Lexington (CV 16) - Naval Cruise Book

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carrier for the first time. the central Philippines, hitting airfields and ship- 44 7 vqmq, .,., ...L . , . . , .,.,...-- - ---f --- W- ,rmnqqwnnxvzavu1:...1.hf-L-1-12419--9 'v .. .. .Y . . ,. .- - ---- - -- -- - -- '---- - gf-J W, -- - . -'Q'- '1 1'EF l ' a ' -emu-v-:ved-vxuuuvn:-nnmaswmwuvw mnmnwwm-wf:3?emqfusmwm.feukm L LN 1 31 1- Guam was subjected to thirteen continuous days of methodical bombardment and air strikes be- fore the landing on july 21 and was described by one observer as Ha mass of smoke.'7 Lex had contributed 551 sorties although engaging only in the final days' operations before moving on to the Western Carolines for three days of air strikes against the Palau Islands. In early August Air Group 19 launched raids against Iwo jima, Chichi jima and Haha jima before its flattop re- turned again to Eniwetok for rest and replenish- ment, August 10. The same day Guam was, de- clared secured, as Saipan Q with a heavy toll of American casualties- 16,500 including 3,400 deadj and Tinian had been shortly before. Lex didn't get underway again until the end of the month, arriving in the Carolines September 6 to commence strikes against Yap and Ulithi. By this time there had been significant changes in the Pacific command and organization, and the next major policy steps had not been finally de- cided for the conduct of the war there. According to the Potter-Nimitz The Great Sea War, the joint'C.hiefs of Staff, and Admiral King in particular, questioned the advisability of afull- scale operation against the Philippines. MacAr- thur could obtain merely a foothold and air bases there, they reasoned, then join forces with Nimitz' Central Pacific Command for an inva- sion of Formosa and the China Coast. MacAr- thur strongly dissented, preferring an all-out Philippine offensive, and Roosevelt still wavered between the two positions when the Second Que- bec Conference opened September 11th with Churchill and the joint Chiefs. 7 Admiral Spruance had returned to Pearl Har- bor for rest and to plan future operations, and his place had been taken by Admiral Halsey, under whom the Central Pacific Force now be- came designated the Third Fleet. This change reportedly led the japanese to believe there were two fleets alternately opposing them-the Fifth and the Third. Vice Admiral Mitscher, by his own choice, remained in command of his Fast Carrier Task Force, which was now known as TF-38, and still included Lexington. Task Force 38 carried out air strikes against 56 ping to make way for impending landings on Leyte. In a brief period the combined Air Groups destroyed about 200 enemy aircraft and sunk a dozen freighters and a tanker. Lexing- tonis Air Group was running into its first real opposition on these raids, and they tookadvan- tage of the opportunity by scoring impressively against enemy fighters. p - I Strikes were launched against Mindanao, the Visayan Islands, and on the 21st, the Manila area. Lex sent aloft four deck-loads of planes on separate strikes, and the resulting damage to enemy planes caught on the ground, hangars and other shore installations proved most signi- ficant. In addition, two convoys were caught off the West Coast of Luzon, and suffered consider- able damage. The next morning a few japanese made runs on the Task Force just as flight operations were commencing, but no damage was suffered. Fol- lowing a few final air strikes, CV-16 and her es- corts retired to the newly-acquired Carolines for replenishment September 27. The Task Force put to sea again October 6, launched attacks on Okinawa four days later, and then followed with heavy strikes against aircraft, airfields and shore installations on Formosa on the 12th. Task Force 38 flew 1,396 separate sorties on the 10th, 1,378 on the 12th and just short of 1,000 more on the 'morning of the 13th. In describing the September-October attacks on the Philippines, Lzk reported on October 23, 1944: c'The cost to the japanese was awesome. In 35 days they had lost the backbone of their Philippine air and naval strength, 894 planes destroyed, 157 ships The shzpis magazines are located far below the thick armor plate that forms the hangar deck of the ship. When the time comes to arm aircraft the bombs are taken to the flight deck using eleva- tors within the carrieris island structure , itsebf or using the deck edge elevators. Five hundred ,bound bombs are about to be loaded aboard a TBR f .

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V, ,-f ,. ...,....-H , . - -Av--Y-- , J ,1-sync. -affix 'ff-ff 'SJFF-11fm:11'11f-0--':L'Ji'1i:1 ::i:t'5: ' M' B? M 'r'i's H 1 sunk. By the attacks on Formosa the Navy. . . Qwasj neutralizing the base from which the jap- anese could best replace their lossesf' Heavier air resistance was met in this period than had been confronting Navy pilots recently, and on October 14 a raid of enemy torpedo planes Uillsj sneaked past the Combat Air Pa- trol and launched their attack. Lex gunners were the first to open fire, shooting down three and assisting in two other kills. The cruisers Houston and Canberra took seri- ous torpedo hits during the attack, but the elated japanese pilots, in their usual modest style, flash- ed word that eleven carriers, two battleships' and three cruisers had been sunk. Radio Tokyo duti- fully broadcast these reports to the world and japan was 'cswept by a sudden wave ofexhilara- tion which dispelled overnight the growing pessi mism over the unfavorable trend of the warf, After lingering 'briefly in the area to cover our retiring damaged cruisers, Lexington resumed at- tacks against the Philippines October 21. Three days later an enemy force was located in the Sibuyan Sea, and pilots from Air Group 19 were credited with hits on three cruisers and an assist in the sinking of the battleship M usacki. The same day TF-38 fell victim of an air attack LeX's guns are manned and ready as an F617 makes ker ina! approach, be- low. At right, is a view of tke flight deck, looking ybrward from Prilfbz, as aircrap' ,are respotted afer a strike on Formosa in Octoben 1944. itseli the CAP was able to splash or drive back most enemy planes Qwith Air Group 19 splash- ing 63 of the 150 shot down during the dayj, but one broke through for a hit on Princeton. When Essex scout planes sighted the japanese carriers the next morning, their Air Group joined with Air Group 19 to deliver a fatal attack on one of them, Ckitose. A second strike successful- ly attacked other enemy units Qincluding the car- rier' Ckzjzodaj an hour later, while Strike No. 3 was sent against additional carriers located to the north. Lex is planes here were credited with sink- ing Zaikaku and assisting in the serious dam- aging of another flattop, Zuiko. The dayas opera- tions were facilitated by the fact that most of the N ipponese aircraft had been caught on the ground at Luzon rather than being on hand to defend the -shipsg Hellcats reportedly made short