Bunker Hill (CV 17) - Naval Cruise Book

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As we returned to join the body of the fieet, we were delighted at the unexpected speed with which the conquest had been effected, and perplexed at what would now await us. Already in this campaign we had established some kind of a record by coming closer to Truk than any other surface ship had come in this war. It wasn't long before we were to discover what was next on the program. In typical Navy style, the scuttle- butt increased in tempo until it burst like a storm as the day of our departure grew near. Once again the scuttlebutt was right and the U. S. Fleet, under Vice-Admiral Raymond Spruance, was headed for the keystone of all enemy positions in the Central and South Pacific. While there was much that we did not know about the Marshalls before the invasion, there was little-and very little--that we knew about Truk. Over a period of years this heart that supplied the main arteries of Jap conquests to the South, East and West had taken on the significance of a Gibraltar and Pearl Harbor in the newly acquired Japanese empire. Lack of reconnaissance, and the fact that it was a staging base, made any estimate of its air power only a rough approximation. There was no doubt, how- ever, that this was the strongest enemy posi- tion that our fieet had approached up to that time. In essence, it was to be the great test of whether a powerful island fortress with an unknown but large concentration of air strength could be attacked successfully by carrier-based planes. After fortuitously eluding Jap search planes, the fleet steamed into position for an early dawn strike. The fighters swept the airfields and shot down or destroyed more than 200 aircraft. With the main defense arm of the enemy utterly crushed, he was helpless to ward off the dive bombers and torpedo planes that followed. For two days the several lagoons, packed with merchant shipping and a few combat ships, were just so many shoot- ing galleries for the naval aviators. It is interesting to note in connection with this raid that the battleships, for the first time since Savo Island, were able to bring their sixteen inch guns to bear on enemy naval units and they did not fail. By the afternoon of the second day, the planes were running out of targets, and the fleet's withdrawal was ordered. We had ob- viously stunned the enemy by this daring and thunderous stroke and, on the principle of crowding him and pursuing him before he could regain his bearings, the fleet was dis- patched to the Marianas. This time we were not as fortunate and the afternoon of the day before we were scheduled to launch our strike an enemy search plane picked us up. Shortly after twilight, the Japs launched a series of torpedo plane attacks that lasted until dawn, when our fighters shot down the remnants on the way into Saipan and Tinian. The immediate results of the attack on the Marianas were pretty much a repetition of what had happened at Truk. Wholesale quantities of aircraft and ship- ping were destroyed, but, perhaps, of greater significance was the proof that our fieet could withstand a land-based aerial onslaught from strong enemy insular possessions and fight its way on to complete its mission. The combined operations against Truk and the Marianas had a profound effect on the course of the war in the Pacific. Aside from the fact that enemy losses in shipping and planes were so severe as to force them to abandon whatever lingering hope they may have entertained to hang on in the South Pacific, it established that the waters of the Central Pacific were no longer an exclusive Jap lake. For a matter of more than tW0 years the enemy had shut off our access t0 the Central Pacific by its string of so-called Uunsinkable carriers -the islands-that dot the map in that area. American aircraft carriers with the superior Hellcat fighter, literally tore that string to shreads, and opened the locks of the gateway to the Orient. Simultaneously with the Navy's forages int0 the Central Pacific, General MacArthur cli- X 525 . ,, . ., ,L ,., bZ.' L .

