Santa Fe (CL 60) - Naval Cruise Book

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-NPs i i w 1' ...L I as-.., ll i :tm lltr Here :he . .Ili xr - . X l5t1I-i 'N x .. ..il' llruup 'll .s , of sired. -2 fffflti in to Bl but ,raided T5 Ptmblf BFRRAIQM :fa 33155. but ' :hifi :fe they if ffl calmed 'TU3-' knots. 33475 Were Vfkii. That the LUCKY -IN Eroup, .:.1 TG 30.5 ' at cramped ull' Y C lflifdfll A. tapplej .: DDE and Las pas: and 'ZT.i3Z'-'JUS SANTA FE leads the way our of port, sen zz course into sailing Jun, and lzerzdsfor Pizifippines. Soon ship.: willform regular circular di5porz'tz'on. NIP FLEET CHALLENGES U. S. NAVY IN WAR'S GREATEST SEA BATTLE HE ramifications of the strategy involved in the p various surface engagements, air assaults, offensive 4 tactics and defensive maneuvers of the battles at Surigao Straits, San Bernardino Straits and Cape Engano will provide material for naval histories for the next ten years. However, these few pages can be concerned only with the role played by the SANTA FE in her particularf chapter of the dramatic Second Battle of the Philippines, and cannot contain a description of the clever ambush the Seventh Fleet laid for the Jap Southern Force, nor the heroic tale of self-sacrifice enacted by the badly out- numbered, outgunned CVE and escort group at the mouth of San Bernardino. The seventy-two hours of 23, 24, and 25 October 1944 were the time of the foolhardy attempt by the Japanese Imperial Fleet to destroy U. S. seapower standing off the Leyte invasion beachhead. Throughout the same period the SANTA FE found herself a unit of Sherman's Task Group 38.3, a part of Mitscher's Task Force 38 within Halsey's Third Fleet-itself one of two American Fleets covering thousands of square miles of water east of the Philippines. An attack against 'the Philippine Liberation forces was expected and the enemy surface force sighted heading north 23 October looked like it. The U. S. Fleets im- mediately began laying plans for the next morning, when the Jap would enter striking range. Sleep that night was impossible. At 2345, when the first bogeys began closing, the beeper called all hands to their battle stations. The planes stayed with the formation all night, occasionally they came within Hring range, but usually the snoopers just circled 20 to 25 miles away. At 0610 the next morning, after search patrols had been launched, CIC reported a large raid estimated at 40 planes. A Even as Hellcats were being scrambled from the carriers, still another raid of 30 aircraft was approaching 75

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Survivors Q' HO US TON rescued from sea hy destroyers are rapidb' brought ahoard--two to a coal bag--via three stores travelersf' dpproximatebf two hundred men are jinalbf transferred to SANTA' FE from crowded DD's. fi.. I .l , 1 'll ll ll FTER the Jill's attack the SANTA FE took half a ,f'Ll,moment to catch a breath, and then again turned her o' attention to the twice hit HOUSTON. There the smoke had cleared away, revealing the shambles that had been her after main deck. She had an added list to star- board, but Damage Control was effective and the Group was not forced to reduce its already slow towing speed. There were sporadic enemy attempts that afternoon to finish the job on the HOUSTON and CANBERRA, but no more planes leaked through the splendid CAP provided by the CABOT and COWPENS. Sunset that evening saw the last raid of the day. Most of 17 October was spent transferring portable pumps to the HOUSTON, water to the CANBERRA, and fuel to two destroyers. Bogeys were detected again, but friendly Hghters intercepted and destroyed all before they reached the Task Group. During the day the sea calmed and the force was able to make good almost 3.7 knots. Late in the afternoon the HOUSTON survivors were transferred from the SANTA FE to a tanker. That evening, when about 400 miles from Formosa, the LUCKY LADY was detached to rejoin her original task group, 38.3. The five days during which the SANTA FE led' TG 30.3 had been tough. Long hours had been spent at cramped General Quarters stations waiting for and fighting off enemy bombers. There had been the strain of constant guard against submarine attack on the slow, crippled force-plus the additional work of fueling the DD's and caring for 200 extra men. But now all that was past and the ship headed northwest for a Task Force rendezvous on the 18th preparatory to the Philippine Invasion. A fit high speed, destroyer plane guardi' rushes over to disa ' ' ' ppearzng azrcraft to rescue water-log ed crew r t th - ' ' 74 coveted zce cream reward. Such operational accidents causefar m 1 g 1 ' 7 e min em to mower HUP, wmegumtb receive ore personne casua tzes than does actual combat wzth enemy. .4

