Bixby High School - Spartan Yearbook (Bixby, OK)

Page 15 text:

Following his February negotiating tour of the Mid- East, Kissinger was understood to be worried that Syria might try to upset a Sinai settlement because of fears that Egypt may be making a separate deal with Israel. His chief worry in arranging a settlement concerns reports that Syrian President Hafez Assad is urging other Arab nations to resist so called partial settlements that could devide the Arabs. As a result, Kissinger is exploring ways of linking a Sinai agreement to Syria's drive for further Israeli withdrawal on the Golan Heights. One approach believed under considera- tion would be to pair an Egyptian-Israeli agreement with an- nouncement of a date for resumption of the Geneva peace conference. Relations with Moscow at this time are also con- sidered central to peace. Basically, Kissinger is working on an Israeli withdrawal of up to 30 miles including the Abu Rudeis oil fields and possibly the strategic Gidi and Mitla mountain passes in return for a commitment by Egypt of peace with Israel. In February United Nations Secretary- General Kurt Waldheim warned that the situation could become very dangerous unless progress toward peace is achieved inside a month. Meanwhile, Syria is trying to in- crease Arab pressure on Sadat of Egypt to get him to make a new Egyptian-Israeli agreement based on Israeli troop withdrawal on the Syrian front. Israeli leaders have, however, praised Sadat for the way he has switched home- front priorities from war planning to such economic goals as the re-opening of the Suez Canal this Spring. A key Israeli cabinet minister promised during january that if this tendency grows, we will concede a lot, although we will not be squeezed. In Cario, Egyptian leaders surmised that Israeli Premier Rabin and Foreign Minister Allon had in- itially put together an unacceptable package in order to pacify Israeli hawks and were now ready for serious bargain- ing. The time is ripe for continued diplomatic efforts to br- ing peace to the area, said Egyptian Information Minister Ahmad Kamal Abul-Magd. Cario is keeping all bridges open. A major problem, however, is the fact that the Sinai negotiations are inextricably tied to similiar discussions over the Golan Heights, and the Israeli-Syrian situation is still hopelessly bogged down. Israel demands guarantees of border security, as well as political recognition from Damascus, before it will return any more of the Golan Heights. Syrian President Assad, so far, is unwilling to recognize Israel, and unless the Israelis pull back farther on the Golan, he is unlikely to accede to another six-month renewal of the United Nations peace-keeping force that is separating the belligerents on the Heights when the present UN mandate expires in May. Israel already regrets giving back the provincial capital Quneitra in the first round of negotiations and as of January was resisting the six or seven kilometer pullback that the US had trial ballooned as a se- cond stage. Another trouble spot is the Lebanese-Israeli border, which Palestinian guerrillas have frequently crossed to at- tack Israel, while Israeli forces have retaliated by bombing, shelling, and raiding Lebanese villages that they claim have provided the Palestinians with shelter. If any good can come from a situation of that nature, then a limited amount did in january when Lebanon's Presi- dent Suleiman Franjieh met with Syrian President Assad in the first formal summit between leaders of the two often con- tentious neighbors since 1947. In discussions concerning the situation with Israel, Franjieh reportedly refused to allow Syrian troops inside his country short of an all-out Israeli assault, and agreed only to military co-ordination with Damascus. In spite of the differences however, it was generally conceded that the meeting had temporarily lessened tension along the northern border. Saudi Arabia's King Faisal, himself a key figure in Mid- dle East peace moves, also visited Damascus, Amman, and Cairo early in '75, as well as signing a S756 million contract with the US for sixty jets. The deal presumably reinforced US-Saudi relations, which are essential to peacemaking in the area. Such is his impact on international affairs that almost anything Henry Kissinger says is bound to produce some think of m yseh' as a historian more than a statesman. As a historian, you have to be conscious of the fact that every civilization that has ever existed has ultimatebi failed. History is a tale of efforts that failed, of aspirations that weren't realized, of wishes that were fuhillea' and then turned out to be dwerent from what are expected So, as a historian, one has to live with a sense ofthe inevitability oftragedy. As a states- man, one has to act on the assumption that problems can be solveal - Henry Kissinger in a conversation V with New York Times columnist f James Reston, Oct. 13 ly. kind of reaction from areas across the globe. Early in 1975, during a BUSINESS WEEK interview, Kissinger responded to a question about possible US military intervention against the oil producers by cautiously noting that this would be a very dangerous course. But then, I am not saying there is no circumstance where we would not use force. But it is one thing to use it in the case of a dispute over pricey it's another where there is some actual strangulation of the industrial world. Reaction to the comment was immediate, emotional and sharply negative: - A colonialist enterprise doomed to failure. -Algerian President Houari Boumedienne. - Gunboat policies. -Pravda - Oil producing Arab nations will blow up their wells rather than let them be seized by US forces. -Egyptian President Anwar Sadat. - American intervention might risk war with the Soviets. - Rome - Kissinger's flirtation with 'brinkmanshipf -London Only the Israelis expressed satisfaction. It was a good statement. said former Intelligence Chief Haim Herzog. It makes the Arabs think twice. Despite their public stances ftaken to appease the Arabs! several European officials privately agreed with Kissinger, acknowledging that if their economic situations became extreme, they would not op- pose US military action to avoid actual economic strangulation. Kissinger clearly stated that American intervention in the Mid-East would be a last resort. But in the face of the outrage, far from retracting his statement that intervention remains a US option, he even added that President Ford agreed with him, and the latter reaffirmed that support. Kissinger's remarks therefore, may have been a calculated signal to the oil exporters, warning them that they cannot re- main adamant much longer on high petroleum prices. The result remains to be seen. ---- -- - W- -------1 Z74fX ig-Xl... zz. l VK. 4 i l l 1 11

