Essex (LHD 2) - Naval Cruise Book

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Forward . . . From the Sea THE STRATEGIC IMPERATIVE The vital economic, political, and military interests of the United Slates are truly global in nature and scope. In many respects these interests are located across broad oceans, and to a great extent they intersect those of current and emergent regional powers. It is in the world ' s littorals where the Naval Service, operating from sea bases in international waters, can influence events ashore in support of our interests. Because we are a maritime nation, our security strategy is necessarily a transoceanic one. Our vital interests-those interests for which the United States is willing to fight-are at the endpoint of highways of the seas or lines of strategic approach that stretch from the United States to the farthest point on the globe. Not surprisingly, these strategic lines and their endpoints coincide with the places to which we routinely deploy naval expeditionary forces: the Atlantic, Mediterranean. Pacific, Indian Ocean, Red Sea, Persian Gulf, and Caribbean Sea. Reductions in fiscal resources, however, dictate that we must refocus our more limited naval assets on the highest priorities and the most immediate challenges, even within these areas of historic and vital interests to the United States. Naval forces are particularly well-suited to the entire range of Military operations in support of our national strategy. They continue the historic role of naval forces engaged in preventive diplomacy and otherwise supporting our policies overseas. Moreover, forward-deployed naval forces-manned, equipped, and trained for combat-play a significant role in demonstrating both the intention and the capability to join our NATO and other allies, as well as other friendly powers, in defending shared interests. Finally, if deterrence fails during a crisis and conflict erupts, naval forces provide the means for immediate sea-based reaction. This could include forcible entrj ' and providing the protective cover essential to enabling the flow of follow-on forces which will be deployed, supported, and sustained from the continental United States. In short, forward-deployed naval forces will provide the critical operational linkages between peacetime operations and the initial requirements of developing crisis or major regional contingency. PEACETIME FORWARD PRESENCE OPERATIONS Naval forces are an indispensable and exceptional instrument of American foreign policy. From conducting routine port visits to nations and regions that are of special interest, to sustaining larger demonstrations of support to long-standing regional security interests, such as with UNITAS exercises in South America, U.S. naval forces underscore U.S. diplomatic initiatives overseas. Indeed, the critical importance of a credible overseas presence is emphasized in the President s 1994 National security Strategy; . . . presence demonstrates our commitment to allies and friends, underwrites regional stability, gains U.S. familiarity with overseas operating environments, promotes combined training among the forces of friendly countries, and provides timely initial response capabilities. In peacetime U.S. naval forces build interoperability -the ability to operate in

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BATTALION LANDING TEAM (Ground Combat Element ) [GCE) compound The 24th MEU (SOC) calls in Thailand, Singapore and Hong Kong, the MEU returned to the United States on 16 March 1994 to begin immediate plans for the next pre-deployment workup period scheduled to begin in April 1994. The 13th MEU (SOC) began its eighth Western Pacific deployment 25 October 1995 only seven months after returning to Camp Pendleton. The MEU conducted its first scheduled exercise on Okinawa, 11- 13 November. Immediately following its completion the MEU conducted a liberty port call in Hong Kong and then sailed south to Singapore to conduct 5 days of bilateral training with the Singaporean Defense Forces. Following the training in Singapore the 13th MEU (SOC) sailed north to the Persian Gulf and came under operational control of COMUSNAVCENT. During the time the MEU was deployed in the Persian Gulf they conducted three major exercises: Eager Mace 95-1 in Kuwait, Nautical Mantis 95-1 in Saudi Arabia, and Iron Magic 95-2 in the United Arab Emirates. Each of these exercises involved extensive bilateral training with the host nation and all were dubbed a success. Additionally during this period the MEU conducted a real world Maritime Interdiction OperatiorWisit Board Search and Seizure (MIOA BSS) mission aboard the Honduran flagged Merchant Vessel Ajmer which was in violation of United Nations sanctions with Iraq. During January 1995 the 13th MEU (SOC) received an execute order to conduct Operation United Shield; the withdrawal of UNOSOM forces from Somalia. Immediately after receiving this warning order the MEU sailed south to Africa and conducted operational rehearsals in Kenya. On 3 February 1995 the MEU was in position off the coast of Somalia and began conducting initial reconnaissance of the operational area and liaison with UNOSOM forces. Early morning on 28 February 1 3th MEU (SOC) conducted an amphibious assault onto Somalia soil and began executing a relief-in-place with UNOSOM forces. By 2 March the withdrawal of all MARINE EXPEDITIONARY UNIT (MEU) COMMAND ELEMENT SQUADRON (Reinforced) I Aviation Combat Element ) (ACE) SERVICE SUPPORT ELEMENT (Combat Service Support Elemenl) (CSSE) PERSONNEL 2.050 Marines; 100 U.S.Navy personnel. Total: 2.150 GROUND FORCES EQUIPMENT 5 Tanks and or 8-17 Light Armored Vehicles (LAV) 8 8IMm Mortars 32 Dragon Missile Launcheis (anti-armor) 8 TOW missile launchers (tube-launched, optically sighted. wire-guided anti-armor) 12 amphibious assault vehicles 4 155mm howitzers 4 1 OSnun howitzers AIRCRAFT AND MISSILES 12 CH-46 medium-lift assault helicopters 4 CH-53 heavy lift assault transport helicopters 3 UH-1 utility helicopters 4 AH- 1 attack helicopters - The squadron could be rein- forced by one VMA Det (6 AV-8B) Venical Short Takeoff and Landmg (V STOLl attack aircraft and 2 KC- 1 30 aenal refuelers as the laciical situation dictates. ) 5 Stinger surface-to-air missile teams While the numbers of per- sonnel and types and quan- tities of equipment shown here are typical of those for a MEU, the actual numbers vary; prior to deployment, an MEU is tailored to meet specific or anticipated mis- sion requirements. MEU COMMAND ELEMENT Surveillance. Reconnais- sance and Inielligence Delachmcm REIN HELICOPTER SQUADRON REIN INFANTRY BATTALION CSSE MEU SERVICE SUPPORT GROUP MOTOR TRANSPORT PLATOON MARINE AIR CONTROL GROUP (DETACHMEhfT) i ASSAULT MPH1BIAN PLATOON -Tanks. LAVS, or twn COMBAT ENGINEER PLATOON LANDING SUPPORT PLATOON ENGINEER SUPPORT PLATOON UNOSOM forces was complete and during the first hours of 3 March, the final Marine forces departed Somali soil. Operation United Shield was a complete success. Following Operation United Shield the 1 3th MEU (SOC) sailed south to Perth, Australia for a port call and some well deserved liberty. After leaving Australia the MEU sailed north to Okinawa to conduct an LCAC turnover with the 3 1 st MEU and proceeded southeast to Hawaii.

