Loyola College - Review Yearbook (Montreal, Quebec Canada)

Page 30 text:

28 LOYOLA COLLEGE REVIEW This is а phantasm, and as, in this essay, we do not concern ourselves with phan- tasms, we here lay it aside. An idea, on the other hand, is imma- terial and universal. It is immaterial, for it is not the product of any organic facul- ty; it is something spiritual (meaning by spiritual, that which is opposed to mater- ial). And it is universal, for our ideas as they exist, that is, our ideas as such, do not represent any determinate or partic- ular individual—as was the case of the phantasm—but rather they represent one essence which, in the world of reality, is multiplied in all individuals of a class. Thus, our idea of a triangle—to make use of the same illustration—is not a repre- sentation of some particular triangle which exists in the world of reality, but rather it represents that which is common to all triangles of any shape, form or di- mension; it represents the essence, or that which makes a triangle a triangle; in a word, it represents the very nature of a triangle. It is with these, then, that we here con- cern ourselves, with ideas properly so- called. And, as we have shown you, since all ideas are of a universal nature, the question at issue may be said to concern the objectivity or non-objectivity of the universals; that is, do universal ideas rep- ‘resent objects which exist in the world ‘which surrounds us? Are all the universal ideas replicas of objects, which, independ- ently of our minds, exist in the world of reality? As we have seen, to this question the scholastics answer: “Yes, the universals do express that which exists in the world of reality; but they do not represent them as they exist. Although this is our stand, nevertheless, it must not be thought that we are exaggerated Realists; that is, we do not belong to that ancient school of philosophers, who held that to our univer- sal ideas correspond in the world of real- ity, objects which existed as universals. The chief exponent of this doctrine was Plato. With the above explanations, I think we have a sufficiently clear understanding of the problem in question. We have ex- plained exactly what we mean by the theory of the objectivity of ideas; we have enunciated the two characteristic tenets of the followers of this theory. Now let . us proceed to an examination of the rea- sons because of which they hold this par- ticular view. It is evident from the enun- ` ciation of the question, our problem con- sists of two parts: First, do our ideas ex- press objects which exist in the world of reality? And secondly, such being the case, do our ideas represent these objects in the manner in which they exist or not? Before we can proceed to an examina- tion of the arguments which the scholas- ties claim substantiate their stand, we must first concern ourselves with an ob- jection put forth by the Nominalists— principal amongst whom are Hobbes, Con- dillac, Comte and Hume—who deny that а universal idea can exist, and consequent- ly claim that the words, which ше hold are the outward expression of these universal ideas, are hollow-sounding and meaning- less. So, before we can prove to them that our universal ideas have objectivity, we must first establish the fact that univer- sal ideas exist. If, for instance, I say “шап”, who is there amongst you, kind readers, who will deny that this word conveys some determi- nate meaning, conveys some idea, in which idea is contained something common to Peter, Paul and John—so that this idea, while it is one in entity, represents that which is common to many; but this is ex- actly what universal means, one applicable to many. So we see that we can have uni- versal ideas, i.e., that universal ideas exist. Now, having I hope, established to your satisfaction, the fact that universal ideas not only can, but do actually exist, let us proceed to our real task, namely, to the proving that these universal ideas have objectivity; in other words, that they rep- resent objects which exist in the world of reality. Here again we have our adver- saries, principally Occam and Kant, who, although they admit that universal ideas exist, say they are mere fabrications of the mind, and that they do not represent, i.e., that they have no foundation in, ob- jects in the world of reality. Against them we argue as follows: When I give expression to the universal idea of “man”, if that one idea is applica- ble to many in the world of reality, as we haye shown it is, it is because there exists in each one of those individuals some one thing in common. Otherwise, the idea would not be applicable to all of them; consequently, the idea must designate or express that thing which exists equally in АП of the individuals. But such being the case, the universal idea represents that which exists; therefore, we must conclude that, as our universal ideas represent ob- jects which really exist, they have objec-

Page 29 text:

LOYOLA COLLEGE REVIEW 27 Objectivity of Ideas HE nature of this essay, from its | title, may appear to some at first sight to be necessarily clothed in a shroud of fine philosophical distinctions and abstract mental intricacies. But those who will patiently suffer with us to its conclusion will, we hope, have these sinister misgivings dispelled; and wil agree with us that the sec- ret of exposing а philosophical question lies, not in the use of formidable - look - ing words, but rather in the sim- plicity of one’s language. With this in mind, kind readers, let us proceed to the unravelling of the question at hand; after a thorough under- standing of ex- actly what we mean by it, we will go on to the proofs which sub- stantiate our stand; and then our task, we hope, is done. The question we have proposed to ourselves to solve is: Are our ideas merely fa- brications of the mind without any correspondence to objects in the world of reality? Or, on the other hand, do they possess this correspondence, that is, are they replicas of objects which exist in the physical world which surrounds us? According to Kant, the great exponent of idealism, our ideas originate in the ob- jects, but when received in the mind they suffer modifications; so, to our question he answers, “Our ideas are neither perfect replicas nor complete fabrications, but rather a composition of the two. If our question be proposed to the Sceptics, they make answer, that being unable to have certainty with regard to anything, our question is beyond the sphere of possible solution. Finally, if it be from the schol- astic philosophers that we seek a solution to our query, they answer us in this man- ner: “Our ideas really and truly express or correspond to objects which exist in the world:of reality, but they do not cor- respond to them or express them as they exist. Now this, the scholastic answer, is the doctrine or theory of the objectivity of ideas. When speaking of ideas, if we are not careful, we are apt to confuse ideas with phantasms—so, let us, at the outset, clear- ly state the distinction between them. A phantasm is material and particular; it is material, for it is the result or product of a material or organic faculty, which facul- ty is the imagination; and it is particular, for when we conjure up anything in our imagination, it is always the picture of some determinate and particular individ- ual—thus, if we imagine a triangle, it is always some determinate and particular triangle with such and such dimensions,

Page 31 text:

ee LOYOLA COLLEGE REVIEW 29 — Mun Усы сапы ы а itae 2800 Rt Cvitors, L, С. Review Gerald Bray, 22 Paul Casey, '24 (599 Cries) tivity, that is, there are objects in the world of reality which correspond to them. But here again our adversaries are close upon our heels, and they deny to us the legitimacy of drawing this conclusion; “for,” they argue, “these ideas being uni- versal, must represent that which exists as universal; but how is tnis possible, as all things existing in the world of reality exist as determinate and particular ob- jects?” This pseudo-objection, for that in reality is all it is, is due solely to a mis- understanding of the scholastic theory, for we never claimed that our universal ideas Horatio Phelan, '25 represented objects as they existed; on the contrary, we explicitly stated that they do not represent them as they exist, but merely represent that which exists. Already our task is completed, and those of you who have followed me through the foregoing paragraphs may now, I hope, be numbered amongst those who, seeing the sound philosophical basis on which the scholastic doctrine is built, give their firm assent to the theory of the objectivity of ideas. JAMES HEARN, ’22.