Manchester (CL 83) - Naval Cruise Book

Page 98 text:

One night near the end of our period in Sasebo, Commander Task Force 95 broke his flag in the Manchester. Rear Admiral Allan E. Smith (at left) carried momentous plans for our future. Meanwhile, UN ground forces in Korea were successfully correcting previous mistakes. Led by General Matthew Ridgeway, the Allies had launched Operation Killer : 1. The front line was no longer ov er-extended and vulnerable as it had been. General Ridge- way was advancing carefully, compactly, and on constant guard against surprise attacks and flank threats. 2. The greatest problem to the UN limited advance was the ability of the Chinese to mass and suddenly threaten our front by pure force of number. The routine never changed: hordes of Chinese from the North would flow down on the coastal highways and railroads, gather into a huge unified body — then strike. If that flow could be interrupted and at intervals demolished, their attack, if attempted at all. would be ineffectual. A naval blockade of the 250-mile east coast transportation system in coordination with air power was assigned to accomplish this vital task of retardation. 3. If, as a result of this plan, Communist forces were kept off balance, the Allies could contain the enemy and Operation Killer ' s final phase — annihilation — could begin. The Manchester, with Admiral Smith embarked, left Sasebo in the early morning of February 21st.

Page 100 text:

DEATH OF A CITY: WONSAN Wonsan was the throat of central Korea ' s transportation system. Highways and railroads from Manchuria that passed through this city branched out along the coast and inland to battle- fronts further south. Air spotters had reported the city area bulging with Chinese Reds, flow- ing through and temporarily billeting in nouses and barracks before continuing their march southward. And there were dangerously large numbers on the way from northern training camps which would be a serious threat to General Ridgeway ' s offensive if permitted to hit our lines in force. It was soon evident that Wonsan must be eliminated. But to effectively bombard Wonsan it would be necessary to extensively maneuver in a harbor full of problems: (1) Observations indicated that at least two of several islands in the area were in enemy hands. Four days before we arrived, the destroyer Ozbourn had received two direct hits from guns believed to be on Sin Do Island. (2) The peninsula of Kalma Gak extended deep into the harbor. On Kalma Gak numerous large-caliber batteries were concealed in caves that dotted the wooded hillsides. I) An estimated 2,000 mines had been planted throughout the harbor area. Some were moored in fields; others floated freely, and could turn up anywhere . . .