Lexington (CV 16) - Naval Cruise Book

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back to his ship when his radio crackled with a report of japanese planes coming in. Having fuel and ammunition, he decided to do a little hunting before landing. When he set down on CV-16 there were three kills to his credit-not bad for a 3,000 yard ferry flight! One of the Navy's foremost Aces, Lt. Vraciu, shot down six ,bombers with 360 rounds of am- munition on a single flight during the HTurkey Shoot. Describing the attack on the enemy bomber squadron later, the former wingman of Butch O'Hare Chero of CV-2's Air Group in 1942, who had since been killed in actionjlwho led a dozen planes against thirty, related: HAfter we had been on them a few minutes they began to separate like a bunch of disorderly cattle. Every time one of the laps would try to lead a string out of formation the Hellcat pilots turned into ccowboys' and herded them back into the group. If they had been able to separate we wouldn7t have been able to shoot down as many as we did. Realizing the advantage to be gained from this increased air superiority, Mitscher was anxious to close the enemy force. The exact position of the japanese ships was not known, however, and therefore little progress was made toward that end during the night. After a fruitless search to the west the following morning, Mitscher finally turned northwest around noon. As the day wore on TF-58 had to reverse course several times to launch aircraft, and it was beginning to appear that the enemy would evade detection and attack completely. At 4:00 p.m. a search plane finally reported the enemy vessels about 220 miles WNW of the U. S. Force. Although this was .M ..m...- ..... l . El

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closer than anticipated fearlier searches had failed because they were looking too far awayj, it was a long range and late inthe day to launch carrier strikes. Fully realizing that dangerous night landings would face tired pilots running short of fuel when they returned, the Task Force Commander nevertheless had little choice but to order the attack against the weakened enemy. Actually, the reported position proved to be an error. The correct position was sixty miles further away, by the time the carriers turned into the wind and launched their planes, some had to fly 300 miles to the target. The first enemy ships sighted by the T F-58 aviators were Oilers, and several planes imme- diately turned their attention to them, sinking two. Most of the attacks were concentrated on the carriers, with torpedo planes sinking Hzyo while bombers ripped up the flight decks and set fire to Zaikalfu and Chzjioda. A battleship and cruiser also were damaged. The return to the flattops was the most difficult part of the mission for many of our pilots, as eighty aircraft ditched or crashed on landing. Several of the latter occurred when pilots were unwilling or unable to take Hwave-offs . Many of those forced to ditch were either damaged or had failed to adequately conserve their limited fuel. A great number of those who went into the sea were picked up by the destroyers in the T ask Force, wghile many more landed on any carrier in the Force in whose landing circle they could find a space. A tradition in the fleet commanded that a destroyer picking up a pilot from the sea be rewarded with five gallons of ice cream from the airmanls aircraft carrier. ' The loss of life and aircraft could have been considerably worse than it was. Following' the precedent set during the Battle of Midway by Admiral Spruance, the Task Force Commander ordered the lights of his carriers turned on to facilitate the recoveries. Running lights, truck lights and the glow lights outlining the flight deck all served to guide the weary fliers in. In addition, search lights aimed at the sky served as homing beacons, while ships in the Force fired star shells to provide further illumination. Total losses of American aircraft during the Radar information is plotted in Lex's Combat Information Center. Above, Vice Admiral Marc A. Mitschen whose flag flew from Lexington. Overleaf, bom bs are tal-:en on the deck edge eleva- tor ,to re-arm aircraj? on the flight deck. two days of battle, from all causes, were 130, of airmen, 76. The enemy fleet had only 35 serv- iceable planes remaining out of their 430. An even more critical result of the two-day battle, however, was the decimation of the Japanese Navy's trained pilot corps. By the time it was light enough to launch a strike the next morning, the enemy had opened to a range of360 miles, TF-58 had had to steam in the opposite direction for two hours while re- covering aircraft the previous evening, while the enemy, of course, not wishing to becomeinvolved in any further actions, had continued to flee. After looking unsuccessfully for stragglers among the japanese Force, while steaming in a vain attempt to close the enemy, Admiral Mits- cher ordered his Force to reverse course for the Marianas around dusk. On july 6 Lexington departed from these is- lands, where they had been providing support for our troops on Saipan, and steamed to Eniwe- tok for replenishment. Three days later heroic Air Group Sixteen was relieved by Air Group Nineteen, who brought Helldivers aboard the 53