Page 14 text:

1f-e'Tf - ggi, 'jg 'T . 1 f- tv -3, IA. 1 1 ' ' , ' kg-V. 1'-x',f, '.-' gf ?' I ' ' 'k f- Aa, .fi L.. if-g,.. H '-ff 'Z' -.x '2 . 1.2723-fi ' 55. i f . i 1 ' A' .,ff..'-? 'f ' - - 25' f Q LL 1 -- If ,-.5y'ti?11:- ' ,tweluxl -qs ' ' Y --'x ---A -- --'-.5 -, iv ,I 1- -'3':1,,wc. P' . . f f . - -ea.:-'f , , ,, '-- T, .ffl ' 5 r fp 'tif -.s X-,. - i E--, Foreign Affairs Commandant Of The United Sta tes Kissinger And The Mid-East Perspective: Success Or Stall? Synonomous with the arrival of Air Force Two in virtually any air- port in the world today is a short man with wavy hair, a German accent and a ready grin, Super K as he is sometimes called, perhaps the foremost figure in world events - United States Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger. Under ex-president Nixon and now under Ford, Kissinger has established a reputation as perhaps one of the greatest statesmen and negotiators the world has ever known. He is largely responsible, through much jetting back and forth, for the truce, even if temporary, in the Mid- East: for the progression of detente with Russia as far as it has come: for dealings with the oil producing nations and assistance in their disputes: and indeed for global diplomacy wherever and whenever necessary - whether for the settling of differences or a trade agreement, it all seems to be part of a day's work for Kissinger. The Middle East has claimed a great deal of his attention this year, not only because of the powder-keg oil situation, but a multitude of inter- related factors which could at any moment lead to war. Visiting Amman in January of '75, Iran's Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlevi provided Jordan's King Hussein with a promise of increased financial aid to help turn Jordan into a prosperous and strongly developed country, as well as a squadron of F-5A fighters being phased out of the Iranian Air Force. The Iranian monarch then flew to Cairo, where his visit was described by one newspaper as probably the most important in modern Egyptian history. Egyptian President Anwar Sadat's warm reception of the Shah perhaps reflected a desire to put some of Iran's oil money to work shoring up Egypt's deficit-ridden economy, to which end the two leaders signed almost S1 billion in economic agreements, including a massive Iranian investment in Egyptian petrochemicals, which will provide needed fertilizer for both domestic use and export as well as plastics and synthetic fibers. Possibly beyond that too, Sadat saw an opportunity, through closer ties with Iran, to increase diplomatic pressure on Israel. For years Iran and Israel have been allies, yet the Shah's stance has changed dramatically since 1967, and he now regularly calls for complete Israeli withdrawal from occupied Arab territory. The one issue the Iranians can perhaps help resolve is con- trol of the Abu Rudeis oil fields in the southwest Sinai, which Sadat in- sists must be returned to Egypt as part of the next Israeli withdrawal. The Shah, whose country supplies Israel with 40'ha of its oil, told Sadat that Iran would be willing to increase its oil shipments to Israel to make up the estimated 5 million tons of petroleum that the Israelis would lose from the Abu Rudeis fields annually. Sadat voiced no opposition to the proposal, which was obviously Kissinger in its origination. The Secretary of State met with Israeli Deputy Prime Minister Yigal Allon in Washington in january under somewhat of a cloud which implied that Kissinger felt the Israelis were stalling. Their diplomats however, insisted that jerusalem had made a serious offer which the Egyptians brushed aside without so much as a counter-proposal. They suggested that Kissinger fly back to Cairo and find out precisely what Sadat would concede in return for further Israeli withdrawals - the Secretary will not however, return to the Mid-East on what he considers another probing mission until he is carrying new Israeli proposals that represent what he regards as significant concessions.

Page 16 text:

l l w w w Mobs Foreign Language Clubs Enjoying while learning was the main goal of Spanish and German Clubs. Celebrating native German and Spanish Holidays provided fun lear- ning experiences. Trips to restaurants specializing in foreign foods gave club members a chance to appreciate new tastes. Service projects, such as the Spanish Club's gifts of food and clothing to Guadalupe Central at Christmas, rounded out the activities of a worthwhile year. The clubs also made their own attempt at fixing native foods in the classroom. 1. GERMAN CLUB OFFICERS: Pres.-N. McElroy, Vice- Pres.-C. Smith, Sec.-J. Lovitt, Treas.-J. Breidenbach, Rep.-K. O'Brien, R. Hoffman 2. GERMAN CLUB: QSIT- TINGJ N. McElroy, T. Smith, K. O'Brien, K. Dugan, D. Farrar, R. Hoffman, V. Armstrong QSTANDINGJ K. Ander- son, B. Pilkington, j. Breidenbach, Miss Stokel, G. Car- michael, F. Wray, B. Creath, D. Abbott, J. Kilgore, J. Lovitt