Louisville (CA 28) - Naval Cruise Book

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would have been able to capture Port Moresby and begin their operations east- ward into the Solomon Islands at an earlier date. If the .laps held these South Pacific islands, then they would be in a position to attack Hawaii, the Panama Canal Zone, or Australia. As it was, the ,laps did cap- ture Salamaua and Lae on New Guinea, Rabaul on New Britain, Kaviang on New Ireland and launch an attack on the Solo- mons which carried them to Guadalcanal. We of the Louisville steamed Westward from Pearl Harbor on February 16, 1942. Enroute to the Southwest Pacific we joined a Pacific Fleet force under Vice Admiral Brown on the Lexington, the consolidation becoming Task Force 11. This force was destined to assist in checking the Japanese onslaught. The mission given Task Force 11 in the middle of February was of vital importance in the light of this background. We were to harass the Japanese as they tried to push south and eastward through these islands, and endeavor to prevent them from cutting off our life line to Australia. After careful deliberation at a conference on March 8, it was decided to attack Lae and Salamaua from the landward side. It was a bold plan, for the planes from the Yorktown and Lexington were to be launched on the Australian side of the unsurveyed Owen Stanley Mountains and attack the Nips from the rear. It was hoped that they, expecting a seaward, attack, would be surprised. An even bolder plan to conduct a cruiser bombardment of Rabaul was given up at the last minute as being too risky. The day chosen for the air attack was March 10, 1911-2. The best information available was that a pass existed through the three-mile high mountains at about 7,500 feet. This gap had beenused by an air line between Salamaua and the Gulf of Papua, fifty miles inland. The valley was usually clear between 0700 and 1100. The planes were to be launched at 0800, fly through this valley, make the attack, and return by noon. 0 At the last moment, word was received that a convoy of troop ships from the United States bound for New Caledonia would need protection. The force com- mander detached the cruiser H. M. A. S. Australia, the Chicago, Astoria, and Louis- OUR CARRIER RAIDS STRUCK AT JAP SHIPPING

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JAP SHORE INSTALLATIONS IN! THE MARSHALLS RECEIVE A PREVIEW OF WHAT WAS YET TO COME the Malay Peninsula, surrounded Singapore Cwhich fell on February ISD and landed on Sumatra, the island adjoining Java. To the north the enemy was strongly entrenched on Borneo and the Celebes, and to the northwest they held Ambon and the Moluccas. Thus Java was threat- ened on three sides, the west, the north, and the east. Within a short time the Japanese would capitalize upon this stra- tegic advantage to capture Java and force us to retreat to Australia. To stop this operation, Admiral Hel- frich had at his command a small Ameri- can task force composed of the cruiser Houston, with her after turret out of com- mission, and thefdestroyers Stewart, Alden, Parrott, John D. Edwards, Paul fones, Pillsbury, Pope and Ford. He also had a Dutch force, and towards the end he was joined by the British with two cruisers and three destroyers. These ships endeav- ored to convoy reinforcements to .lava from Australia and attack enemy shipping. In the night battle of Badoeng Strait on February 19, 1942, this task force in- flicted heavy damage upon enemy trans- ports and cruisers. Again in the Battle of Java Sea hits were scored on the enemy. This, however, was the end, for out of this battle only the destroyers Edwards, Alden, Ford and Paul jones survived to fight again. The others were sunk or destroyed. The enemy soon overran Java but the men on these ships had delayed them. The same story can be told of our heroic garrison which fought so gallantly on Bataan and Corregidor. Thousands of Japanese army troops and tons of enemy shipping were engaged in winning this sector. If these troops and shipping had been free then, perhaps the Japanese

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'ville with their destroyers to act as a screen against a Japanese sortie to the south. This task group, under the com- mand of Rear Admiral Crace, R. N., took up a position off the Louisiade Archipelago southeast of New Guinea. There they could intercept any J ap forces which might come down intending to attack the convoy or to attack the two carriers stationed in the Gulf of Papua. On the morning of March 10, 103 planes took off, successfully navigated the pass' in the Owen Stanley Mountains and completely surprised the laps. They sank five transports and cargo shipsj a light cruiser and a destroyer. In addition a minelayer was left burning, a 500-pound bomb exploded the magazine in a heavy cruiser and caused fierce fires, a 1,000- pound bomb hit plus two near-misses left a second cruiser in a sinking condition. Serious damage was done to two other destroyers, two gunboats, and a seaplane tender. Besides this, anti-aircraft installa- tions, airfields, and other shore facilities were destroyed or badly damaged. By noon all planes, except one, were safely aboard their respective carriers. The raid had been a success. CinPac congratulated Task Force 11 on a raid 'cwell planned and well executed. The war of attrition on the part of the allies had been forwarded another step toward the foreseeable and hopeful future when direct and concerted attacks would be waged on all the strongholds of the far- flung .lap Empire. During this battle we had acted as part of the screen to protect the troop convoy and the carriers. This duty, though impor- tant, was uneventful. Excitement, however, came our way two days later after we had rendezvoused with the carriers and were steaming back to our base. ln the after- noon on March 12, we catapulted two of our planes on a scouting mission. They took off with other cruiser planes at 14-00 and were to return in late afternoon. When they failed to return, we made smoke puffs to help guide them home. Later we em- PATROLING WESTWARD INTO THE SETTING SUN