Santa Fe (CL 60) - Naval Cruise Book

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D catch and sink any cripples. Aircraft from two carrier Task Groups which also stayed behind continued raids on the enemy. At 14115 the light striking group set a course for the nearest Jap ship sighted by carrier planesg at 1605 a surface target was picked up on the radar screen. As the contact was closed, a Jap CVL later identified as the CHITQSE could be seen on the horizon, dead in the water but not burning and only slightly down by the bow. All four cruisers commenced fire when range allowed, and almost immediately the target took hits and started to burn. No planes could be seen on the carrier, but per- sonnel were swarming all over the flight deck, sliding down handlines into the sea and scrambling off the radio an- tenna. Steadily and methodically the 6-inch and 8- inch projectiles mauled the carrier. The target slowly capsized, and finally went under at 1655. YYith the Jap carrier settling into Davey Jones' Locker, the cruisers were free to continue the chase. At 1637 a LANGLEY plane had made the following report: Main enemy group bearing 335, 40-50 miles. Consists of 1BB, 1CA, 3 DD, 10 miles SE of this group 1 CA making 6-8 knots. Also 1 BB, 1 CL 10 miles NE of main group, going like Hell. At 1825 the CAP located 1 CL or CA and 2 DD dead ahead, ten minutes later Combat reported surface contacts at 360, 17 miles-evidently the same ships. Now that the sun was down the men topside could see nothing, but the radar scope showed the three pips milling around and the distance to them rapidly closing. The SANTA FE and MGBILE were directed to take under fire the nearest target, the heavy cruisers the more distant targets. At 1905 the main battery opened fire, and two minutes later the secondary battery joined in. The black night sky was sharply etched by the projectile's telltale red tracers arching their way to the target. A sudden flash followed by a brief fire at the end of the trajectory showed that Plot was getting no change-no change. However, the Jap was not taking this lying down, he returned fire throughout the engagement. For- tunately, though some '1shorts and many 'ioversl' were observed, he was never able to straddle his target. Qc- casional fires 'breaking out on the enemy ship did not seem to affect his ability to maneuver radically at speeds up to 28 knots. At 2043 the 5-inch mounts commenced illumi- nating with star shells, and the SANTA FE closed to almost point-blank range and resumed fire. Four minutes later the target was dead in the water. The range was 41830 yards now, and the majority of each salvo could not fail to hit-she sank at 2056. Although accurate identifica- tion was impossible, observers agreed the target was a cruiser of the OYODO or AGANO class. At 2110 the night fighters reported the nearest target 112 miles north. Since the fuel situation in the destroyers precluded a 30 knot stern chase, ComCruDiv 13 ordered the force to rejoin the carrier groups. After fueling ship the next day, the SANTA FE resumed her old station in Task Group 38.3. She lay off Leyte Gulf in a covering position until 28 October, when she was ordered to proceed to Ulithi. So ended the SANTA PES part in one phase of the greatest sea battle of all time. The Japanese had suffered irreparable losses. Never again would they be able to dispute the American Navy's absolute control of Pacihc Waters. ffap earrier maneuvers violently to escape attacking U. S. Navy planes. Hours later slze lay at bottom of waters east Q' Luzon. Ise Class battleship-earrier, another part of 7ap Northern Force, flees underfull tlzrottlefor hiding place back lzome. l Pride of Hirolzito's Navy, tlze YAMATO, takes hits from 3rd Fleet alive- oonzber as the BB lzeads lzomeward tlzru Tablas Straits. 77

