Philippine Sea (CG 58) - Naval Cruise Book

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dmiral Spruance wanted the fleet to remain close to Saipan, fearing the Japanese might feint to the center, then attempt an end run around the U.S. fleet to get at the Marianas invasion forces. He ordered the fleet to advance westward dur- ing the daylight and retire eastward at night - until information of the enemy requires other action. This tactic would forestall the discovery of the Jap fleet until the second day of bat- tle, too late to enable Task Force 58 to close for deci- sive action. VADM Mitscher on the bridge of the Lexington. he next day's air search gave Mitscher the cor- rect position of the Japan- ese forces, approximately 275 miles away. The range was risky for the U.S. carri- er planes, and their return would require night land- ings on the flight decks. The air groups were launched. Despite resistance from the remnants of the Japanese Carrier Air Force, they sank the enemy carrier, Hiyo and destroyed two-thirds of Ozawa's remaining aircraft. American losses from the action were only twenty planes. ...B Another Japanese plane goes down under the fire of a TF-58 ship. he next day, June 19, Ozawa's carrier planes launched four separate raids, but their approaches were plotted by radar on the U.S. carriers in time for intercepting planes to meet them. What few planes got through to the fleet were destroyed by anti-aircraft fire or driven off. The Japan- ese lost about 515 planes in such a slaughter that the June 19 action became known as 'The Great Mari- anas Turkey Shoot. In the meantime, U.S. submarines sank two Japanese fleet carriers - the Shokaku and Taiho. Admiral Ozawa had 55 fe' wr planes left out of 450. He '-f ' Q,-3-W 1.593 turned his fleet homeward, 'yy' ji fnfyglgfilhjgl beaten in the greatest carrier battle of the war. His failure can be attributed to the inex- M. ' Navy Helldiver The Zuzkaku is surrounded by bomb bursts as she twists and turns to escape the attack. Admiral Jilsaburo Ozawa - - - ' :sv-Ag. U, ' I penance of his Carr 137' Pilots H' LTJG Alex Vraciu happily signals his score for ltheir training hadn't been completed before they were sent into battlel, and his dependence on land-based aircraft, which he'd eaqnected to operate from the Marianas and lruk. Unknown to him, the reinforcements he'd asked for had been diverted at the last moment to hit MacArthur's invasion of Biak. the interception. he battle of the PHILIP- PINE SEQ stirred up much argument among the U.S. naval commanders. Admiral Spruance was charged with being too cautious, not allowing the ships of Task Force 58 to steam westward on the 19th to make contact with the Japanese fleet lsubs had signaled their approxi- mate positionj. If they had, they would have been in position, early on June 20th, for day long strikes at the Japanese, and the toll of ships could have been much greater. 95

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VADM Mitscher hile the Marines were fighting on Saipan Admiral Spruance had a huge naval force drawn up west of the Marianas to ward off expected Japanese was composed of 15 carri ers seven battleships eight heavy cruisers thirteen light cruisers and sixty nine destroyers under the tacti 1 sea strikes. Task Force 58 -ff V cal command of Vice Admi ral Marc Mitscher. he Japanese had hoped to entice the U.S. naval forces into battle farther southwest, in waters within range of their land-based planes, to offset U.S. numerical superiority in carrier aircraft. But once news of the Marianas inva- sion reached Admiral Toyo- da, Commander of the Japanese Combined Fleet, he ordered a rendezvous of his forces in the PHILIPPINE SEA to attack the U.S. Fleet. Sailors on the USS CABOTKCVL-281 watch as a Japanese plane falls in flames. His tactical commander, Admiral Ozawa, had forces inferior to Mitscher's in every category except heavy cruisers - nine carri- ers to Mitscher's fifteen, five battleships to Mitscher's seven, etc. - and the plane disparity was even more striking - in everything but float planes, the U.S. out- numbered Ozawa's forces two to one. owever, once the battle began, Ozawa expected major support from planes based in the Marianas and at Iruk, where reinforcements had been ordered before the action began. And his search planes had a greater range, giving him the chance to spot the enemy's position before his own forces were detect- ed. 92 A Hellcat lands on the Lexington to rearm during the air battle. awa's planes did dis- cover Task Force 58 on June 18, 1944, the day before the battle. Mitscher's task force was drawn up in five circles: four carrier groups approximately four miles in diameter, with perirneters of battleships, cruisers and destroyers to provide screen fre, To the west of the carTi- ers a battle line fcircularj Of six battleships, four cruiserS and a dozen destroyers tO engage enemy strikes, with two picket destroyers furihef west to warn of enemy approach. 4,-A

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