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concert with friendly and allied forces-so that in the future we can easily participate fully as part of a formal multinational response or as part of ad hoc coalitions forged to react to short-notice crisis situations. Participation in both NATO Standing Naval Forces and in a variety of exercises with the navies, air forces, and land forces of coalition partners around the Pacific rim, Norwegian Sea, Arabian Gulf, and Mediterranean basin provide solid foundations for sustaining interoperability with our friends and allies. Additionally, the outreach to the former Warsaw Pact countries in the NATO Partnership for Peace program will further build solidarity and interoperability. We have already made solid progress in expanding and intensifying our cooperation with the navies in Eastern Europe with exercises such as BALTOPS 94 and BREEZE 94, which included units from Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Russia, and Ukraine. U.S. forward-deployed naval forces have also contributed to humanitarian assistance and disaster-relief efforts-from the Philippines to Bangladesh to Rwanda- with similar, very positive, results. Although naval presence includes a wide range of forward-deployed navy and Marine Corps units afloat and ashore in friendly nations, our basic presence building blocks remain Aircraft Carrier Battle Groups - with versatile, multipurpose, naval tactical aviation wings - and Amphibious Ready Groups - with special operations-capable Marine Expeditionary Units. These highly flexible naval formations are valued by the theater commanders precisely because they provide the necessary capabilities forward. They are ready and positioned to respond to the wide range of contingencies and are available to participate in allied exercises, which are the bedrock of interoperability. We have also turned our attention to examining the naval capabilities that could contribute to extending conventional deterrence. In this regard, forward-deployed surface warships-cruisers and destroyers-with theater ballistic missile defense capabilities will play an increasingly important role in discouraging the proliferation of ballistic missiles be extending credible defenses to friendly and allied countries. By maintaining the means to enhance their security and safety, we may reduce the likelihood that some of these nations will develop their own offensive capabilities. Our efforts will thereby slow weapons proliferation and enhance regional stability. In addition, even as we have shifted our emphasis to forward presence and power projection from sea to land, the Navy continues to provide a robust strategic nuclear deterrent by maintaining strategic ballistic missile submarines at sea. As long as it is U.S. policy to ensure an adequate and ready strategic nuclear deterrent, our highly survivable strategic ballistic missile submarines will remain critical to national security. CRISIS RESPONSE U.S. naval forces are designed to fight and win wars. as are all elements of our military arsenal. To successfully deter aggressors, we must be capable of responding quickly and successfully in support of U.S. theater commanders. Forces deployed for routine exercises and activities girding forward presence are also the forces most likely to be called upon to respond rapidly to an emerging crisis. The potential for escalation dictates that present forces must be shaped for missions they may encounter. This provides theater commanders with credible crisis-response capabilities in the event normal conditions or outcomes do not turn out as we expect. Building on normally deployed forces, we can mass, if the situation requires, multiple Aircraft Carrier Battle Groups into Carrier Battle Forces, Amphibious Ready Groups with embarked Marine Expeditionary Units, and as needed project our naval expeditionary forces ashore using the afloat Maritime Prepositioning Force. Such as massing of naval units can be complemented by the deployment of Army and Air Force units to provide a joint force capable of the full range of combat operations that may be required.