Bunker Hill (CV 17) - Naval Cruise Book

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l ' 2 1 1 I 5 l 2 2 3 i l -2 E X f . l it 1 P i 1 1 I l -.W ......-....,.. I... . .d. , . 5 - . ,M M I 1 l I 1 . i g., ij. U Q,k,..f' .5 ,J hifi: 1, f Clearly it seems they were expecting a con- centration of American naval might in the northern New Guinea area to assist a likely thrust into the eastern East Indies as a re- sult of the invasion of Biak, early in June. Point two was the large troop convoy head- ing for Guam, which our task force picked up and annihilated. The invasion of the Marianas followed the regular pattern of previous amphibious opera- tions. The three key islands, Saipan, Tinian, and Guam, in this chain, that belonged to four major powers in the last fifty years, were first subjected to intense aerial bombard- ment with particular attention paid to Sai- pan, the site of the flrst landings. The battle- ships were then brought in to shell with murderous effect strategic installations. When the island had been sufllciently softened up, the troops stormed the beachheads. From all appearances it had the earmarks of a routine mission for the carriers once the enemy air power within reach had been crushed. The Japs on the other hand, for the first time since Guadalcanal, had made plans to combat the invasion of the Marianas with the use of their fleet. Because of their geographic location, within bombing range of Tokyo by our Super-fortresses, and because they are an all-important link in the chain of supply stretching from Pearl Harbor, to the Marshalls and Palau to the Philippines and Formosa, the enemy considered them of sufficient significance to risk exposing a vital part of the fleet in the hope of outmaneuver- ing us and dealing us a staggering blow while We were engaged in supporting the landing operations. In short, the Jap naval brains felt that the long-awaited moment of great tactical advantage had arrived. For two days the opposing fleets jockeyed back and forth. The Japanese tactics were based on striking at us with their carrier air groups while keeping their fleet safely out of the range of our planes. In order to achieve this craftily conceived scheme they devised a plan of launching from far out and, after attacking the American Fleet, landing their planes at Guam, refueling and rearming, and then striking again on the way back to their carriers. To augment their striking power, planes were flown into Guam from the Caro. lines, the morning of the all-out attack. Thus the American Fleet was to be caught in a, gigantic aerial vise between the island of Guam and the Jap carriers. The opening phase of the greatest air en- gagement of the war found our carrier-based planes striking at Guam. By this action we not only denied the enemy the use of the landing fields but destroyed a host of air- craft poised for the big blow. Vals, Kates, Judies, and Zekes lined the overcrowded strip and others were circling the field looking for a landing spot as our fighters swept out of the skies. In the meanwhile, Jap carrier-based aircraft were on their way to the U. S. Fleet. For the better part of nine hours they were engaged by our fighters. At the end of the day the Japs had lost more than four hundred planes and the cream of the flying personnel in the Jap Empire, at a cost of twenty-five planes and minor damage to a few surface units. The following afternoon, the enemy was spotted, fleeing to the west. A strike was immediately sent out which definitely sank one Hayataka class carrier, one DD, and two AO's, and probably sunk two carriers of the Hayataka and Zuiko class, one DD, and one AO. In addition, damage was done to one Skokaku class carrier and one CVL, two BB'S of the Kongo class, and two heavy cruisers. A true assessment of the full significance of this battle of the Eastern Philippines iS not yet possible. Like all battles of great strategic consequence, only time can reveal the exact measure of its importance. It W2S a source of tremendous disappointment t0 all concerned that every ship in the enemy fleet wasn't obliterated, yet the staggering losses to their air groups, and the realization on their part that their fleet was hopelessly outclassed by ours, doubtlessly had a PTO' found effect on the Japanese Imperial com- mand in their conduct of defense as we drew closer to the Orient. . 'ir . :- ,,,,,'.. Q... , A

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