Johns Hopkins University - Hullabaloo Yearbook (Baltimore, MD)

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agreed that absolute ethical rules for the guidance of men cannot be laid down. In other words, the binding force of all ethical imperatives is dependent upon the facts and circumstances to which they are to apply. The consequence of this is that he who would seek to give practical ethical advice must base his directions upon a thorough comprehension of the social conditions under which, and of the social forces by which, the desired ends are to be obtained. This knowledge the special social sciences afford. We now begin to see the manner in which history, ethics, and the other social sciences supplement the work of one another, and jointly afford the foundations for what may properly be termed a social philosophy. A social philosopher, as we conceive him, is one who is able to survey social life as a whole, to understand its mechanics and dynamics, to evaluate the intrinsic merits of its special features, and to point out with clear vision .the lines OF development which will most surely lead to the highest possible civilization. The task of the social philosopher is thus teleological, the framing of social ideals. Social philosophy and philosophy of ,history thus complement one another. While the historical philosopher searches out the rationality of the past, the social philosopher discovers the ttue ethical significance of present social conditions and forces, and points out the ideals which should be real- ized. i This conception of the aim of social philosophy takes us back to the old Greek ideal which gave to speculative thought the task of interpreting the concrete facts of life, of filling them with an inherent meaning and of vivifying them with a purpose. Such a work may well claim to be the highest effort of the human mind. Found- ed as it must be upon all the facts made known by the several sciences, and interpreted by the principles revealed by the speculative process, a true social philosophy becomes the focal point at which all knowledge meets to issue forth as aclear light in which all men may be able to see the highest social ideals, and perceive the means for their attainment. Thus, and thus only, in truth, does philosophy, by becoming social, completely justify itsright to existence. WESTEL WOODBURY WILLOUGHBY, AB. '88, Ph. D. '9:. I5

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an infinite series, there would be nothing in the history of mankind, so conceived, to satisfy that demand for unity of the manifold in relation to an end which alone leads us to read the idea of development into the course of human affairs. If there is a progress in the history of men, it must be towards an end consisting in a state of being which is not itself a series in time, but is both comprehended eternally in the eternal mind and is intrinsically, or in itself, eternal. History thus represents the gradual working out of processes which depend upon r'nanls essential nature. For a philosophical comprehension of this development there is therefore required a knowledge of manls moral nature as revealed by ethical philosophy, which, in turn, is of course dependent upon philosophy in its ontological sense. For an adequate interpretation of the life of men in the past we are,then, ultimately dependent upon the results of metaphysical inquiry. According to the realistic assumptions of some evolutionary writers, however, no such working out of spiritual principles is to be discovered in the history of men. As they teach, there is needed for the discovery of complete truth only the application of an enlightened and unbiased judgment. Alleging that by the historical method it is theoretically possible to trace not only the development of social facts, forces, and ideals, but to determine in time their absolute origin and fix the direction in which they are tending, they assert that no supplementary information is needed from a metaphysical source. If this be the true position, if , in other words, the origin of the sense of moral obligation has been wholly due to the influence of environment upon the individual, if the innate sense of justice be not, in truth, innate at all,but an historical growth, and if , in fine, the ideals which at all times have directed the efforts of men and urged them along the paths of progress, be but the results of a purely natural process worked out in the struggles of races of men to adjust themselves to the requirements of their surroundings, then, philosophy, in its purest sense, not only has nothing of interest to tell the sociologist but has no good reason for existence at all. If , however, along with Kant and the whole modern idealistic school. we hold that experience itself implies the very conceptions for which the realists make it account; if we believe that man. as a partaker in the Divine or Absolute Reason, is potentially a moral being, possesses within himself the elements whence spring his truest ideals, and is by his very nature destined to a spiritual development, then history cannot be the narration of events as determined simply by efficient causes, but must instead display the progres- sive realization of final causes, the gradual working out of ideals inherent in men and determined by their very nature. History, which according to the realists, is barren of meaning, thus becomes pregnant with significance, which otherwise is without purpose, is made alive with it, and metaphysics becomes all-important in the inter- pretation of social progress, for to it belongs the special function of determining, so far as is possible, the real nature of man and his relation to the world and to God. In developing our conception of a philosophy of history in its highest sense we have been led to consider its essen- tial task to be the portrayal of what are at the bottom of the operation of ethical forces. Now it is generally I4

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