boasting that he was a self-made man. Sad was the tale,— and skilfully he told it—of the penniless orphan thrown on the cold world. How he had become wealthy was not told; but he spoke vaguely of lucky chances and daring ventures,—an inspiring example of how the sturdy and true ever climb! And now he is a man of power, a ward- leader of a political party. But he appears far from happy. As minute after minute passes without an arrival, the scowl darkens and the malevo- lent eyes almost disappear between bushy eyebrows and flabby cheeks. The scar that cuts the under-lip and disappears be- neath the chin is now livid, now flaring red. At length he throws the paper-knife upon the desk with a curse, and begins to pace the room with long strides, noiselessly on the thick carpet. There is something un- canny in the swift, silent movement in the darkened room—for he has turned off all T