Meyerkord (DE 1058) - Naval Cruise Book

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April 24, 1971 The Houston Perth Memorial Servicio in Sunda Strait ln january, 1942 the japanese had moved southward from the Philippine Islands on a sweep through lndomfslz Opposing them was a combined command of American, British, Dutch, and Australian fABDAj forces headed by FIC Marshal Sir Archibald Wavell. Under Wavell, the U.S. Admiral Thomas C. Hart commanded the combined Naval Forcesia Dutch Lieutenant General the ground forces, and a British air Chief Marshal the air forces. Hart's forces were based onthe north coast of java with Port Darwin, Australia T200 miles away, as the nearest supply and support base. I , The japanese, in the mean time, had two powerful attack groups, the Eastern under Vice Admiral Takahashi and the yi Western under Vice Admiral Ozawa, composed of cruisers, destroyers, and transports The aircraft carriers of Admiral rl ,Z Nagumo's Pearl Harbor Striking Force provided mobile air support. They moved relentlessly in a giant pincer through the C South China Sea towards java. Capture of java would ensure their control of the entire Indonesian Archipelago. d The ABDA Forces attempted to offer resistance to the japanese advances but were steadily and irreversibly weakene and pushed backward in each encounter. By February, 1942 only the combined ABDA Navy remained, headed DY Rea' Admiral Karel Doorman of the Netherlands who, for political reasons, had assumed Admiral Hart's position. This f0fCe consisted ol' the heavy cruisers USS Houston and HMS Exeter, light cruisers HMAS Perth HMN5 De Ruyter and IUVU plus - - - , ' ' four American, three Dutch, and three British destroyers. Doorman had resolved to prevent the japanese Invasion Ofl3Va and l I' t so movet tis ships to counter the japanese Eastern Force. He had, however, no time to issue any battle Plan- Hls problems were compounded by the fact that he had no common allied signal plan and, therefore was forced to translate all of his tactical signals from Dutch to English. Though outnumbered upon contacting the japanese in the java Sea, the extreme ranges between the ships made the battl 1 t d fff l f' 1 . le t s an 0 or tie irst several hours. Eventually, after the range had been closed, luck went against him. Doorman S intentions confused his allies and with no easy means of sending clear signals, the force fell into disarray. The japanese then took the initiative damaging the Allied force severely Doorman parried and countered th d irabl before he . D, an , - M e japanesena rn Y welll down Wllll l1'Sfl21SSl1ID, De Ruyter. When the Battle of the java Sea was over, half Doorman's fleet had been IOS!- J 60 t--- -in s ' as