Essex (LHD 2) - Naval Cruise Book

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BATTALION LANDING TEAM (Ground Combat Element ) [GCE) compound The 24th MEU (SOC) calls in Thailand, Singapore and Hong Kong, the MEU returned to the United States on 16 March 1994 to begin immediate plans for the next pre-deployment workup period scheduled to begin in April 1994. The 13th MEU (SOC) began its eighth Western Pacific deployment 25 October 1995 only seven months after returning to Camp Pendleton. The MEU conducted its first scheduled exercise on Okinawa, 11- 13 November. Immediately following its completion the MEU conducted a liberty port call in Hong Kong and then sailed south to Singapore to conduct 5 days of bilateral training with the Singaporean Defense Forces. Following the training in Singapore the 13th MEU (SOC) sailed north to the Persian Gulf and came under operational control of COMUSNAVCENT. During the time the MEU was deployed in the Persian Gulf they conducted three major exercises: Eager Mace 95-1 in Kuwait, Nautical Mantis 95-1 in Saudi Arabia, and Iron Magic 95-2 in the United Arab Emirates. Each of these exercises involved extensive bilateral training with the host nation and all were dubbed a success. Additionally during this period the MEU conducted a real world Maritime Interdiction OperatiorWisit Board Search and Seizure (MIOA BSS) mission aboard the Honduran flagged Merchant Vessel Ajmer which was in violation of United Nations sanctions with Iraq. During January 1995 the 13th MEU (SOC) received an execute order to conduct Operation United Shield; the withdrawal of UNOSOM forces from Somalia. Immediately after receiving this warning order the MEU sailed south to Africa and conducted operational rehearsals in Kenya. On 3 February 1995 the MEU was in position off the coast of Somalia and began conducting initial reconnaissance of the operational area and liaison with UNOSOM forces. Early morning on 28 February 1 3th MEU (SOC) conducted an amphibious assault onto Somalia soil and began executing a relief-in-place with UNOSOM forces. By 2 March the withdrawal of all MARINE EXPEDITIONARY UNIT (MEU) COMMAND ELEMENT SQUADRON (Reinforced) I Aviation Combat Element ) (ACE) SERVICE SUPPORT ELEMENT (Combat Service Support Elemenl) (CSSE) PERSONNEL 2.050 Marines; 100 U.S.Navy personnel. Total: 2.150 GROUND FORCES EQUIPMENT 5 Tanks and or 8-17 Light Armored Vehicles (LAV) 8 8IMm Mortars 32 Dragon Missile Launcheis (anti-armor) 8 TOW missile launchers (tube-launched, optically sighted. wire-guided anti-armor) 12 amphibious assault vehicles 4 155mm howitzers 4 1 OSnun howitzers AIRCRAFT AND MISSILES 12 CH-46 medium-lift assault helicopters 4 CH-53 heavy lift assault transport helicopters 3 UH-1 utility helicopters 4 AH- 1 attack helicopters - The squadron could be rein- forced by one VMA Det (6 AV-8B) Venical Short Takeoff and Landmg (V STOLl attack aircraft and 2 KC- 1 30 aenal refuelers as the laciical situation dictates. ) 5 Stinger surface-to-air missile teams While the numbers of per- sonnel and types and quan- tities of equipment shown here are typical of those for a MEU, the actual numbers vary; prior to deployment, an MEU is tailored to meet specific or anticipated mis- sion requirements. MEU COMMAND ELEMENT Surveillance. Reconnais- sance and Inielligence Delachmcm REIN HELICOPTER SQUADRON REIN INFANTRY BATTALION CSSE MEU SERVICE SUPPORT GROUP MOTOR TRANSPORT PLATOON MARINE AIR CONTROL GROUP (DETACHMEhfT) i ASSAULT MPH1BIAN PLATOON -Tanks. LAVS, or twn COMBAT ENGINEER PLATOON LANDING SUPPORT PLATOON ENGINEER SUPPORT PLATOON UNOSOM forces was complete and during the first hours of 3 March, the final Marine forces departed Somali soil. Operation United Shield was a complete success. Following Operation United Shield the 1 3th MEU (SOC) sailed south to Perth, Australia for a port call and some well deserved liberty. After leaving Australia the MEU sailed north to Okinawa to conduct an LCAC turnover with the 3 1 st MEU and proceeded southeast to Hawaii.