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l 4 1 4 ? afzifeyiee 41 i Y pl nfl 5 .V ik ,fn ik .1 1 I 4 E ii ii 11 1 l ei 1. H 1 ii 5 5 'Ii il 1? ' Q 1 L . V l l 1 . I PT X. ,i L 4. -Qi-A W? First tragic note Q' 2nd Battle lj Philippine S ea occurs when PRINCETON in same Task Group is hit by 7ap bombers on 24 Oct. , L- Tremendous column of smoke visible for many miles rises from stricken carrier as internal explosions follow the enemy hit. Sister-ship BIRMINGHAM pours streams Q' water into PRINCETON before her magazines explode and kill hundreds Q' rescuers. 5. 76 ! I 1 1 J f . 1 l from the northwest. From then on, all Hell broke loose, While some raids were intercepted and broken up by CAP, others continued to close until the radar screen was so cluttered inside the 8 mile circle that visual sighting had to be depended upon. The anti-aircraft battery-5 inch, 40MM and 20MM- fired continuously . . . lookouts strained to distinguish friend from foe . . . the personnel stationed below decks, listening to the Padre's running account of the action, breathed easier when the enemy planes were identified as dive-bombers, not torpedo bombers . . . just after one enemy plane attacked the formation and was driven off by gunfire, another dove at the HEALY from low cloud cover and scored a near miss . . . bogies remained in the area . . . still more raids were reported closing. At 0938 the PRINCETON took a divebomber hit on her hangar deck, forcing her to drop from the formation. With the BIRMINGHAM alongside for rescue operations, the PRINCETON exploded violently, inflicting on the rescuer more terrible casualties than existed on the CVL. While the fury of the attack continued unabated, the ESSEX and LEXINGTON launched search planes. Since most of the laps were carrier based planes approach- ing from the North a still undiscovered Nip force must be descending on the Group. At noon, in the midst of launching and recovering operations, a new series of attacks began - the sky swarmed with planes. Extra fighters were launched and two raids were broken up, but one group got through and into the formation. Simultaneously three divebombers roared in from nowhere and a torpedo bomber made a rung SANTA FE port and starboard batteries opened fire immediately. The formation emergency-turned, zig- zagged, evadedg luckily no hits were scored. At 1637 search planes made contact, reported a Jap carrier force consisting of 4 BB, 4 CV, 6-10 CA and CL, and 11 DD's 190 miles to the northeast. Within an hour Halsey had made a momentous decision-to leave San Bernardino unguarded in order to crush this fresh group. His attack plan called for early morning air strikes from all of TaskFor 38, surface vessels ranging ahead of the carriers were to finish off whatever was not sunk by the planes. It was a good plan, but . . . During that night and next morning everything went according to schedule. The surface attack disposition formed ahead of the carriers and pre-dawn deckloads of Hghters and bombers were launched. The ,laps were only 44 miles away, preliminary reports of the first strike indicated good results over target. The set-up was perfect! But just as annihilation seemed certain, a third Japanese Heet-arCenter Group-was sighted back in San Ber- nardino Straits. The main striking forces of the Third Fleet executed a 180 degree turn to return to San Bernardino and counter this new threat. ComCruDiv 13 in the SANTA FE was given tactical command of a cruiser-destroyer group including the MOBILE, WITCHITA, NEW ORLEANS and 12 .destroyers and was ordered to continue north,