Santa Fe (CL 60) - Naval Cruise Book

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l 4 1 4 ? afzifeyiee 41 i Y pl nfl 5 .V ik ,fn ik .1 1 I 4 E ii ii 11 1 l ei 1. H 1 ii 5 5 'Ii il 1? ' Q 1 L . V l l 1 . I PT X. ,i L 4. -Qi-A W? First tragic note Q' 2nd Battle lj Philippine S ea occurs when PRINCETON in same Task Group is hit by 7ap bombers on 24 Oct. , L- Tremendous column of smoke visible for many miles rises from stricken carrier as internal explosions follow the enemy hit. Sister-ship BIRMINGHAM pours streams Q' water into PRINCETON before her magazines explode and kill hundreds Q' rescuers. 5. 76 ! I 1 1 J f . 1 l from the northwest. From then on, all Hell broke loose, While some raids were intercepted and broken up by CAP, others continued to close until the radar screen was so cluttered inside the 8 mile circle that visual sighting had to be depended upon. The anti-aircraft battery-5 inch, 40MM and 20MM- fired continuously . . . lookouts strained to distinguish friend from foe . . . the personnel stationed below decks, listening to the Padre's running account of the action, breathed easier when the enemy planes were identified as dive-bombers, not torpedo bombers . . . just after one enemy plane attacked the formation and was driven off by gunfire, another dove at the HEALY from low cloud cover and scored a near miss . . . bogies remained in the area . . . still more raids were reported closing. At 0938 the PRINCETON took a divebomber hit on her hangar deck, forcing her to drop from the formation. With the BIRMINGHAM alongside for rescue operations, the PRINCETON exploded violently, inflicting on the rescuer more terrible casualties than existed on the CVL. While the fury of the attack continued unabated, the ESSEX and LEXINGTON launched search planes. Since most of the laps were carrier based planes approach- ing from the North a still undiscovered Nip force must be descending on the Group. At noon, in the midst of launching and recovering operations, a new series of attacks began - the sky swarmed with planes. Extra fighters were launched and two raids were broken up, but one group got through and into the formation. Simultaneously three divebombers roared in from nowhere and a torpedo bomber made a rung SANTA FE port and starboard batteries opened fire immediately. The formation emergency-turned, zig- zagged, evadedg luckily no hits were scored. At 1637 search planes made contact, reported a Jap carrier force consisting of 4 BB, 4 CV, 6-10 CA and CL, and 11 DD's 190 miles to the northeast. Within an hour Halsey had made a momentous decision-to leave San Bernardino unguarded in order to crush this fresh group. His attack plan called for early morning air strikes from all of TaskFor 38, surface vessels ranging ahead of the carriers were to finish off whatever was not sunk by the planes. It was a good plan, but . . . During that night and next morning everything went according to schedule. The surface attack disposition formed ahead of the carriers and pre-dawn deckloads of Hghters and bombers were launched. The ,laps were only 44 miles away, preliminary reports of the first strike indicated good results over target. The set-up was perfect! But just as annihilation seemed certain, a third Japanese Heet-arCenter Group-was sighted back in San Ber- nardino Straits. The main striking forces of the Third Fleet executed a 180 degree turn to return to San Bernardino and counter this new threat. ComCruDiv 13 in the SANTA FE was given tactical command of a cruiser-destroyer group including the MOBILE, WITCHITA, NEW ORLEANS and 12 .destroyers and was ordered to continue north,

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-NPs i i w 1' ...L I as-.., ll i :tm lltr Here :he . .Ili xr - . X l5t1I-i 'N x .. ..il' llruup 'll .s , of sired. -2 fffflti in to Bl but ,raided T5 Ptmblf BFRRAIQM :fa 33155. but ' :hifi :fe they if ffl calmed 'TU3-' knots. 33475 Were Vfkii. That the LUCKY -IN Eroup, .:.1 TG 30.5 ' at cramped ull' Y C lflifdfll A. tapplej .: DDE and Las pas: and 'ZT.i3Z'-'JUS SANTA FE leads the way our of port, sen zz course into sailing Jun, and lzerzdsfor Pizifippines. Soon ship.: willform regular circular di5porz'tz'on. NIP FLEET CHALLENGES U. S. NAVY IN WAR'S GREATEST SEA BATTLE HE ramifications of the strategy involved in the p various surface engagements, air assaults, offensive 4 tactics and defensive maneuvers of the battles at Surigao Straits, San Bernardino Straits and Cape Engano will provide material for naval histories for the next ten years. However, these few pages can be concerned only with the role played by the SANTA FE in her particularf chapter of the dramatic Second Battle of the Philippines, and cannot contain a description of the clever ambush the Seventh Fleet laid for the Jap Southern Force, nor the heroic tale of self-sacrifice enacted by the badly out- numbered, outgunned CVE and escort group at the mouth of San Bernardino. The seventy-two hours of 23, 24, and 25 October 1944 were the time of the foolhardy attempt by the Japanese Imperial Fleet to destroy U. S. seapower standing off the Leyte invasion beachhead. Throughout the same period the SANTA FE found herself a unit of Sherman's Task Group 38.3, a part of Mitscher's Task Force 38 within Halsey's Third Fleet-itself one of two American Fleets covering thousands of square miles of water east of the Philippines. An attack against 'the Philippine Liberation forces was expected and the enemy surface force sighted heading north 23 October looked like it. The U. S. Fleets im- mediately began laying plans for the next morning, when the Jap would enter striking range. Sleep that night was impossible. At 2345, when the first bogeys began closing, the beeper called all hands to their battle stations. The planes stayed with the formation all night, occasionally they came within Hring range, but usually the snoopers just circled 20 to 25 miles away. At 0610 the next morning, after search patrols had been launched, CIC reported a large raid estimated at 40 planes. A Even as Hellcats were being scrambled from the carriers, still another raid of 30 aircraft was approaching 75