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History of the 13th Marine Expeditionary Unit (SOC), FMF (950409) The 1 3th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) was activated at Camp Pendleton, California on 1 February 1985. It is one of three West Coast MEUs which make periodic deployments to the Western Pacific, Indian Ocean, and Persian Gulf regions. Since its activation, 13th MEU has completed eight Western Pacific Deployments, participated in forty-five amphibious training exercises, visted thirteen foreign countries, and conducted combat operations in support of Operations Desert Shield, Desert Storm, and United Shield. The Fighting 13th MEU has experienced a number of firsts. It was the first West Coast MEU to be designated as Special Operations Capable, having undergone extensive training in conducting a wide variety of special missions. It was the first MEU to deploy with Landing Craft Air Cushion (LCAC) and the Mastiff remotely piloted vehicle, and the first West Coast MEU to deploy with a force reconnaissance platoon. The 13th MEU (SOC) ' s special operations capabilities were used extensively on its deployment during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Beginning a routine deployment on 20 June 1990, the MEU was diverted to Southwest Asia in August 1990. The first amphibious force to arrive in theater of operations, 1 3th MEU conducted the first offensive actions against Iraq by Marine units. In October, elements of the 13th MEU (SOC) boarded two Iraqi tankers that refused to obey the United Nations sanctions. The MEU conducted a number of operations during Desert Storm including a helicopter raid on Maradim Island, Kuwait and amphibious operations the day the ground war started. The MEU ' s last combat operation in Desert Storm was an Iraqi prisoner of war roundup on Faylaka Island, Kuwait, on 3 March 1991, which resulted in 1,413 Iraqi prisoners. The 13th MEU returned to the United States on 16 April 1991 after being deployed 301 consecutive days. The 13th MEU (SOC) deployed again in January 1992 in support of its Western Pacific commitment. During this deployment, the MEU conducted training operations in the Persian Gulf, Africa and Thailand. Addtionally, the MEU was the last deploying unit to visit the Philippines prior to the closure of Naval Station, Subic Bay. In September 1993, the 13th MEU (SOC) sailed to the Western Pacific, keeping its normal deployment schedule. After completing a routine exercise in Okinawa and a liberty port call in Hong Kong, the MEU was redeployed to Somalia in early October in response to increasing hostilities there. As a key element of the newly-formed COMMARFOR SOMALIA, the 13th MEU (SOC), along with the 22nd MEU (SOC), remained on station ready to provide direct support to United States and United Nations forces ashore. By mid November, the 22nd MEU (SOC) was reassigned back to the Mediterranean area of operations, resulting in the disestablishment of COMMARFOR SOMALIA and leaving the 13th MEU (SOC) as the principle rapid response force in support of the joint task force ashore. During the execution of this vital presence mission, the MEU developed and executed two humanitarian assistance operations. The first, dubbed operation Show Care took place in the cities of Marka and Qoryooley from 11-14 November. From 1-3 December 1993 Operation More Care was conducted in the Old Port of Mogadishu. Both operations provided badly needed medical and dental assistance to the Somali people and went far to enhance civil military operations. The 13th MEU (SOC) continued its presence mission throughout December and January, providing aircraft for the Eyes Over Mogadishu mission as well as sniper support at the United States Embassy

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Forward . . . From the Sea THE STRATEGIC IMPERATIVE The vital economic, political, and military interests of the United Slates are truly global in nature and scope. In many respects these interests are located across broad oceans, and to a great extent they intersect those of current and emergent regional powers. It is in the world ' s littorals where the Naval Service, operating from sea bases in international waters, can influence events ashore in support of our interests. Because we are a maritime nation, our security strategy is necessarily a transoceanic one. Our vital interests-those interests for which the United States is willing to fight-are at the endpoint of highways of the seas or lines of strategic approach that stretch from the United States to the farthest point on the globe. Not surprisingly, these strategic lines and their endpoints coincide with the places to which we routinely deploy naval expeditionary forces: the Atlantic, Mediterranean. Pacific, Indian Ocean, Red Sea, Persian Gulf, and Caribbean Sea. Reductions in fiscal resources, however, dictate that we must refocus our more limited naval assets on the highest priorities and the most immediate challenges, even within these areas of historic and vital interests to the United States. Naval forces are particularly well-suited to the entire range of Military operations in support of our national strategy. They continue the historic role of naval forces engaged in preventive diplomacy and otherwise supporting our policies overseas. Moreover, forward-deployed naval forces-manned, equipped, and trained for combat-play a significant role in demonstrating both the intention and the capability to join our NATO and other allies, as well as other friendly powers, in defending shared interests. Finally, if deterrence fails during a crisis and conflict erupts, naval forces provide the means for immediate sea-based reaction. This could include forcible entrj ' and providing the protective cover essential to enabling the flow of follow-on forces which will be deployed, supported, and sustained from the continental United States. In short, forward-deployed naval forces will provide the critical operational linkages between peacetime operations and the initial requirements of developing crisis or major regional contingency. PEACETIME FORWARD PRESENCE OPERATIONS Naval forces are an indispensable and exceptional instrument of American foreign policy. From conducting routine port visits to nations and regions that are of special interest, to sustaining larger demonstrations of support to long-standing regional security interests, such as with UNITAS exercises in South America, U.S. naval forces underscore U.S. diplomatic initiatives overseas. Indeed, the critical importance of a credible overseas presence is emphasized in the President s 1994 National security Strategy; . . . presence demonstrates our commitment to allies and friends, underwrites regional stability, gains U.S. familiarity with overseas operating environments, promotes combined training among the forces of friendly countries, and provides timely initial response capabilities. In peacetime U.S. naval forces build interoperability -the ability to operate in