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l 4 1 4 ? afzifeyiee 41 i Y pl nfl 5 .V ik ,fn ik .1 1 I 4 E ii ii 11 1 l ei 1. H 1 ii 5 5 'Ii il 1? ' Q 1 L . V l l 1 . I PT X. ,i L 4. -Qi-A W? First tragic note Q' 2nd Battle lj Philippine S ea occurs when PRINCETON in same Task Group is hit by 7ap bombers on 24 Oct. , L- Tremendous column of smoke visible for many miles rises from stricken carrier as internal explosions follow the enemy hit. Sister-ship BIRMINGHAM pours streams Q' water into PRINCETON before her magazines explode and kill hundreds Q' rescuers. 5. 76 ! I 1 1 J f . 1 l from the northwest. From then on, all Hell broke loose, While some raids were intercepted and broken up by CAP, others continued to close until the radar screen was so cluttered inside the 8 mile circle that visual sighting had to be depended upon. The anti-aircraft battery-5 inch, 40MM and 20MM- fired continuously . . . lookouts strained to distinguish friend from foe . . . the personnel stationed below decks, listening to the Padre's running account of the action, breathed easier when the enemy planes were identified as dive-bombers, not torpedo bombers . . . just after one enemy plane attacked the formation and was driven off by gunfire, another dove at the HEALY from low cloud cover and scored a near miss . . . bogies remained in the area . . . still more raids were reported closing. At 0938 the PRINCETON took a divebomber hit on her hangar deck, forcing her to drop from the formation. With the BIRMINGHAM alongside for rescue operations, the PRINCETON exploded violently, inflicting on the rescuer more terrible casualties than existed on the CVL. While the fury of the attack continued unabated, the ESSEX and LEXINGTON launched search planes. Since most of the laps were carrier based planes approach- ing from the North a still undiscovered Nip force must be descending on the Group. At noon, in the midst of launching and recovering operations, a new series of attacks began - the sky swarmed with planes. Extra fighters were launched and two raids were broken up, but one group got through and into the formation. Simultaneously three divebombers roared in from nowhere and a torpedo bomber made a rung SANTA FE port and starboard batteries opened fire immediately. The formation emergency-turned, zig- zagged, evadedg luckily no hits were scored. At 1637 search planes made contact, reported a Jap carrier force consisting of 4 BB, 4 CV, 6-10 CA and CL, and 11 DD's 190 miles to the northeast. Within an hour Halsey had made a momentous decision-to leave San Bernardino unguarded in order to crush this fresh group. His attack plan called for early morning air strikes from all of TaskFor 38, surface vessels ranging ahead of the carriers were to finish off whatever was not sunk by the planes. It was a good plan, but . . . During that night and next morning everything went according to schedule. The surface attack disposition formed ahead of the carriers and pre-dawn deckloads of Hghters and bombers were launched. The ,laps were only 44 miles away, preliminary reports of the first strike indicated good results over target. The set-up was perfect! But just as annihilation seemed certain, a third Japanese Heet-arCenter Group-was sighted back in San Ber- nardino Straits. The main striking forces of the Third Fleet executed a 180 degree turn to return to San Bernardino and counter this new threat. ComCruDiv 13 in the SANTA FE was given tactical command of a cruiser-destroyer group including the MOBILE, WITCHITA, NEW ORLEANS and 12 .destroyers and was ordered to continue north,

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Desperate plunge Q' another Saki-driver endx fnally, Q' sueeesjulb, on island superstructure M large carrier LEXINGTON. ,W , ..,, .f --1 Aww ' ' 5, E '-N I' almlfv, ii J F u ei afiyf fi Af? lg. , E l Q5 -it Q -5 'Haj B xg, viffri J Q2 Q1 . -1 J affix 23-A! c ii Ll LE if 5.1 il'-tri. rl x ,,'kugv' ,,...a. 1. ka 1, .:.. an... fall. .4...Jx. alrlwa-'f 4'i'w.,,, F ILIPINO FIGHT GAINS MOMENTUM, 7.2 N port hardly 24 hours, the SANTA FE again part Fl of TG 38.3 was underway headed for Manus. How- A ever, the same evening l November, Heet course was changed towards Leyte to counter an expected Jap naval thrust. On 3 November, traveling through heavily mined waters, the Group was attacked by a Jap sub which slipped a fish into the RENO forcing her to withdraw and retire to port. The report of enemy surface units in the vicinity proved false. Consequently air strikes against Luzon were ordered insteadg Jap air power, although well-reduced, was still capable of determined attack against the landing forces at Leyte., On 5 November, TG 38.3,s planes hit Manila, and, at the same time, the Japs sent out their suicide planes which attacked the formation just after noon chow. One crashed on the LEXINGTGN, another near the TICONDEROGA, while a third was shot down. 11 November saw an entire convoy of Jap rein- forcements for Leyte annihilated in the Camotes Sea by one strike from the Task Force. After fueling the next day, sustained strikes were launched at the Manila area the 13th and 14th. A few enemy planes approached the SANTA FE, but only one plane came briefly within range of her 5-inch. Upon completion of the strikes, all ships returned to Ulithi, arriving 17 November. V 3 Five days later, the SANTA FE, replenished and refueled, sortied-with T.G. 38.3 and again set course Carrier ESSEX eatelzes Nip .raieide plane on forward fi ht deek aft f 6 l g 0 num er one e evator yet is-able to maintain pro er station in Ta lc G . W 'thin teen mznutes fre damage ix controlled, and .felzeduled attadkjfiglzts can take of from tick. J mu? Z 1 l .