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wpeled as one of the most daring and haz- carrier operations ever attempted. AS Smlll as our task group was at Rabaul, this we was smaller. Whereas at Rabaul we were within hailing distance of assistance gem friendly surface forces if needed, at Kavieng we were some two hundred miles north of the nearest assistance. The few Ships that composed our tiny force were the first ones to penetrate this area since the outbreak of the war. We were as exposed to a large scale air attack as we had been at Rabaul, for the airfields on New Ireland were still operational and it was only a matter of 3 few hours ferry hop from Truk, Eaeh time as the ship faded into the night after a tortuous fourteen hours of daylight the The Second Era A X -Cs.b-aff Juli sri! :i.45f.1...i-f 1.5 A .z'f.4,sff 11,52-1' Power Tactics Take Over As Fleet Strength Grows With the promotion of Captain J. J. Ball- entine to Rear Admiral and the assump- tion of his duties by Captain T. P. Jeter, the second era of Bunker Hill commenced. During the first era our efforts had been directed primarily to reducing enemy air and naval power in those areas that formerly belonged to the Allies. To most of us, and then only to the incurable optimists, it seemed hardly possible that in the short space of four months, after our departure from the States, we would be engaged in an operation designed to cap- ture pre-war Japanese territory. The Pacific War was beginning to open up with unfalter- mg rapidity, and our second era was to wit- ness the relentless march of the U. S. Navy t0 the Philippines. . Of all the amphibious operations conducted ln 1944 by the U. S., none proved more com- Plefely successful from every aspect than the S1gh.0f relief emitted from all hands caused Z T11101' Cyclone in the immediate areag then fny to be met with the announcement a ew days later that we would try it once more. After our first strike there when we found a CTUISCIB. an escort vessel, and a few AK's, all of which were heavily damaged or sunk, the laps kept the port clear for our returning planes. The mission to Kavieng ended our operations with the SoPac Forces and from then to this day we became an integral part of the Fast Carrier Task forces. It was only a few months before all enemy resistance col- lapsed in the South Pacific and Allied efforts were concentrated on the New Guinea and Central Pacific Areas. f iflfl-13.1. 45 Afie.. f ,fi if.4'.4...4f -Ln!-4...51-Q..6 invasion of the Marshalls. It had been generally conceded that the operation would be rough and that with twenty-live years to prepare defenses, the enemy would exact a heavy price in men and materials. In this campaign our strategy showed an ingenuity and flexibility, rooted in experience, that some of the others lacked. The enemy was waiting for us on the Eastern fringes of this great chain of islands, but we outfoxed him by plunging the dagger into his heart. We by- passed his outer string of fortresses and struck at Kwajalein, the strategic center of the Marshall Island group. The Bunker Hill was in the vanguard of the invasion. After launching the first strike at Kwajalein, we took up a position off the Jap staging base at Eniwetok, some six hundred miles from Truk, to act the role of interceptor to naval and air power that might be sent to reinforce the Marshalls. For several days the island was subjected to a merciless pounding that ren- dered it totally useless.

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maxed his series of encirclements in the South Pacific with the occupation of the Admiralties, a Small group of islands lying to the north of New Britain. This move, in conjunction with the occupation of Eniwetok by Admiral T urner's forces, bringing as it did Truk with- in bombing range of Admiral Hoover's Sev- enth Air Force, effectively isolated the Jap strongholds of New Britain and New Ireland and sealed the fate of the enemy in the South Pacific. Our over-all strategy was now tak- ing shape with one arm in the form of General MacArthur's forces stretching northward to the Philippines, while the other arm, in the body of the U. S. Fleet and accompanying amphibious forces, closed the vise from the East. The Army on New Guinea was now ready to take a long hop up the coast to Hollandia, on the border of the Dutch portion of New Guinea. Such a step would encircle large enemy forces to the north of the present allied positions on New Guinea and success- fully avoid a prolonged campaign through the dense forests and jungleland of the coastal regions. As a preview to this major opera- tion, it was decided to send a powerful Am- erican task force to Palau, the last remaining great enemy naval base east of the Philippines and the hub of supply lines to the New Guinea area, for the purpose of further crip- pling the Jap Merchant Marine and with the intention of neutralizing this base for the campaign to follow. In many respects the Navy Department publicly regarded our attack on Palau as the most daring and strategically significant attack up to that time. Nevertheless, the manner in which we handled the enemy at Truk and the Marianas had instilled a feel- ing of genuine confidence aboard ship that We could more than match anything that might be arrayed against us. After a long steam through waters covered by enemy reconnaissance planes, our fleet blasted its way to the target, only slightly more than HVC hundred miles from enemy airfields on the Philippines. After giving it bombing treat- ment for two days, we returned to assist in the execution of the Hollandia invasion. The hop from the Allied position at Saidor, south of Wewak, to Hollandia was so great that the Southwest Pacific forces could not adeClUatClY cover the invasion with land- based planes. Accordingly, the ever-growing carrier strength of our fieet was called in to Support the landings. The weak resistance offered, both in the air and on the ground, was further proof that Jap supply lines to the south of the Philippines had been all but severed by the terrific destruction of their merchant marine by our subs and planes. With the occupation of Hollandia, General MacArthur was in a position to move against Jap air bases on the islands to the north and west, and to bring his Air Force to the perimeter of the Southern Philippines. In point of fact, by this one bold stroke General MacArthur won more territory than he had regained since the outbreak of the war. By summer of 1944 we reaped the further benefits of that campaign. The Japs on New Guinea became desperate because supply lines were completely broken down and they were starving. They could barely live off the land and definitely could not Hght on what could be produced. In truth, the war had taken a mighty surge forward. It was quite apparent that the next naval amphibious operation in the Central Pacific would be the capture of the Marianas. As the only logical step in our drive across the vast Central Pacific, there is little doubt that it was equally obvious to the enemy. Yet our schedule of operations, which was already months in advance of the original conception, was moving at such a rapid pace that the enemy was not expecting us when we arrived off the Marianas in the early part of June. As the campaign developed, two pertinent facts tended to bear this out. The Jap fieet, which had already been committed to the protection of the Marianas against invasion, was steaming in the Philippine Waters with a view to a possible surprise attack on our forces off the northwestern New Guinea coast.