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D catch and sink any cripples. Aircraft from two carrier Task Groups which also stayed behind continued raids on the enemy. At 14115 the light striking group set a course for the nearest Jap ship sighted by carrier planesg at 1605 a surface target was picked up on the radar screen. As the contact was closed, a Jap CVL later identified as the CHITQSE could be seen on the horizon, dead in the water but not burning and only slightly down by the bow. All four cruisers commenced fire when range allowed, and almost immediately the target took hits and started to burn. No planes could be seen on the carrier, but per- sonnel were swarming all over the flight deck, sliding down handlines into the sea and scrambling off the radio an- tenna. Steadily and methodically the 6-inch and 8- inch projectiles mauled the carrier. The target slowly capsized, and finally went under at 1655. YYith the Jap carrier settling into Davey Jones' Locker, the cruisers were free to continue the chase. At 1637 a LANGLEY plane had made the following report: Main enemy group bearing 335, 40-50 miles. Consists of 1BB, 1CA, 3 DD, 10 miles SE of this group 1 CA making 6-8 knots. Also 1 BB, 1 CL 10 miles NE of main group, going like Hell. At 1825 the CAP located 1 CL or CA and 2 DD dead ahead, ten minutes later Combat reported surface contacts at 360, 17 miles-evidently the same ships. Now that the sun was down the men topside could see nothing, but the radar scope showed the three pips milling around and the distance to them rapidly closing. The SANTA FE and MGBILE were directed to take under fire the nearest target, the heavy cruisers the more distant targets. At 1905 the main battery opened fire, and two minutes later the secondary battery joined in. The black night sky was sharply etched by the projectile's telltale red tracers arching their way to the target. A sudden flash followed by a brief fire at the end of the trajectory showed that Plot was getting no change-no change. However, the Jap was not taking this lying down, he returned fire throughout the engagement. For- tunately, though some '1shorts and many 'ioversl' were observed, he was never able to straddle his target. Qc- casional fires 'breaking out on the enemy ship did not seem to affect his ability to maneuver radically at speeds up to 28 knots. At 2043 the 5-inch mounts commenced illumi- nating with star shells, and the SANTA FE closed to almost point-blank range and resumed fire. Four minutes later the target was dead in the water. The range was 41830 yards now, and the majority of each salvo could not fail to hit-she sank at 2056. Although accurate identifica- tion was impossible, observers agreed the target was a cruiser of the OYODO or AGANO class. At 2110 the night fighters reported the nearest target 112 miles north. Since the fuel situation in the destroyers precluded a 30 knot stern chase, ComCruDiv 13 ordered the force to rejoin the carrier groups. After fueling ship the next day, the SANTA FE resumed her old station in Task Group 38.3. She lay off Leyte Gulf in a covering position until 28 October, when she was ordered to proceed to Ulithi. So ended the SANTA PES part in one phase of the greatest sea battle of all time. The Japanese had suffered irreparable losses. Never again would they be able to dispute the American Navy's absolute control of Pacihc Waters. ffap earrier maneuvers violently to escape attacking U. S. Navy planes. Hours later slze lay at bottom of waters east Q' Luzon. Ise Class battleship-earrier, another part of 7ap Northern Force, flees underfull tlzrottlefor hiding place back lzome. l Pride of Hirolzito's Navy, tlze YAMATO, takes hits from 3rd Fleet alive- oonzber as the BB lzeads lzomeward tlzru Tablas Straits. 77