Louisville (CA 28) - Naval Cruise Book

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JAP SHORE INSTALLATIONS IN! THE MARSHALLS RECEIVE A PREVIEW OF WHAT WAS YET TO COME the Malay Peninsula, surrounded Singapore Cwhich fell on February ISD and landed on Sumatra, the island adjoining Java. To the north the enemy was strongly entrenched on Borneo and the Celebes, and to the northwest they held Ambon and the Moluccas. Thus Java was threat- ened on three sides, the west, the north, and the east. Within a short time the Japanese would capitalize upon this stra- tegic advantage to capture Java and force us to retreat to Australia. To stop this operation, Admiral Hel- frich had at his command a small Ameri- can task force composed of the cruiser Houston, with her after turret out of com- mission, and thefdestroyers Stewart, Alden, Parrott, John D. Edwards, Paul fones, Pillsbury, Pope and Ford. He also had a Dutch force, and towards the end he was joined by the British with two cruisers and three destroyers. These ships endeav- ored to convoy reinforcements to .lava from Australia and attack enemy shipping. In the night battle of Badoeng Strait on February 19, 1942, this task force in- flicted heavy damage upon enemy trans- ports and cruisers. Again in the Battle of Java Sea hits were scored on the enemy. This, however, was the end, for out of this battle only the destroyers Edwards, Alden, Ford and Paul jones survived to fight again. The others were sunk or destroyed. The enemy soon overran Java but the men on these ships had delayed them. The same story can be told of our heroic garrison which fought so gallantly on Bataan and Corregidor. Thousands of Japanese army troops and tons of enemy shipping were engaged in winning this sector. If these troops and shipping had been free then, perhaps the Japanese

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, . f f bg I , ii :sf X Ja- 4' L X ---4 ,42?::'4'i -. '1:J.- .,. .. . ga - 553:39 - .1-f,.f,-3-,,:.ffq 5 :'f : M . 'T i' iiS.ilIil.'QfvI'Q.l' ..- - ,. Til-,-31:-2 71-j3'. '1' A ' '..,'f,,. . , 74 , '...:'-: , . wr Q3 Q 4'hTf,,583f.,rL1A J' ' A - -1 X J' ' Reaching Pearl Harbor February 6, we received an ovation that We will never for- get. Bluejackets lined the rails of every ship present giving three cheers as each unit of the force passed to its anchorage. 'CTWO-blocked to the foremast of Admiral Halsey's flagship Was the traditional cgbroomv of the Mclean sweepf, Salamaua-Lae The importance of our forthcoming operation was not to be measured in terms of spectacular front-line fighting but rather in terms of cold, hard logic. Our task was to capitalize upon the heroic sacrifice which other men were making on Bataan, Corregidor, Malaya, Singapore, and Java. These men were fighting a losing battle. They fought to the bitter end, knowing that their hopes of a sea full of ships and a sky full of planes coming from the east was only wishful thinking. There were to be no reinforce- ments and yet they fought, fought in order that We might have an extra day or Week or month to rally our forces and stem the triumphant march of the ,lapa- nese before the life line to Australia was severed. The focal point of attention was cen- tered on our forces afloat in this area. The allied navy was the only resistance available to check the rising tide of the Japanese offensive. On February 14, 19442, Admiral Hart Was ordered back to Wash- ington and was relieved by Vice Admiral Helfrich, Royal Netherlands Navy, as Allied Naval Commander. The situation in this area was critical. The Japanese, with strong forces, had leap-frogged down STRAFED BY TWO F4F,S, AN EMILY SEAPLANE PLUNGES INTO THE SEA

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would have been able to capture Port Moresby and begin their operations east- ward into the Solomon Islands at an earlier date. If the .laps held these South Pacific islands, then they would be in a position to attack Hawaii, the Panama Canal Zone, or Australia. As it was, the ,laps did cap- ture Salamaua and Lae on New Guinea, Rabaul on New Britain, Kaviang on New Ireland and launch an attack on the Solo- mons which carried them to Guadalcanal. We of the Louisville steamed Westward from Pearl Harbor on February 16, 1942. Enroute to the Southwest Pacific we joined a Pacific Fleet force under Vice Admiral Brown on the Lexington, the consolidation becoming Task Force 11. This force was destined to assist in checking the Japanese onslaught. The mission given Task Force 11 in the middle of February was of vital importance in the light of this background. We were to harass the Japanese as they tried to push south and eastward through these islands, and endeavor to prevent them from cutting off our life line to Australia. After careful deliberation at a conference on March 8, it was decided to attack Lae and Salamaua from the landward side. It was a bold plan, for the planes from the Yorktown and Lexington were to be launched on the Australian side of the unsurveyed Owen Stanley Mountains and attack the Nips from the rear. It was hoped that they, expecting a seaward, attack, would be surprised. An even bolder plan to conduct a cruiser bombardment of Rabaul was given up at the last minute as being too risky. The day chosen for the air attack was March 10, 1911-2. The best information available was that a pass existed through the three-mile high mountains at about 7,500 feet. This gap had beenused by an air line between Salamaua and the Gulf of Papua, fifty miles inland. The valley was usually clear between 0700 and 1100. The planes were to be launched at 0800, fly through this valley, make the attack, and return by noon. 0 At the last moment, word was received that a convoy of troop ships from the United States bound for New Caledonia would need protection. The force com- mander detached the cruiser H. M. A. S. Australia, the Chicago, Astoria, and Louis- OUR CARRIER RAIDS STRUCK AT JAP SHIPPING