Denver (CL 58) - Naval Cruise Book

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In the Cliaiiis Main Deck Aft {R}

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ACTION REPORT-U.S.S. DENVER THERE is plenty of reason for men of the Diiu ' ir to be proud of their ship, and they are proud of her, and not a little bit thankful for her luck. For the Daivcr ' s story does not quite cover three years, yet in that time she is credited with the destruction or assist of 7 Japanese warships and 14 Japanese aircraft and has participated in 14 shore bombardments, most of which covered amphibious landings. On the other side of the ledger, she has had her share of hits and near misses, having had 3 Nip eight- inch projectiles pass completely through her without exploding, but getting hit by an aerial torpedo within the next ten days in November, 1943. She had one Kamikaze crash close aboard in October, 1944, holing her starboard side and causing minor flood- ing. Her topside men have -watched lots of bombs fall, and her below decks personnel have heard the explosions. But for all this, she has let the Japs take only 20 of her men and less than that number wounded. Except for a brief training cruise through the fog banks of Chesapeake Bay after she w as commissioned in October, 1942, the Denvar ' s story is one of the Pacific War, and commences after her arrival at Noumea, New Caledonia, on February 5, 1943. The con- solidation of the Southern Solomons was beginning, with emphasis on disrupting the enemy ' s Tokyo Express rims to airstrips and bivouacs at Munda and Kolombangara. She joined Admiral A. S. Merrill ' s task force of cruisers and destroyers, which by force of circumstances then existing in the Solomons was a small and ever-changing organization. On the nights of March 5 and 6 the Den- ver drew first blood. With a group assigned to bombard Kolombangara the Denver was approaching the harbor, her guns loaded with High Capacity projectiles for shore bom- bardment. Rounding a point of land, her radar operators picked up two targets through the darkness lying dead in the water. As all hands were at GQ, it was but a mat- ter of seconds before the first salvo was streaking through the night towards the targets. The H.C. projectiles caused great explosions topside and evidently cleared off all personnel, for not a shot was fired in return. The Denver is officially credited with the sinking of two destroyers, but the men in the directors and the control stations feel certain that the tripod masts illuminated by the tremendous explosions could belong only to Jap cruisers. However, they were not given long to discuss the matter, for the vessels were both beneath the waves in less than ten minutes. Thereafter, bombardment operations in the Solomons became routine to the extent that they were a complement to I. r training activities. On the nights of June 30-July 1, 1943, the Denver participated in a mine laying and bombardment operation, the purpose of which -was to mine the southern outlets of the enemy ' s base at Bum and to destroy his air facilities in this sector preliminary to the New Georgia assault on July 1. This raid was made in a rainstorm so thick it was impossible to see your hand in front of your face. At Ballale, on this strike against an airstrip, was conducted the first blind spot- ting operation participated in by the Denver, {7

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her air coverage having gi en up and returned home because of the weather. This raid repre- sented the greatest penetration by surface craft into enemv held territory of the war to that date. And after these preparations, the Dini ' tr found herself in a verv busv lulv, dur- ing which the Cruiser Division to which she was attached was running The Slot almost nightly with another bombardment of Munda airstrip in support of projected troop movements thrown in. This activity was followed by a brief period of training and rest, but by October the Dliii ' lt and her running mates were a part of the task force which opened the Bougain- ville Island campaign with a bombardment of the Buka-Bonis airstrips in northern Bougainville on the night of the 31st, and a strike on southern Bougainville the morn- ing of November 2. This action included a somewhat timid air attack by 70 Jap Vals, Bettys, and Zekes in which this ship shot down at least two planes. The night bombardment of the Buka- Bonis installations caught the Japanese so by surprise that they confusedly thought them- selves under air attack and fired their guns harmlessly skyward while our ships meth- odically pounded them from the sea. But surprise in the north alerted the Jap gun- ners to the south in the Shortland area and three, five, and six-inch batteries opened fire there without delay. The Dciutr ' .s gun- ners, however, quickly silenced three three- inch and one six-inch emplacement in her sector before they could get her range. Only twenty-four hours later occurred the night engagement of Empress Augusta Bay, the Dfiuvr ' 5 most spectacular battle. Although there are many of the old salts who are not sure yet just e.xactly what happened that night because of the utter darkness, the engagement has since been reconstructed. The stage for this sea battle was the north end of the Solomon Sea, about thirty-five miles west of Empress Augusta Bay. When intercepted, the Japanese task force, com- prising twelve units in three groups, namely four destroyers, four cruisers, four destroyers, was on a direct course between their base at Rabaul and Empress Augusta Bay. Their apparent intention was to intercept and de- stroy our transports and supply ships un- loading there, and bombard the Marines ashore. Admiral Merrill ' s orders were ex- plicit: prevent any such occurrence. He exceeded his orders by not only doing just that, but virtually destroying the entire opposing force as well, never at any time, however, leaving even the tiniest entrance to Empress Augusta Bay where into a segment of the Jap force might slip in the heat of battle. With the surprise element in his favor, the choice of battle site was Admiral Merrill ' s. He had two alternatives: fight off uncharted shoals surrounding Em- press Augusta Bay, or farther westward in an area permitting more sea room. The former was chosen despite its disadvantages, because the mission was to maintain units in position across the entrance to Empress Augusta Bay. To compensate for the selec tion of the less favorable of the two battle sites, however. Admiral Merrill ' s strategy encompassed pushing the enemy westward in an area permitting more sea room. Admiral Merrill chose thusly, first, in order to gain more sea room to aid maneuvering; secondly, to enable the movements of any possible cripples to the unengaged side of the battle 9